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The Large Capacity Missile Carrier, CMX
This report documents a systems engineering and design capstone project undertaken
by students in the Total Ship Systems Engineering program at the Naval Postgraduate School.
The project was under the direction of Prof. C.N. Calvano. (The officer students who
comprised the design team were: CDR J. M. Berner; LCDR J.M. Bradley; LT K. A.
Torsiello, LT D. T. Hooker, LT C. F. Merrill, all USN.)
ABSTRACT
A tentative operational requirement is given to the development team, calling for analysis and
design of a ship (CMX) which acts as the launch platform for large numbers of anti-aircraft
and/or cruise missiles, but which does not carry the sophisticated systems required to
accurately direct those missiles. The envisioned requirement would have the subject ship
serve as a large magazine augmentation for other ships, permitting them to make use of the
CMX's missiles. The intent is to increase a battle group's overall effectiveness by increasing
its firepower, while decreasing its cost by reducing the number of sophisticated and expensive
Aegis control systems.
The report examines four warfare scenarios: land strike; amphibious assault (including theater
ballistic missile defense); an engagement against small surface combatants in littoral waters;
and a blue water AAW engagement. For each, the degree to which the substitution of CMXs
for Aegis ships would improve the effectiveness of a battle group is examined. It is included
that the benefits of the large number of additional missiles provided by the CMX more than
offsets the lost capability of the reduced number of Aegis systems in the battle group. For
each of the first three scenarios, the report concludes that overall battle group effectiveness is
increased. For the blue water AAW engagement, effectiveness is decreased if incoming raids
are of high density, but increased otherwise.
Upon completion of the scenario analysis, a combat system suite and architecture for the CMX
is selected, including a self-defense (but not area defense) capability. Feasibility studies, based
on this "payload" proceed, examining propulsion plant options, features for survivability
enhancement and general naval architectural considerations. A hull geometry; stability,
flooding, structural and weight analysis is provided; ship arrangements are defined; a manning
analysis is presented and a cost analysis provided. Numerous examples of calculations,
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This paper is the final report for the Total Ship System Engineering (TSSE) student design
project for the TSSE class of the summer and fall quarters of 1993. This report represents the
compilation of the work performed for the course sequence TS 4002 and TS 4003 during the
period from July through December 1993 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California. The design products created have been integrated into this design report to provide a
detailed and comprehensive record of the work completed
The goal of the design project was to exercise the ship design process from the
requirements setting phase through the preliminary design, including design analysis. The subject
of the design project was the Large Capacity Missile Carrier, CMX. Although the depth of detail
in some areas of the design process were limited due to time and resource constraints, this project




2. Combat System Definition
3. Feasibility Study
4. Preliminary Design
The chapters of this report contain the results of these design phases and the supporting
information. A documented design history is provided in Appendix X, which outlines the major
design decisions and project milestones associated with the design process. Figure 1-1 provides a
timeline of the evolutions which occurred during the project.
A. TENTATIVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
1. Background Political/Military World View
Below are the World View, US Navy mission and CMX role descriptions as quoted from
the Faculty Board product entitled Background Political/Military World View (Summer 1993).
World View. 2010 Time frame
The Former Soviet Union (FSU) is emerging from a turbulent period that
lasted from about 1990-2005. Some of the great hopes for the emergence of
democracy and open markets in the FSU are beginning to dim. After the initial
breakup of the USSR, there was a period of liberalization. Many economic
reforms were enacted and a social federation of the former republics was
emerging. But more recently, the strong centralizing tendencies of the Russian
past have begun to re-assert themselves The Russian republic is clearly the
premier republic in the federation and is beginning, more and more, to dictate
policy New Russian leaders are dissatisfied with their role in shaping and
participating in the new world order. The world appears to be on the brink of a
new round of the old cold war.
However, in the interim between the old cold war and the new Russian
ascendancy, India and China have emerged as world powers second only to the
United States and the re-emerging Russian federation The world has witnessed
the emergence of former third world countries as significant regional powers.
Regional conflict and small, localized, but persistent, wars have been frequent
Racial and religious hatreds seem to spring up like weeds and show no sign of
abating. The Middle East remains a powder keg, the Balkans have been the scene
of revolving conflicts with the identities of foes and allies frequently changing.
Wars among nations in Africa are almost commonplace.
It appears the world is forming into three "camps." The Russian-led
federation of most of the former Republics appears to be headed for an alliance
with the Moslem Fundamentalist League. The US and a number of Pacific Rim
nations are emerging as a countervailing grand alliance. Western Europe and
China are concerned about the apparent emergence of a new cold war, but seem to
want to assume the roles of neutrals, with Europe willing to assert its military
powers only in containing the continuing Balkan conflicts. China continues to be
largely inward-focused, intent on condoling its own vast population and territory,
while slowly strengthening its military technology.
US Navy Role
Against this world background, the US Navy will continue to require the
ability to:
Operate in a forward deployed mode, far from US shores, for lengthy
periods of time. (The Pacific Ocean, with its vast distances, has
become the primary sphere ofNavy concern and the scene of most
Navy operations. The new US-Russian confrontation seems to have a
Pacific axis, rather than the European one of the old cold war.)
Project power ashore via tactical air power and cruise missiles.
Conduct opposed amphibious assaults.
Defeat a re-emerging Russian (ex-Soviet) Navy at sea
Protect US interests and US nationals worldwide.
After passing through a period when the US had no credible blue-water
competitors, the world is changing again. The recently increased USN capabilities
for littoral, third world, operations will continue to be needed But much of the
lost open ocean superiority must be re-asserted. The Navy is responding with a
number of ship, submarine and weapons programs. One of those under
consideration is a "Large Capacity Missile Carrier", tentatively designated the
CMX (Carrier, Missile, X) The CNO has recently issued the tentative
requirements document for such a ship.
2. Large Capacity Missile Carrier (CMX) 2010
The following is quoted from the Faculty Board product entitled Large Capacity Missile
Carrier, CNO Tentative Operational Requirement (Summer/Fall 1993).
With the drawdown of naval combatants, the number of surface
combatants available for use in task groups will be decreasing. This means fewer
task groups deployed at one time or a decrease in capability of those task groups
that are deployed. An alternative is to increase the magazine capacity available to
the task group without increasing the number of surface combatants. Increasing
the magazine capacity on existing surface combatants is not a viable option.
However, providing a low cost ship which can act as a magazine for the available
surface combatants may be. What is envisioned is a "missile carrier" that acts as a
launch platform for a large number of anti-aircraft and/or cruise missiles but does
not cany the sophisticated (and costly) detection and control elements needed to
employ all these weapons itself For SM-2 missiles used in their normal task group
AAW role, the Off-board Controlled Casualty Launch System planned for DDG
51 Flight III ships allows AEGIS ships to utilize an off-board launcher. A similar
approach could handle SM-2 Block 4A missiles used for tactical ballistic missile
defense. For other missiles — Tomahawk, Harpoon, ASROC — the "missile
carrier" would carry the necessary fire control and navigation equipment but would
depend on off-board assets (other tactical units or National assets) for target
detection and localization. The number of missiles carried should be determined
on the basis of incremental ship cost and the configuration needs of future task
groups.
Whenever a threat may exist, the "missile carrier" would sail as part of a
task group or would be escorted by a surface combatant. Hence its self-defense
capabilities would be limited to dealing with air and underwater threats (torpedoes)
which get past the surface combatant(s), small craft which the surface
combatant(s) may be too busy to attack, and mine avoidance. Provisions for an
onboard helo should be limited to a single gun ship and that, only if the associated
cost is low. This implies that: (a) its point defense AAW systems would not
include SM-2 missiles, (b) Its air surveillance capability need be no more than that
required by the installed point defense AAW capability, (c) its surface surveillance
and ASUW capability would be limited to the horizon and (d) its ASW capability
would be limited to torpedo countermeasures
The ship's speed and endurance should be as required to maintain PIM with
carrier and amphibious task groups It should be capable of extended forward
deployment and operation in areas of regional conflicts.
B. SCENARIO STUDY
Several different scenarios for which a "missile carrier", or CMX, could be employed,
were developed from those quoted in the TOR:
Blue water engagement against a resurgent Russian Empire and Moslem Allies
Small combatant engagement
Support of amphibious landing
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)
The Design Team developed four scenarios to analyze the efficacy of a CMX design.
These were closely related to those provided by the faculty but reoriented to enable analysis of
specific mission tasks The four scenarios were:
Land Strike
Amphibious Assault (including TBMD)
Blue Water Engagement
Small Combatant Engagement
Each of the four scenarios is described in the following sections. To develop them,
"standard" ship battlegroup configurations were defined for both present (1995) and future (2010)
time frames. These configurations are as shown in the following table:























As each scenario was developed, the effect of adding one or more CMX or replacing
platforms with a CMX was evaluated. At this point in the design, the CMX was little more than a
collection of VLS cells grouped together at one point. No estimates were made of the
displacement, speed, propulsion plant or auxiliaries. The combat system was not defined, except
to say that it did not have SPY1 or a successor radar and that the ship can receive offboard
commands to control the missiles it carries. This stage had two goals The first was to determine
if there were any credible scenarios that would show a benefit to having a CMX, and the second,
to lay some ground work for determining the size of the CMX
1. Land Strike Mission
Long range cruise missiles launched from ships and submarines against land targets are the
high technology weapon of choice in the "new world order" for situations ranging from sanction
enforcement to conventional warfare During the 1991 Persian Gulf war, 288 Tomahawk cruise
missiles were launched from US Navy ships against fixed targets in Iraq In January 1993,
another 45 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired at suspected Iraqi nuclear facilities, and, in June
1993, 23 more were fired from a US Navy cruiser in the Persian Gulf and a US Navy destroyer in
the Red Sea, at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters near Baghdad These recent events underscore
the value of the sea-launched cruise missile, in low intensity, littoral conflicts
Cruise missiles launched from warships act to complement carrier-based and land-based
tactical air power. Employed as a first strike weapon, cruise missiles can be effective in clearing
enemy AAW defenses and disrupting enemy command, control, and communications in
preparation for conventional tactical air raids In areas remote from land based air assets,
employment of tactical air power requires the presence of an aircraft carrier. However,
employing ship launched cruise missiles for such missions allows aircraft carriers to operate on
longer tethers from the world's hot spots and other areas of strategic interest. Moreover, cruise
missile attacks add political flexibility in the use of such force since pilot casualties can be
reduced.
The ability to support the high operating tempo of numerous carrier battle groups has been
somewhat improved due to the versatility of surface action groups which now have a limited
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strike capability. Thus, US surface combatants which are capable of launching cruise missile
attacks have assumed a conventional deterrence role.
One obstacle to the employment of strike capable Surface Action Groups (SAG), referred
to as Surface Strike Groups (SSG), is the limited number of cruise missiles carried by current
cruisers and destroyers. AEGIS cruisers (CG 52 and newer classes), can carry a total of 122
anti-air, anti-ship, or land attack cruise missiles. DD 963 class ships fitted with vertical launch
systems (VLS) can carry a total of 61 missiles, and DDG 51 class ships can carry a total of 90
missiles However, because these vessels must also carry self-defense assets, there is obvious
competition for VLS cell space among SM-2 AAW missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and other
planned weapons such as vertically launched ASROC and Sea Sparrow close-in AAW missiles.
Tomahawk capable attack submarines (SSN) can also support the land attack mission.
However, the long range cruise missile land attack is an adjunct to the primary missions of the
SSN Since the SSN is a relatively expensive cruise missile launch platform, and the SSN force
levels will probably continue to decrease in the near future, land attack from SSNs will probably
continue to be a secondary mission.
The January and June (1993) cruise missile attacks on Iraq would have severely depleted
the strike capability of any current two ship SSG. Because of this limitation, it might be necessary
to locate a carrier battle group near the SSG operating area if further hostilities are expected
However, with continued downsizing in both fleet units and personnel, adding ships to the SSG
composition is not desired, and it will become more difficult to quickly position carrier battle
groups since there will be fewer of them operating. Clearly, increased missile magazine capacity
is required for the future SSGs.
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a. Assumptions
Vertical launch systems can fire SM-2 AAW missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and
planned versions of ASROC, Sea Sparrow and Harpoon missiles A probable missile loadout for
current VLS equipped ships is shown in Table 2.2.













CG52+ 74 8 40 122
DDG51 54 8 28 90
DD963 8 45 61
Given this loadout, a two ship SSG would possess the following land attack strike
capability:




2 DD 963 90
1 CG52+and 1 DDG51 68
1 DDG51 and 1 DD 963 73
1 CG 52+ and 1 DD 963 85
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A standard CMX missile loadout was postulated as having 50% Tomahawk cruise
missiles, 40 to 50% SM-2 AAW missiles, with the remainder possibly being an improved
self-defense AAW missiles. The possible missile loadouts for the various proposed versions of
CMX ships include the following table:














v3 3 73 92 72
v4 4 104 122 72
v5 5 135 152 72
v6 6 165 183 72
v7 7 195 214 72
v8 8 226 244 72
Based on these CMX configurations, future SSGs will likely be made of one AEGIS ship
and at least one CMX. This combination gives the SSG a total land attack cruise missile loadout
within the range shown in the following table:
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SSG Combination Tomahawk Cruise Missiles
DDG plus CMX v3 120
CG plus CMX v3 132
DDG plus CMX v4 150
CG plus CMX v4 162
DDG plus CMX v5 180
CG plus CMX v5 192
DDG plus CMX v6 211
CG plus CMX v6 223
DDG plus CMX v7 242
CG plus CMX v7 254
DDG plus CMX v8 272
CG plus CMX v8 284
b. Scenario
United Nations weapon inspectors have become increasingly frustrated with the lack in
progress in their monitoring of suspected Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons plants. Stalled
inspections, outright confrontation with inspectors and news media
,
and painfully slow United
Nations negotiations have precluded the inspection of five sites which are alleged to be part of an
accelerated Iraqi program to build nuclear warheads for use on an improved, longer range SCUD
missile. US national asset intelligence sources have indicated possible shipments of warhead
grade uranium and plutonium from China to Iraq. Saddam Hussein has scheduled an international
press conference to be held in 48 hours Reports, apparently leaked from the US Central
Intelligence Agency and National Security Council staffers, have made headlines in both the
Washington Post and New York Times: "Nuclear Armed Saddam Prepares Ultimatum".
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In recent months, given higher than anticipated budget deficits and the stalled national
economy, the beleaguered US president had ordered his Defense Secretary to cut an
unprecedented $10 billion dollars from the current fiscal year defense budget. The result of this
drastic funding cut leaves the US Navy with only ten carrier battle groups (CVBG). Previous
fiscal year cuts have begun to impact maintenance schedules and operating tempo. Readiness
reports have become bad news. Two CVBGs are currently deployed: one to the western
Mediterranean Sea and one to the western Pacific Ocean. The Mediterranean CVBG stands ready
to surge into the Atlantic Ocean to support UN peacekeeping troops in Nigeria. The WestPac
CVBG is in the Sea of Japan, flexing muscle in support of talks with North Korea concerning
nuclear non-proliferation. A two ship surface strike group (SSG) is stationed in the Persian Gulf
and Straits of Hormuz.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has proposed a Tomahawk cruise missile
attack from the Persian Gulf SSG. The CVBGs are out of range to respond within the required
time frame. Tactical air strikes by US Air Force (USAF) bombers have been "shot down" by the
European Community via NATO: Denial of landing and fueling flights in support of bombers and
denial of air space overflight (France) effectively vetoed the USAF option.
The SSG plan is based on a swift, surprise, stealthy strike against the five suspected
nuclear weapons sites in Iraq. The plan calls for twelve Tomahawk cruise missiles to be targeted
against each of the five nuclear weapons sites, for a total of sixty cruise missiles. These missiles
are to be launched in a first strike within the next twenty four hours. Based on current
intelligence reports, the proposed strike should encounter limited AAW fire in the vicinity of the
suspected nuclear plants. The magnitude of this first strike is based on this limited AAW
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capability and provides for sufficient firepower to quickly neutralize nuclear weapons production
National assets have been redirected and programmed to provide bomb damage assessment
(BDA) within four hours of the planned first strike. Additional strikes will be performed as
necessary to assure destruction of any potential nuclear weapons.
The timeline for this hypothetical scenario unfolds as follows, where T=0 is the time
scheduled for the expected apocalyptic Iraqi press conference, and times are shown in minus
hours from that event:
T-48 Iraqi spokesman schedules international press conference for T=0.
T-40 President meets with NSC to approve JCS attack plan
T-36 US Navy SSG launches Tomahawk attack per JCS plan against suspected Iraqi
nuclear facilities, 60 missiles fired
T-32 US satellite BDA reveals 3 of 5 Iraqi nuclear sites destroyed.
T-3 1 Additional BDA reveals intense activity at four semi-mobile SCUD launch sites,
each within a twenty mile radius of the partially damaged nuclear weapons plant
sites
T-29 Updated Tomahawk missile terrain maps transmitted to Persian Gulf SSG
T-27 Second Tomahawk strike consisting of 40 missiles launched as follows: 4 each
against the two remaining, partially damaged nuclear weapons plants, 8 each
against the semi-mobile SCUD launcher sites.
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T-23 Satellite BDA confirms destruction of all weapons plants; two semi-mobile Scud
launch sites appear to remain functional, four SAM sites in vicinity of the two
remaining SCUD launch sites show major activity.
T-2 1 New Tomahawk terrain map data transmitted to Persian Gulf SSG.
T-20 CNN transmits impromptu new conference with Saddam He announces that in
response to US aggression against Iraqi sovereignty, a Holy War of revenge will
be launched against Israel and the West.
T-19 Third Tomahawk attack launched against two SCUD launch sites and four
surrounding SAM sites Attack methodology: Initial strike of 24 cruise missiles
against the SAM sites (6 missiles each) Second wave strike of 16 Tomahawk
cruise missiles against two remaining SCUD launch sites.
T-15 Satellite BDA confirms destruction of all nuclear weapons plants and semi-mobile
SCUD launcher sites.
T-0 Iraqi Foreign Minister, announces that Iraq will comply with UN resolutions
concerning nuclear weapons.
Scenario Missile Summary: 140 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired at 13 Iraqi fixed targets.
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c. Evaluation
The table below shows the various SSGs and the remaining missile balance after
completion of the Iraqi strike scenario. Without carrier based tactical air power, current two-ship
SSGs (the first three entries in the table) do not carry sufficient cruise missiles to successfully
execute small-scale land attack against modern adversaries such as Iraq in the above scenario.
The Iraqi scenario is presented as a plausible land strike mission which naval forces might need to
execute in preserving the new world order
Table 2-4. Land Strike Scenario
Ship Composition of
Surface Strike Group (SSG)
Tomahawk missiles available
after Iraqi Land Strike
Scenario
2DDG51 -84
2 CG 52+ -60
2 DD 963 -50
1 DDG51 and 1 DD 963 -67
1 CG52+and 1 DDG51 -64
1 CG 52+ and 1 DD 963 -55
DDG plus CMX v3 -20
CG plus CMX v3 -8
DDG plus CMX v4 10
CG plus CMX v4 22
DDG plus CMX v5 40
CG plus CMX v5 52
DDG plus CMX v6 71
CG plus CMX v6 83
DDG plus CMX v7 102
CG plus CMX v7 114
DDG plus CMX v8 136
CG plus CMX v8 148
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An incomplete conventional attack would probably result in increased tension levels which
could actually accelerate the commencement of hostilities by a would-be aggressor. In the Iraqi
strike scenario above, a limited nuclear strike could have been launched by Iraq against Israel at
time T-16 hours from the two remaining semi-mobile SCUD launch sites. Such a nuclear attack
would probably, at the very least, result in an expansion of the conflict beyond the local region.
Thus, the US needs to maintain the military force necessary to pre-empt such nuclear attacks.
Conventional weapons such as ship launched cruise missiles appear to offer an effective means to
swiftly disarm any would-be international nuclear aggressor. However, these weapons must be
employed in sufficient quantity and in repeated strikes until bomb damage assessment verifies total
destruction of the enemy's capital forces The proposed CMX class has the potential to provide
the necessary quantity of ordnance on target.
For the land attack mission, a new CMX ship class along the line of variants v5 through v8
appears to present a reasonable and necessary capability for naval surface strike groups. These
CMX variants allow for SSG compositions which can execute the Iraqi strike scenario and still
have margin for unexpected additional strike or AAW requirements. The larger CMX ships with
more VLS modules are obviously more capable than the smaller versions, but two factors may
limit the size of the CMX: higher ship procurement cost, and, increased vulnerability for other
engagement scenarios (such as a high intensity blue water battle) as the ship size is increased due
to more VLS installations Later studies investigate the tradeoffs for the upper limit size for the
CMX
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This scenario did not consider the addition of the CMX to a current surface strike group.
The CMX is proposed as a lower cost alternative to future AEGIS platforms with relatively
expensive sensors, computers, and crews. Also, the scenario for long-term, but
very-low-engagement-rate, littoral water, land strike operations was not investigated, but the
results are expected to confirm that for these land strike scenarios, surface strike groups are not
limited by the number of sensors, but rather by the number of missiles in the strike group's
magazines. Finally, while certain sizes (i.e., missile capacities) of the CMX ship may appear to be
optimum for the land strike mission, there will be tradeoffs when other scenarios are considered
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2. Amphibious Assault
The tactical employment ofUS Navy surface combatants and submarines in the role of
Land Strike is also essential in an Amphibious Assault. The functions of cruisers and destroyers
i
in providing gun fire support (NGFS) and defense of the Amphibious Operation Area (AOA) can
be expanded through the use of land attack, anti-air and anti-ship cruise missiles.
As in the land strike mission, cruise missiles can complement the air attack and reduce
losses of aircraft and personnel. The extended range of the cruise missiles would allow the
Amphibious Task Force (ATF) to launch the first strike at a greater distance from the beach,
reducing the opportunity for enemy retaliation. Once secured, control of a larger AOA (inland,
seaward and the surrounding airspace), can be accomplished. However, the limited cruise missile
loadout capacity of cruisers and destroyers limits the viability of an expanded mission such as an
amphibious assault. Employment of the C1VLX would provide additional cruise missile capacity,
which would significantly reduce this limitation.
This scenario provides an analysis of the mission capabilities of the ATF in its present
conventional configuration and the effects on its capabilities of the employment of the CMX to
augment the ATF, or to reduce the number of cruisers/destroyers required to accomplish its
mission.
In addition, the ATF will also have to defend itself from tactical ballistic missiles launched
in response to the amphibious landings. Third world countries presently have and will continue to
acquire these types of weapons.
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a. Assumptions
A standard probable missile loadout for the current VLS ships to be used in an ATF battle















DDG51 54 8 28 90
CG52+ 74 8 40 122
The US Naval ATF, configured for a third world amphibious landing operation is assumed
to consist of the following units 1 :








1 . Configurations incorporate employment of the LX class ship in future ATFs along with the
CMX
Considering only the missile capabilities of the DDG 51 and CG 52+ ships, the ATF would








1 CG 52+ and 2 DDG 51 182 96
Proposed VLS missile loadout for an amphibious assault may consist of 50% Tomahawk
cruise missiles and 40% SM-2 AAW missiles with the remaining 10% Sea Sparrow (or future
variant point defense weapons not to exceed 18 cells for larger CMX variants). It is also
postulated that a Naval variant of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), configured for
vertical launch, may be available by 2010, and would be employed similarly to the Tomahawk












v3 3 73 92 72
v4 4 104 122 72
v5 5 135 152 72
v6 6 165 183 72
v7 7 195 214 72
v8 8 226 244 72
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Future ATFs are assumed to employ one AEGIS ship and at least one CMX, giving the







DDGplus CMXv3 127 120
CGplus CMXv3 147 132
DDGplus CMXv4 158 150
CGplus CMXv4 178 162
DDG plus CMX v5 189 180
CGplus CMXv5 209 192
DDG plus CMX v6 219 211
CG plus CMX v6 239 223
DDG plus CMX v7 249 242
CG plus CMX v7 269 254
DDG plus CMX v8 280 276
CG plus CMX v8 300 288
Also, for this scenario, it was assumed that the SM-2 of the future would provide a
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD), with capabilities similar to that of the Patriot Missile.
The envelope of engagement for this SM-2 is an altitude up to 100,000 feet and a range out to 20
nautical miles.
The objectives of the ATF are to establish the AOA by securing:
A 25 square mile land area (5 mile along beach front, 5 mile penetration into
surrounding areas).
The area seaward extending 25 nautical miles.
An airspace within 50 mile radius of the beachfront.
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Land approximately 2400 troops and support equipment on the beach front.






The following threats may be encountered during the development of the scenario:
Sea (patrol boats, anti-ship missiles)
Air (patrol or attack aircraft, anti-ship missiles)
Land based (guns, anti-ship missiles, ballistic missiles)
b. Scenario
The scenario for the Amphibious Assault was developed as follows:
(1) The ATF approach to the AOA vicinity was unopposed until first offensive
strike.
(2) The ATF initiated the first land strike on twenty land based targets. The land
strike began with Tomahawk cruise missiles or ATACMS launched at a range of
50 nautical miles from the beach Ten cruise missiles were used against each land
based target. As the land strike continued, the ATF units closed the beach front
area and secured the seaward areas to establish the AOA.
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(3) Upon commencing the land strike, the ATF defended against sea and air threats
SM-2 missiles and ships' point defense systems were employed against incoming
patrol aircraft and anti-ship missiles launched from the aircraft. Ten patrol
aircraft attacked the ATF, each launching two anti-ship missiles at different units
in the ATF (totaling twenty anti-ship missiles). Two AAW missiles were
expended in destroying each patrol aircraft and anti-ship missile. As the ATF
units closed within 25 miles of the beach, anti-ship missiles launched from patrol
boats were defeated Five patrol craft, firing two missiles each, were
encountered (totaling ten anti-ship missiles) Two more SM-2s were expended
for each patrol boat and anti-ship missile.
(4) Upon securing the AOA, the ATF defended against land based ballistic missiles.
Once the ATF units had closed the beach front areas, troops and equipment were
moved ashore and the remaining areas of the AOA were secured. Land based
ballistic missiles were then launched at the beach front and seaward areas of the
AOA. Thirty missiles were fired at units in the ATF, from a range of up to 500
miles. In response, two SM-2s were employed against each ballistic missile in
defense.
(5) Over the following two weeks, repeated enemy attempts to regain control over
portions of the of the AOA were made using aircraft, patrol boats and ballistic
missiles. Ten patrol aircraft, five patrol boats and twenty ballistic missiles were
encountered. In addition, ten new land targets were uncovered by intelligence.
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SM-2 and Tomahawk missiles were used in similar proportions similar to that
described above.
c. Evaluation
As shown in the table below, current ATF configurations do not carry a sufficient loadout
to support the amphibious assault scenario developed Tactical employment of the CMX in these
configurations improves the capability of the ATF.







1 CG52+and2DDG51 -98 -204
DDG plus CMX v3 -153 -180
CG plus CMX v3 -133 -168
DDG plus CMX v4 -122 -150
CG plus CMX v4 -102 -138
DDG plus CMX v5 -91 -120
CG plus CMX v5 -71 -108
DDG plus CMX v6 -61 -89
CG plus CMX v6 -41 -77
DDG plus CMX v7 -31 -58
CG plus CMX v7 -11 -46
DDG plus CMX v8 -24
CG plus CMX v8 21 -12
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Based on the above table, the future ATF would require a CMX larger than variant v8, or
at least two v6 variants, to have a sufficient number of missiles available to support this
engagement.
3. Blue Water Engagement
With the resurgence of Russia as a hostile power, the possibility that the US Navy will be
faced with blue water engagements arises. With a smaller base force, the availability of smaller
escorts will be severely diminished. Additionally, the number of cruisers will also be significantly
reduced, due to the retirement of all classes except AEGIS. Thus the total number of platforms,
missiles and directors will be much smaller than today, and the possibility exists that a task group
could exhaust its missile supply. The reduction of available missiles plus the development of the
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) introduces the possibility that in certain scenarios, the
deployment of an inexpensive missile carrier could help to make up for the reduced availability of
other platforms One of these scenarios is a blue water engagement.
a. Assumptions
Commercial software for a naval battle simulation computer game, entitled Harpoon™,
manufactured by Three Sixty, Inc., was used to analyzed the blue water scenario. Some of the
assumptions for this scenario, such as ship types and weapons employed, were taken from the
information provided by the software documentation and instruction books, and are part of the
simulation program.
The blue water scenario postulated that a US Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) had been
deployed to oppose a Russian Republic Navy (RRN) SAG The US CVBG was within range of
27
land-based RRN strike aircraft and the US force had been detected by RRN forces. RRN forces
had identified the CVN and had launched an attack, intending to concentrate on taking the aircraft
carrier out of action.
The primary US force objectives were to engage an RRN amphibious force that
threatened Iceland and to control the battlespace around the CVBG. The RRN had mustered the
following forces to screen the amphibious assault with the primary ASUW weapons as shown:
:
Platform Number ASUW Missile Range
(nm)
Number PK
Kirov 1 Shipwreck 250 20 0.8
Slava 2 Sandbox 300 16 0.8
Sovremennyy 2 Sunburn 65 8 0.8
Udaloy 3 NA NA NA NA
Krivak 3 NA NA NA NA
Sierra 1 NA NA NA NA
Oscar 1 Shipwreck 250 24 0.8
Backfire 24 Kitchen 250 72 0.7
Badger 24 Kitchen 250 48 0.7
For the future war (2010) the following CVBG was deployed: one CVN, two AEGIS
VLS cruisers and two DDG 51s. For the present day CVBG the following ships were selected:
one CVN, two AEGIS VLS cruisers, three DDG 5 1 s and one Kidd class DDG. The number of
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) missiles for each platform were estimated The missiles brought to the
battle by the air wing were tallied separately. Each of the six CMX variants were also listed. An
Evolved Sea Sparrow system was assumed to have been developed. This system will be
discussed later in this study. The parameters for missile ranges and probability of kill (Pk) were
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drawn from open sources The naval combat simulator Harpoon™ was used to model the present
day battlegroup response to the Russian missile attacks. The scenario was then evaluated with
several different configurations ofCMX The number of Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles were held
constant as the CMX size was scaled The number of SM-2s was allowed to vary with size.
Platform AAW Missile Range (nm) Number PK
Nimitz NATO Sea Sparrow 10 24 0.6
Ticonderoga
VLS
SM-2 Block II 50 74 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 32 0.75
DDG51 II
A
SM-2 Block IV 60 54 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 32 0.75
F-14D
AIM-54 Phoenix 110 2 0.55
AIM-7M Sparrow 24 4 0.55
AIM-9R Sidewinder 10 2 0.75
F/A-18 AIM-7M Sparrow 24 4 0.55
AIM-9R Sidewinder 10 4 0.75
CMXv3
SM-2 Block IV 60 73 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv4
SM-2 Block IV 60 104 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv5
SM-2 Block IV 60 133 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv6
SM-2 Block IV 60 165 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv7
SM-2 Block IV 60 195 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv8
SM-2 Block IV 60 226 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
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The missiles available to the Battlegroup had been classified as long or medium range.
Short range (e.g. Stinger missiles) had not been evaluated. Long range was defined as greater
than 15 miles, medium range was defined as greater than 2 miles but shorter than 15 miles. The
following table summarizes the long and medium range missiles available to the Battlegroup at full
load.





Nimitz 1 - 24




F-14 24 48 144
F/A-18 24 - 192
CMXv3 2 146 144
CMXv4 2 208 144
CMXv5 2 270 144
CMXv6 2 330 144
CMXv7 2 390 144
CMXv8 2 452 144
The complete weapons suite modeled for each ship is detailed in Appendix A.
b. Scenario
Over the past several years, fishing in the North Atlantic around Iceland has been severely
depressed. Icelandic fishing vessels have journeyed far and wide to sustain their fishing industry
Northern waters have been fairly fruitful, but have led to conflicts with Russian authorities.
Several Icelandic vessels have been seized by the Russian Republic Navy. Three weeks ago, four
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vessel were seized near Russian territorial waters In retaliation, Denmark closed the Skagerrak
to all Russian flag shipping Twelve days ago, a RRN Krivak attempted to send a boarding party
aboard a fishing vessel that was clearly in international waters. The crewmen responded with
small arms fire, killing several of the boarding party. A nearby Norwegian destroyer and the
Krivak then traded gunfire Both vessels were damaged severely but returned to port. US
national assets have detected large numbers ofRRN vessels under way. The Russians have
informed NATO of a "scheduled" naval exercise in the vicinity of Jan Mayen Island. They have
also insisted that Iceland pay reparations for the damaged frigate. A Russian amphibious task
force was reported underway by Norwegian patrol boats, shortly before contact was lost with
them.
The United States has had declining relations with the Russian Republic The Russian
Ruler, Alexander Chekhov, has endeavored to restore the Russian empire. Over the past several
years Russia has forcibly returned several Republics to the empire, while most of the world has
stood idly by. Following the detection of Russian preparation of an amphibious force, a CVBG
was deployed to Norwegian waters Three days ago, Russian aircraft overflew the CVBG. Over
the past several days, the Russians have made preparations to attack the CVBG.
Over the past several hours many feints have been made to force the US BG Commander
to deploy fighters. Missile attacks will be launched from the RRN SAG as detailed above, an
Oscar SSGN, and land based aircraft. The missile launches from the SAG and Oscar will be
coordinated to arrive as simultaneously as possible.
The naval combat simulator, Harpoon™, was used to measure the effectiveness of the
present day battlegroup. In the simulation, the RRN SAG was located approximately 225 miles
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north of, and the Oscar was located approximately 100 miles to the south of the US CVBG. The
airstrike was comprised of successive waves of land based aircraft, all attacking from the east.
The US CVBG had launched all available Combat Air Patrol (CAP), but took no offensive action
until the first Red unit was detected. Since the simulation did not allow the prepositioning of
aircraft at game start, there was a forced delay in accomplishing the airstrike. The artificial
intelligence, simulating the Blue force, launched attacks against the RED forces as soon as they
were detected. This further required separating surface and submarine attacks from the air strike.
The scenario was refined until a strike size was determined that sank the carrier approximately
25% of the time.
A numerical study was then conducted to evaluate the performance of the battlegroup
with CMX attached and with the CMX as a replacement for one or more DDGs.
c. Evaluation
Using Harpoon™, the US CVBG described above was shown to be capable of defending
itself from an initial attack of 24 Surface to Surface (a mixture of Shipwreck and Sunburn)
missiles from the SAG and 20 Shipwreck missiles launched from the Oscar, followed
approximately one hour later by three waves of missiles from land based aircraft consisting of a
wave of 24 AS-6 Kitchen missiles in high altitude flight, a wave of 72 AS-6 Kitchen missiles in
high altitude flight and a final wave of 48 AS-6 Kitchen missiles in sea skimming mode for a total
of 188 missiles.
Once it was determined that the CVN had survived the encounter a numerical study was
performed. Since the data required to conduct a numerical analysis of the Harpoon™ simulations
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was not available, the Design Team developed a set of threat weapon models (see Appendix B).
In addition, the following assumptions were made:
(1) Threat missiles are co-located;
(2) AEGIS platforms can launch a missile every second,
(3) A 0. 1 second time delay exists between missile end of flight and the associated
illuminator slewing to the next missile;
(4) AEGIS platforms can have 16 missiles in flight at one time,
(5) Minimum SM-2 effective range is 4 miles;
(6) SM-2 has a PK of 0.7 versus the threat missile anywhere within the SM-2's
engagement envelope,
(7) Two SM-2s are fired at each incoming missile,
(8) Friendly air assets were not modeled
The table below summarizes the performance of a single AEGIS platform in a high threat













178 32 2.88 64
Seagull
(Sea Skimmer)
15 29 2.61 58
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Also calculated was the expected SM-2 inventory for the nominal battlegroup with one
CMX of each variant type added It was assumed that one quarter of all SM-2s expended came
from the CMX, except for the case with CMX v3, where the CMX runs out before the end of the













Nominal-CVN, 2 CG, 3
DDG51, 1 DDG993
66 66 -
Nominal with CMX v3 159 159 -21
Nominal with CMX v4 190 180 10
Nominal with CMX v5 221 180 41
Nominal with CMX v6 251 180 71
Nominal with CMX v7 281 180 101
Nominal with CMX v8 312 180 132
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The condition where two CMXs replace one of the DDGs and one of the CGs was also
studied. This condition reaches saturation more rapidly due the reduction in the number of target
illuminators. As this battlegroup was not capable of being modeled in Harpoon™, only a
numerical study was performed. In this scenario, it was assumed that fifty percent of the SM-2s
expended were launched from the two CMXs, except for CMX v3 case, in which the two CMXs
ran out of missiles The following table summarizes the missile inventories following the same












1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv3
-42
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv4
62 40 20
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv5
124 40 82
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv6
184 42 142
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv7
244 42 202
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv8
306 42 264
These results showed that the number of missiles remaining on the CG and DDGs became
almost constant. This indicated a need for a higher proportion of the total missiles assigned to
originate from the CMX. It was initially assumed that twenty-five percent of the missiles assigned
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would originate from the CMX, however, this greatly reduced the missiles remaining in the more
capable combatants.
Further studies were conducted for the case in which the CMX carried sixty percent of the
missile assignments, however this would require a higher firing rate from the CMX. The
assumption was then made that it would be possible to build a missile that would have the
capability (engagement range and speed) to be employed in this fashion. The results of this study
are provided in the following table;












1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv3
-80
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv4
62 62 -18
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv5
124 70 50
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv6
184 80 104
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv7
244 80 164
1 CVN, 1 CG,
2DDG51,2CMXv8
306 80 226
As shown, the revised missile assignment rate results in a more rational missile distribution
following the engagement.
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The following conclusions were drawn from the above analysis:
The task force with an additional CMX had significant missiles remaining onboard the
major combatants, at the end of the engagement,
When the engagement was not illuminator (saturation) limited, the task force could
function adequately with two CMX v5 (or larger) hulls replacing a CG or DDG;
The AAW coverage remained satisfactory until the number ofAEGIS platforms
dropped below four, assuming no other mission requirements for those vessels;
The saturation limited scenario did not improve with the replacement of an AEGIS
platform by a CMX, the number of missiles that could be engaged simultaneously, was
reduced;
It would probably be desirable to have the CMX expend its missiles first, thus leaving
the major combatants as fully loaded as possible,
A CMX with only 3 or 4 VLS modules reduced the overall engagement capability of
the BG with little incremental improvement in the major combatant missile inventory;
The CMX would need to defend against approximately three leaker missiles during the
saturation scenario.
The numerical study did not evaluate the impact of the carrier air wing on AAW
coverage. In fleet practice, some zones are assigned to air units and 360 degree
coverage is not accomplished by the exclusive use of surface combatants.
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4. Small Surface Action Group Engagement
The resurgent Russian Empire has extensive alliances with the Moslem world. After a
blue water engagement such as that described in the previous section, some of these Moslem allies
may be prompted to engage American forces in the Gulf of Sidra. This scenario postulated this
type of reaction and provided an analysis of the effectiveness of the CMX as employed against a
small surface action group.
a. Assumptions
The scenario was designed as follows Two American warships were deployed in the Gulf
of Sidra. Libyan forces consisted of several groups of small combatants. Nanuchkas and
Combattantes have sailed from Tripoli and Benghazi, shore based Libyan assets have detected the
American vessels The primary US objective was to maintain the current patrol. The following
forces have been mustered by Libya:
Platform Number ASUW Missile Range (nmj Number Pk
Nanuchka II 5 Styx 43 4 0.65
Combattante IIG 4 OtomatMKl 32 4 0.75
Osall 6 Styx 25 4 0.4
A US BG consisting of either two DDG 51s or an AEGIS platform and a CMX variant
was been deployed. The number of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) missiles for each platform was
estimated. Each of the six CMX variants is described in the following table. An Evolved Sea
Sparrow system was assumed to have been developed. This system will be discussed later in this
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report. The parameters for missile ranges and probability of kill (Pk) were drawn from open
sources For this analysis, the naval combat simulator Harpoon™ was used to model the
battlegroup response to the Libyan missile attacks on the combination of two DDG 51s A
synthetic CMX was modeled by using a superposition of a merchant ship and a DD 963 with its
air search radar turned off.
Platform ASUW Weapon Range (nm) Number PK
Ticonderoga VLS SM-2 Block 11 50 74 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 32 0.75
DDG 51 II
A
SM-2 Block IV 60 54 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 32 0.75
CMXv3 SM-2 Block IV 60 73 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv4 SM-2 Block IV 60 104 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv5 SM-2 Block IV 60 133 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv6 SM-2 Block IV 60 165 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv7 SM-2 Block IV 60 195 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
CMXv8 SM-2 Block IV 60 226 0.8
Evolved Sea Sparrow 10 72 0.75
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b. Scenario
Two US vessels were on patrol off the coast of Libya. Following the destruction of the
RRN battlegroup, attacks had been made against US forces around the world by Moslem
fundamentalist groups. US forces were at a heightened state of readiness. The effectiveness of
the battlegroup was analyzed with, and without the CMX. The Harpoon™ simulator was used to
determine if the task group was missile, illuminator or hull limited. The CMX would be loaded
with various numbers of SM-2 missiles.
Ship Combination Tomahawk Cruise Missiles
DDG plus CMX v3 120
CG plus CMX v3 132
DDG plus CMX v4 150
CG plus CMX v4 162
DDG plus CMX v5 180
CG plus CMX v5 192
DDG plus CMX v6 211
CG plus CMX v6 223
DDG plus CMX v7 242
CG plus CMX v7 254
DDG plus CMX v8 272
CG plus CMX v8 284
c. Evaluation
While the scenario revealed the need to provide close escort, the use of the synthetic
CMX was inconclusive. The model was not judged successful in simulating a CMX. The
characteristics of the CMX do not approach the superpositioned ship. The program revealed that
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for this stage of the analysis, there were too many variables to simulate. Three Sixty, Inc., the
manufacturer of Harpoon™, has agreed to insert a CMX model into its database As of the
completion of this report, the new CMX model database was not yet available.
5. Summary
The scenario studies demonstrated the utility of a platform with a large missile inventory
and a reduced combat system. The individual scenarios also served to highlight the capabilities
provided by the proposed vessel and the limitations imposed on the battlegroup by the vessel.
These are summarized as follows:
The Land Strike, Amphibious Assault and Blue Water Engagement scenarios
demonstrated that the employment of the CMX dramatically increased the
sustainability of a battlegroup even when used as a replacement for a more expensive
platform.
The Land Strike and Amphibious Assault scenarios showed little degradation in
battlegroup performance with the addition of the CMX.
The Blue Water Engagement scenario resulted in significantly greater missile
inventories remaining in the major combatants when at least 6 VLS modules with a
longer legged missile are provided to the battlegroup via the CMX.
Some of the capability of the battlegroup was degraded in the Blue Water Engagement
scenario. There were fewer ASW capable platforms and the battlegroup became
illuminator limited. This latter degradation was important when determining
saturation.
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The Small Surface Action Engagement illustrated the need to provide close escort for
the CMX. Without the escort, the self-defense capability of the CMX was
overwhelmed by one or two fast patrol boats.
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C. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR LARGE CAPACITY
MISSILE CARRIER (CMX) 2010
1. General Description of Operational Capability.
The world view scenario provided by the Faculty Board required that the role of the Navy
be redefined for the year 2010 The new Russian commonwealth, in consort with its Moslem
allies, threatens resources vital to the US and its allies However, the US Navy ~ weakened from
the military drawdown of the nineties — is not capable of meeting all of the challenges implied by
the threat. Specifically, the scenario presumes that one effect of the Russian-Moslem alliance is
an increase in the number and intensity of regional conflicts Although the US Navy possesses the
ships required to support littoral warfare, these ships do not contain sufficient firepower --
namely, missiles -- to defend our regional interest for any protracted period of time To achieve
this ability the Navy must either modify existing ships to provide the magazine capacity to support
sustained operations, or design a new ship to meet this need The Faculty Board proposed that
one possible solution would be to design a new ship, with the primary mission of bringing more
missile to bear in any given conflict. This study examines the feasibility of designing such a
"missile carrier."
The combat scenarios examined supported this effort to determine the mission need and to
develop requirements for the vessel. In general, the results of this study indicated a ship capable
of carrying several hundred missiles would be required.
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2. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)/OffTboard Command Launch (OCL)
Two concepts concerning weapon systems employment, currently in development, are
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Offboard Command Launch (OCL).
a. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
The CEC concept, currently in development by Naval Space and Warfare Systems
Command (SPAWAR), involves the tactical employment ofAAW weapon systems on a force
level. Its purpose is to overcome limitations of ability of individual platforms to engage due to
enemy countermeasures and/or physical/environmental influences.
Force level employment would include all functional areas such as detection and tracking,
threat assessment and target assignment, weapon selection, electronic warfare and EMCON,
kill/damage assessment and graceful degradation and reconfiguration for battle damage.
The CEC concept is based on a real-time data base shared amongst all surface and air
units within the battle force. This data base would provide initial offboard targeting and target
updates and support a universal missile guidance mode for all platforms via multi-path
communications relays.
All development efforts are currently being tailored to establish these system architecture
goals by the year 2020.
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b. Onboard Command Launch (OCL)
The OCL concept would incorporate the same components of the Offboard Command
Casualty Launch (OCCL) concept, however it would be employed as a normal vice damaged
operating mode. The OCCL concept, currently in development by Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA), involves the control of a (damaged) unit's AAW weapon system (VLS) by another
unit's fire control system
Employment of the OCCL concept would involve the two ships establishing a
communications link The control ship would then initialize and issue configuration orders to the
VLS on the damaged ship, and initiate the SM-2 launching sequence After launch, the control
ship would acquire the missile and provide illumination through the missile's terminal phase.
The OCCL concept would provide for improved overall missile usage of the battle force
and improved battle force tactical strategy. The AEGIS system can be configured to support
OCCL with minor changes to the command and decision, ACDS and weapon control system
computers, and further development of specific OCCL data link/control software.
It was assumed, by the Design Team that development of the OCL concept and support




The threat faced in 2010 will be primarily from modern, capable weapon systems operated
by Russian forces or their Moslem allies. We anticipate that the weapons encountered will be a
mixture of US, Russian, French and Chinese built. Thus, the CMX must be employed against a
range of threats including:
a. Air and surface launched anti-ship missiles with all categories of sophisticated homing
techniques;
b. Surface and submarine launched torpedoes in shallow water engagements,
c. Waters infested with all varieties of mines;
d. Small and medium caliber gunfire from coastal patrol craft,
e. Biological and chemical agents;
f. Covert attack by special forces;
4. Shortcomings of Existing Systems.
Analysis of various scenarios likely to occur in the future world environment reveals that
the forces available will not have sufficient missiles in the magazines at the point of engagement.
One alternative is to provide more vessels to the Task Force Commander; however the reduced
size of the future Navy will reduce the viability of this option. A second alternative is using
aircraft to provide delivery vehicles, but this option requires ground bases and may be politically
impossible or physically unavailable.
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5. Range of Capabilities Desired.
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) studies were conducted to establish the parameters for
the Range of Capabilities for the CMX (see Appendix C) The CMX would possess the following
capabilities:
a. Transit all major commercial shipping canals and waterways;
b. Operate at a (sustained) speed of 28 knots for 72 hours,
c. Endurance: 8000 nautical miles at 20 knots,
d Operate at highest readiness condition for two weeks at a time,
e 100% operational capability in all oceans through sea state five,
f. Completely integrate the shipboard combat system including Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) and OfTboard Command Launch (OCL).
g. Employ AAW, ASUW and STW weapon systems configured for OCL
h. Employ ASUW and STW weapon systems independently.
i. Provide AAW and ASUW self-defense against limited duration attacks,
j. Provide ASUW and STW support of Amphibious Task Force (ATF);
k. Provide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD),
1. Attack high value land based military targets (both coastal and interior);
m. Receive real time targeting information from diverse sources;
n. Employ torpedo countermeasures,
o. Operate in mine infested waters;
p. Possess rapidly configurable C 3 system for interoperability with joint or coalition
forces,
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q. Operate in chemical, biological and radiological environments;
r. Sustain a six month forward deployment schedule with a two week replenishment
interval;
s. Remain operational for a projected lifetime of 50 years,
t. Display low radiation and signal signatures,
u. Satisfy naval shock qualification requirements;
v. Implement an intelligent damage control system;
w. Support an organic aviation asset;
x. Support flight operations of non-organic joint force helicopters,
y. Incorporate advanced survivability measures;
6. General Affordability Limits.
The average acquisition cost of the CMX should be less than 600 million 1992 dollars
7. Integrated Logistics Support.
The CMX is expected to operate in conjunction with other US and allied forces. It would
rarely operate independently. However, it is anticipated that the CMX would be used for long
duration in the vicinity of expected trouble spots. Therefore, the following Integrated logistics
Support (ILS) would be necessary:
a. Modular design of weapons, sensors, communications and propulsion equipment to
facilitate upgrade and repair,
b. Arrangement of equipment and machinery to ease change out and repair of
components and minimize interference removal;
48
c. Commonality of components, unless significant system performance degradation
occurs,
d. Automated component monitoring including Built-In-Test-and-Evaluation (BITE)
and Automated Test and Evaluation (ATE),
e. Manning not to exceed 200.
8. Infrastructure Support and Interoperability.
The CMX would have the following interoperability features:
a. The SM-2 missiles carried by the CMX would be capable of being targeted and
controlled by other vessels with Oflfboard Command Launch capability,
b. CMX would be capable of receiving targeting data from joint/coalition forces,
c. CMX would have a 10 year overhaul cycle
9. Force Structure.
There would be 30 CMXs constructed
10. Other Considerations.
The Scenario Study indicated that employment of the CMX would be advantageous when
an engagement arises requiring a significant number of missiles. Several current threats (Iraq,
Serbia) may require engagement in the near future. The emergence of any hostile world power
would also require the delivery of a large number of missiles during a conflict. Failure to provide
this capability may result in loss of the forces committed to the conflict.
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D. REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (ROC)
Based on the Range of Capabilities Desired section of the Requirements Document, the
following Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and design requirements are delineated;
1. Primary ROCs
a. Completely integrate the shipboard combat system including Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) and Offboard Command Launch (OCL);
b. Provide AAW self-defense against limited duration or low intensity attacks;
c. Deliver ASUW and STW support of Amphibious Task Force (ATF);
d. Provide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD),
e. Attack high value land based military targets (both coastal and interior),
f. Receive real time targeting information from diverse sources,
g. Possess rapidly configurable C 3 system for interoperability with joint or coalition
forces;
h. Employ torpedo countermeasures;
i. 100% operational capability in all oceans through sea state five,
2. Secondary ROCs
a. Operate in mine infested waters;
b. Operate in chemical, biological and radiological environments;
c. Support an organic helicopter,
d. Support flight operations of non-organic joint force helicopters;
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3. Primary Design Requirements
a. Transit all major commercial shipping canals and waterways;
b. Operate at sustained speeds of 26 to 28 knots for 72 hours,
c. Endurance: 8000 nautical miles at 20 knots,
d. Operate at highest readiness condition for two weeks at a time,
e. Sustain a six month forward deployment schedule with a two week replenishment
interval;
f. Implement an intelligent damage control system;
g Incorporate advanced survivability measures;
4. Secondary Design Requirements
a. Remain operational for a projected lifetime of 40 years,
b. Display low radiation and signal signatures;
c. Satisfy naval shock qualification requirements;
d. Support flight operations of non-organic joint force helicopters,
The Primary ROCs applicable to the CMX parallel those for the DDG/CG as defined in
OPNAVTNST C3501.2H, Naval Warfare Mission Areas and Require Operational
Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE). The table, on the next page, lists
these ROCs. ROCs associated with CEC or OCL mission requirements are denoted by **.
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TABLE 2-1. PRIMARY REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (ROC)
Reference: OPNAVINST C350 1 2H, Naval Warfare Mission Areas and Require Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment
(ROC/POE)
ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW). The destruction or neutralization of enemy air platforms and airborne weapons, whether launched from air,
surface, subsurface or land platforms.
AAW 1 Provide anti-air defense in cooperation with other forces.**
AAW 1.2 Provide self-defense
AAW 1.5 Support area defense for amphibious forces in transit and in Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).**
AAW 1.6 Support area defense for a Surface Action Group (SAG) **
AAW 2 Provide anti-air defense of a geographic area (zone) in cooperation with other forces. **
AAW 3 Engage air targets in cooperation with other forces **
AAW 6 Detect, identify and track air targets
AAW 6.1 See Reference.
AAW 6.2 Recognize by sight, friendly/enemy A'C which may be encountered in extended operating area.
AAW 6.3 Maintain accurate air plot.
AAW 6.4 Measure A'C altitude by radar
AAW 6.5 Detect, identify and track air targets with radar
AAW 6.6 Acquire and track targets with Missile Fire Control System (MFCS)
AAW 6.7 See Reference.
AAW 6 8 See Reference
AAW 6 9 Conduct PRCA for embarked A/C under all weather conditions
AAW 6.10 See Reference.
AAW 6.XX Detect and track air targets with infrared sensor
AAW 9 Engage airborne threats using surface-to-air armament *•
AAW 9. 1 Engage high speed, medlong range airborne threats with med/long range missiles.**
AAW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats with missiles and gunfire. **
AAW 9 6 See Reference •*
AAW 9.XX Launch surface-to-air armament in conjunction with Oflfboard Command Launch (OCL) concept.**
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASU) The destruction or neutralization of enemy surface combatants and merchant ships.
ASU 1 Engage surface threats with anti-surface weapons *•
ASU 1
.
1 Engage surface ships with long range cruise missiles **
ASU 1 .2 Engage surface ships with medium range cruise missiles **
ASU l.XX Launch anti-surface armament in conjunction with Offboard Command Launch (OCL) concept.**
ASU 2 Engage surface targets during BG operations in cooperation with other forces •*
ASU 2.1 Operate as a member of a multi-ship SAG.**
ASU 2.2 Operate in direct support of surface forces. ••
ASU 2.4 Operate in coordination with land and sea based air forces in conducting long range surface actions •*
ASU 3 Support anti-surface ship defense of a geographical area (e.g. zone or barrier) in cooperation with other forces.**
ASU 4 Detect identify, localize and track surface targets.
ASU 4. 1 Detect, identify, localize and track surface targets with radar
ASU 4.4 Detect and track surface contacts visually
ASU 4.5 Delect, identify, localize and track surface targets with infrared
ASU 4.6 Detect, identify, localize and track surface targets by ESM
ASU 4.7 Identify surface contacts.
ASU 4. 1 1 Prosecute attack using Link 4A targeting information .*•
ASU 6 Disengage, evade and avoid surface attack **
ASU 6 1 Employ countermeasures * *
ASU 6.2 Employ evasion techniques
ASU 6.3 Employ EMCON procedures
ASU 6.4 Detect, identify' and track targets to perform contact avoidance using ESM or RDF.
ASU 8 Provide for air operations in support of ant i-surface attack operations.
ASU 8. 1 Launch rotary wing aircraft in support of anti-surface operations
ASU 8.2 Recover rotary wing aircraft in support of anti-surface operations.
ASU 12 Support and conduct independent ASU operations.
ASU 12.2 Conduct ASU operations while escorting ATT or protecting an AOA**
ASU 12.3 Conduct ASU self-defense operations
ASU 13 Conduct pre-attack deception operations.
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW). The destruction or Neutralization of enemy submarines
ASW 8 Disengage, evade, avoid and deceive submarines.
ASW 8. 1 Employ torpedo countermeasures and evasion techniques.
COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (CCC> Providing communications and related facilities for coordination and control of
external organizations or forces and control of unit's own facilities.
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CCC 3 Provide own unit* C* functions
CCC 3 1 Maintain a CIC capable of collecting, processing, displaying, evaluating and disseminating tactical information.
CCC 3.3 Provide all necessary personnel services, programs, and facilities to safeguard classified material and information
CCC 3.4 Carry out emergency destruction of classified matter and equipment rapidly and efficiently.
CCC 3.5 Employ Identification Friend or Foe'Selective Identification Feature (IFF/SIF) secure IFF mode 4.
CCC 3.6 Coordinate and control the operation of remotely piloted vehicles
CCC 3.8 Establish voice communications with US Marine Corps (USMC) evacuation and command nets and Naval Support Activity
(NSA)net.
CCC 4 Maintain NTDS data link capability"
CCC 4.3 Transmit/receive and support Link 1 1 .••
CCC 4.5 Receive and process data link information from Satellite Communication (SATCOM)."
CCC 4.6 Receive and process data link information from High Frequency (HF) systems "
CCC 4.7 Receive Link 14 information."
CCC 4.9 Transmit/receive and support Link 16 (JTIDS) surveillance, navigation and identification circuits."
CCC 4.10 Transmit/receive and correlate targeting information with Link 4A"
CCC 6 Provide communications for own unit
CCC 6. 1 Provide tactical voice communications
CCC 6.2 Provide visual communications.
CCC 6.3 Provide multi-channel cryptographically covered teletype send and receive circuits.
CCC 6.4 Provide uncovered Radio-Teletype/Continuous Wave communications.
CCC 6.5 Provide full duplex cryptographically covered HF teletype circuits.
CCC 6 10 Provide voice/teletype 'computer data cryptographically covered satellite communication circuits
CCC 6. 1 1 Establish and provide fixed combat communications and relay support for NSW operations
CCC 6 1 2 Provide internal communications systems
CCC 6. 16 Provide tactical, secure, anti-jam Ultra-High Frequency (l^HF) voice communications.
CCC 6 1 8 Provide tactical, secure, anti-jam HF voice communications
CCC 6 1 9 Provide tactical, secure voice or data communications
CCC 9 Relay Naval communications with visual and electronic means
CCC 9. 1 Relay visual communications
CCC 9.3 Relay electronic communications
ELECTRONIC WARFARE (ELW). The effective use by friendly forces of the electromagnetic spectrum for detection and targeting while
deterring exploiting reducing or denying its use by the enemy
ELW1 See Reference .••
ELW 1.1 See Reference.
ELW 1.2 See Reference
ELW 1.3 See Reference
ELW 1 5 See Reference. ••
ELW 2 See Reference
ELW 2.2 See Reference
ELW 2.5 See Reference
ELW 2 6 See Reference
ELW 2.7 See Reference
ELW 2.10 See Reference.
ELW 3 See Reference."
ELW 3.1 See Reference."
ELW 3.2 See Reference."
ELW 4 See Reference
ELW 4.1 See Reference
ELW 4.2 See Reference
ELW 4.3 See Reference.
ELW 5 See Reference "
MOBILITY (MOB). The ability of naval forces to move and to maintain themselves in all situations over, under or upon the surface.
MOB 1 Steam to designed capability and in most fuel efficient manner.
MOB 1 . 1 Steam at full power.
MOB 1.2 Steam with split plant
MOB 1.5 Steam at sustained BG SAG speeds.
MOB 1 .6 Maintain necessary machinery redundancy to enhance survival in high threat areas.
MOB 1 .7 Transit at high speed.
MOB 3 Prevent and control damage
MOB 3.1 Control fire, flooding electrical, structural, propulsion and hull casualties
MOB 3.2 Counter and control CBR contamination'agents
MOB 3.3 Maintain security against unfriendly acts.
MOB 3.5 Provide IX security and surveillance
MOB 3 8 Provide EBDs in accordance with ships allowance
MOB 5 Maneuver in formation.
MOB 7 Perform seamanship, airmanship and navigation tasks.
MOB 7. 1 Navigate under all conditions of geographic location, weatheT, and
visibility.
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MOB 7.2 Conduct precision anchoring
MOB 7.3 Get underway, moor, anchor, and sortie with duty section in a safe manner
MOB 7.5 Utilize programmed evasive steering.
MOB 7.6 Abandon/scuttle ship rapidly
MOB 7.7 Provide life boal/raft capacity IAW ships allowance
MOB 7.8 Tow or be towed.
MOB 7.9 Operate day and night and under all weather conditions
MOB 7.14 Moor alongside ATF shipping or docks.
MOB 7. 1 5 Operate in a chemically contaminated environment
MOB 10 Replenish at sea.
MOB 10.1 Receive VERTREP.
MOB 10.2 Receive fuel while underway (alongside method).
MOB 10.3 Receive munitions and provisions while underway.
MOB 10.4 Receive potable and/or feed water while underway.
MOB 12 Maintain the health and well-being of the crew.
MOB 1 2. 1 Ensure all phases of food service operations are conducted consistent with approved sanitary procedures and standards.
MOB 1 2.2 Ensure the operation of the potable water system in a manner consistent with approved sanitary procedures and standards
MOB 12.3 Maintain the environment to ensure the protection of personnel from overexposure to hazardous levels of radiation,
temperature, noise, vibration, and toxic substances per current instructions.
MOB 1 2.5 Monitor to ensure that habitability is consistent with approved habitability procedures and standards.
MOB 1 2.6 Ensure operation and maintenance of all phases of shipboard environmental protection systems do not create a health hazard
and are consistent with other naval directives pertaining to the prevention of pollution of the environment.
STRIKE WARFARE (STV\"). Support the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons.
STW 3 Support/conduct multiple cruise missile strikes either independently or in support of other strike forces. •*
STW 3.2 Support/conduct conventionally armed cruise missile strikes **
STW 3.3 Provide navigation, targeting data to missile fire control and guidance subsystems with specified accuracy.**
STW 9.XX Launch cruise missile strike in conjunction with Offboard Command Launch (OCL) concept.**
STW 8 Provide for air operations in support of air strike operations **
STW 8. 1 Launch fixed and or rotary winged aircraft involved in air strike operations *•
STW 8.2 Recover fixed and'or rotary winged aircraft involved in air strike operations.**
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HI. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
A statement of priorities was established from which the design team would base trade-off
decisions. These priorities were established to ensure that the trade-offs would be made in a
consistent manner. This chapter outlines and justifies the priorities which formed the Design
Philosophy for the CMX
A. PRIORITY OF DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
To develop this list of priorities, the Design Team evaluated many facets of naval ship
design, including military and technical considerations Political and social issues were also
evaluated. Using the Requirements Document (see Chapter II, Section C) as a guide, the Team
developed list of the highest priority design considerations as follows.
Cost
Combat System Effectiveness (CEC/OCL)
Combat System Effectiveness (self-defense)
Survivability/Vulnerability
Manning Reduction
Note that this list is not ordered. The Team felt that these considerations were of
relatively equal or comparable priority level. Similarly, the Team established a list of design
priorities to be considered next:




Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)
Detection Signature
Environmental Impact








Cost was given a high priority due to the TOR specifying low cost as a design objective.
The ORD was written limiting the ship cost to 600 million 1992 dollars. This cost was to be
significantly less than the cost of an AEGIS ship. Failure to meet this objective would most likely
kill this program at the DOD and Congressional levels of review.
b. Combat System Effectiveness (CEC/OCL)
Combat effectiveness in the CEC/OCL role was given high priority since it is the primary
mission requirement for the ship. The Scenario Studies justified the existence of the CMX based
on its capabilities in this role, and it must be viewed as a primary design consideration.
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c. Combat System Effectiveness (Self-Defense)
Although the CMX would be escorted into any high threat area, its function of enhancing
the capabilities of the battlegroup in a hostile engagement make it a likely target The inability to
defend itself would have a significant negative impact on the outcome of an engagement. For
these reasons, self-defense was given a high priority.
d. Survivability/Vulnerability
Poor survivability and high vulnerability would have the same impact as poor self-defense
capability, and as such, were also given high priority.
e. Manning Reduction
Having a significant impact on overall ship cost, manning reduction was given high
priority. The level of automation of ship, weapon systems and engineering plant controls, directly
affects the degree of manning reduction achievable. Additionally, maintenance and damage
control manning requirements must be considered
2. "Next" Priorities
a. R, MAndA
While not ranked as high as primary mission or manning considerations, R, M and A was
still viewed as an important priority due to second order effects on manning requirements and
overall mission capability for the ship.
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b. Future Growth/Upgrade
Future growth and upgradability was considered important since the CMX must be
reasonably adaptable to advances made in weapon technology.
c. Standardization
Standardization was considered to support future growth and upgradability provided there
would be no negative impacts on cost, manning or R, M, and A considerations.
d. Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
COTS considerations were viewed to parallel standardization
e. Detection Signature
Improvements in detection signature was considered due to its impact on the ship's
primary mission capabilities and vulnerability.
f. Environmental Impact




Specifications (i.e., weights, volumes, power requirements) were considered in order to
avoid negative impact on higher priorities such as primary mission or manning requirements.
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b. Habitability
Habitability was considered so as not to conflict with higher priority considerations such
as reduced manning, R, M and A, vulnerability, primary mission or cost requirements Sufficient
habitability standards would be considered so as to provide adequate living space for all crew
members without compromising morale.
c. Political/Societal Issues
Political and societal issues address those design considerations currently used in naval
ship design due to tradition, standard practice or "because it's always been done that way." The
Team decided that such issues would not influence the design considerations for this ship.
d. Appearance
Although there were no requirements for the CMX to play a role in power projection or to
"show the flag", it would frequently be in the company of ships that had such requirements,
especially when escorted into a high threat area Therefore, design attributes affecting the
appearance of the CMX would be considered, provided no negative impact would result for
higher design priorities.
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IV. COMBAT SYSTEM DEFINITION
In this phase of the design process the elements that would comprise the combat system of
the CMX were selected. The categories of elements considered included detection, engagement,
and communication, computers and control elements. The detection element category was further
subdivided into surface search/navigation radar, air search/tracking radar, aviation/navigation
support, and electronic warfare elements. The selection methodology was based on a
determination of what prospective combat system capabilities would be effectively employed
against a spectrum of threats which resulted from the operational scenarios presented in Chapter
II
The approach to the combat system definition began with the application of the
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and the Ship Design Philosophy (presented in
chapters II and III, respectively), in the form of priorities, to the combat system. These priorities
were used as a basis for the tradeoff analysis and element selection.
The effectiveness of the selected elements was then evaluated against various threats, and
the performance of the combat system was analyzed using the operational engagements developed
as a result of the Scenario Study.
Section A of this chapter presents an overview of the design philosophy as it was applied
to the combat system. Section B discusses the tradeoff methodology and element selection. The
evaluation of the proposed CMX Combat System is included in Section C. Section D
summarizes the combat system definition for the CMX.
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A. COMBAT SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
Based on the ORD and the Ship Design Philosophy, the following discussion further
develops the high priority ship design considerations as applicable to the CMX combat system.
The primary mission for the CMX combat system would be to support the Oflfboard
Command Launch (OCL) and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) operational
concepts. The CMX would carry the most potent offensive and defensive vertically launched
missiles of the U.S. Fleet: SM-2 AAW missiles and Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles
These missiles would be fired under the remote or off-board control of accompanying AEGIS
cruisers or guided missile destroyers Thus, a major focus of the CMX combat system would be
to guarantee the most effective data communication and control systems necessary for the remote
ship engagement capability. The local self-defense capability must also be highly effective in
order to safeguard the offensive strike and defensive AAW payload which the CMX would
contain.
An accompanying AEGIS ship would provide long range sensor service and would
control defensive engagements beyond the self-defense range of the CMX. The CMX local
combat system would be designed to handle "leakers" from larger battle group defensive actions.
For this reason, the CMX sensors need to possess only short range capability. The CMX
self-defense system must integrate remote data link target tracks with local sensors, identify tracks
within a self-defense zone, and successfully defend itself. The CMX must also have local ASUW
capability to fend off surface threats in littoral waters so as not to unnecessarily burden the
AEGIS platform
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The CMX system must be survivable and affordable. To this end, automatic close-in
reaction and engagement would be necessary to ensure that combat system defensive manning
would be minimized. Simplicity, reliability, and effectiveness were also underlying qualitative
factors which describe the CMX combat system requirements.
i
In addition to the above, was the requirement to minimize overall ship cost and manning.
System automation achieved through technical advances and system integration must be high
design priorities
This discussion provided the basis for the tradeoff methodology used in the element
selection process.
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B. TRADEOFF METHODOLOGY AND ELEMENT SELECTION
Tradeoff studies were conducted by the design team using both analytical and qualitative
methods. The design philosophy (described in the previous section) provided the structure for the
tradeoff studies and final element selection The analytical tradeoff methodology involved
assigning weighting factors to the ship design philosophy priorities (by group) to reflect their
relative importance. The ship design philosophy priority groups and the assigned weighting
factors are provided in the following table:
Ship Design Priority Group Weighting Factor
High
Cost
Combat System Effectiveness (CEC/OCL)





R, M and A
Future Growth/Upgrade
Standardization











Data on both current and future elements considered for the combat system elements was
obtained from open sources (see References). The elements considered for each subsystem of the
combat system were then assigned a rating index (1, 2 or 3, 1 being the most desirable) to reflect
their relative performance (or value) with respect to each ship design priority. These indices were
assigned based on the open source data when available, otherwise, the engineering judgment and
past experience of the Design Team were employed. In some cases, no index was assigned,
indicating no significant contribution to a particular design priority. Weighted sums of the rating
indices were then calculated to determine an overall ranking of the element The elements
receiving the lowest numerical ranking were initially considered the most suitable for the combat
system.
A qualitative check of the analytical results was conducted for each element achieving the
highest ranking prior to final selection. This check synthesized the analytical results with
engineering judgment to provided a sense of logic and integrity to the selection process.
In the following sections, a list of the elements considered is provided for each functional
area of the combat system. The tradeoff decision matrices with analytical results are included,
followed by a qualitative discussion of the results and the most notable factors driving each
selection. Comparison of performance features or specific data are made as a direct result of
information obtained in the open literature (see References). Tables of performance parameters
for the elements selected are also provided.
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1. Detection Elements
a. Surface Search/Navigation Elements
(1) Elements Considered
The following surface search, tracking, and navigation radars were considered as





(e) AN/SPS-58 & AN/SPS-65(V)
(f) Furuno Radars (various)
The following non-radar type sensors were also considered:
(g) Radiant Mist
(2) Discussion of Tradeoffs
Detailed design priority ratings for surface search/navigation elements are included in the
table on the following page.
Surface search and navigation radars can be broadly categorized as Class A, B 1 and B2
where Class A indicates full military specification and high cost, Class Bl indicates partial military
specification and moderate cost, and Class B2 indicates commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
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AN/SPS-67 and AN/SPQ-9(i). Although not a conventional detection element, Radiant Mist
is being developed along the lines of a Class A system. Extremely high cost was a key factor
in eliminating the AN/SPQ-9(i). The AN/SPS-55 scored relatively high but did not measure
up to the CMX priorities. The AN/SPS-67, the current surface combatant surface radar
mainstay, did not contribute to the goal of signature reduction.
The primary Class Bl surface radar is the AN/SPS-64. Class B2 radars include the
RAYCAS system, various Furuno radars, and the LN-66.
Redundancy of surface search and detection elements is important for both safety of
navigation and for combat system survivability standpoints The Design Team selected one
detection element from each category (A, Bl/2) in order to achieve redundancy at relatively low
cost. Radiant Mist, the Class A system choice, also supports the goal of detection signature
reduction due to its passive search mode Radiant Mist promises reduced operational and
maintenance manning All surface detection systems would be interfaced with the self-defense fire
control and engagement systems to improve probability of detection and engagement of low
flyers.
(3) Surface Search/Navigation Elements Selected
The AN/SPS-64 and Radiant Mist radars was selected to provide the primary surface
search and navigation detection elements for the CMX.
The AN/SPS-64, is a Class Bl navigational and surface search radar with detection range
capability up to 60 nautical miles Originally manufactured by Raytheon in the late 1970's, this
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radar will be upgraded and modernized under a new competitively bid contract during the 1990's
The resulting AN/SPS-64 system will be integrated with the commercial Raytheon Computer
Aided Shipping System (RAYCAS) to automate surface tracking and plotting functions. This
system could also be interfaced to provide initial detection information on sea-skimming ASCMs
to the Mk 91 Sea Sparrow fire control system (FCS).
Radiant Mist, a new shipboard electro-optical sensor system that incorporates infrared
(IR) imaging and laser radar, would complement the AN/SPS 64 while providing surface search
and tracking capability. Radiant Mist has a programmed passive IR search mode which can be
used for target detection Low flyers or surface targets can be passively tracked and identified by
the C0
2
laser in the Radiant Mist system The system's laser radar can "interrogate" a target to
perform independent automatic target recognition. In summary, Radiant Mist can detect, track,
perform fire-control functions and positively identify air and surface targets. The system would
be fully integrated with other ship sensors and fire control systems.
A summary of the characteristics the surface detection elements selected is provided in the
following table:
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Surface Detection Sensors Characteristics
Parameter AN/SPS-64 Radiant Mist
Range (nm) 60 horizon
Frequency/Band I/J IR/laser
Scan Rate 33 N/A
Antenna Size 8 feet 1 x 2 x 2 feet
Antenna Weight 132 lbs 200 lbs (est)
Console/Cabinet Weight 332 lbs 400 lbs (est)
Console/Cabinet Volume 25 ft 3 20 ft3
Average Electric Power 4 kw unknown
Cost $40 K $2M
b. Air Search/Tracking Elements
(1) Air Search/Tracking Elements Considered
Both 2-D and 3-D air search and tracking radar systems were considered for the CMX
combat system. Specific systems evaluated are the following:
(a) AN/SPS-48(E)
(b) AN/SPS-49
(c) MK 23 Target Acquisition System
(2) Discussion of Tradeoffs
Detailed design priority ratings are shown in the table on the following page.
Self-defense combat system effectiveness was the primary focus for air search radar
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approximately ten nautical miles And, the CMX concept itself is based upon the cost savings
realized by the elimination of one SPY-1 radar system from the command ship and CMX
combination. Thus, while the SPY-1 is the premier air search and tracking radar, it was not
even considered as a candidate for the CMX. The self-defense and cost priorities also
eliminated longer range, powerful air search radars such as the AN/SPS-48 and the
AN/SPS-49.
Except when under attack or during times when attack may be imminent, it is expected
that the CMX would operate in an EMCON condition where its sensors would be operated only
in passive modes (e.g., Radiant Mist and SLQ-32) Data links from the AEGIS command ship
would provide the surface and air plots (Active surface search via the AN/SPS-64 and RAYCAS
would be used during special circumstances such as entering or leaving port, transiting shipping
lanes, and as required by International Rules of the Road) However, when attack is imminent,
the ACDS data link tracks would be handed off to the local air search and track radar of the
CMX Thus, the MK 23 Target Acquisition System with its automatic tracking capability and its
relatively short range was the element of choice for air search and tracking. Further, its capability
against low flying ASCM targets is well established by current fleet exercise results
(3) Air Search/Tracking Elements Selected
The Mk 23 Target Acquisition System (TAS) would handle the air search and tracking
functions. The Mk 23 TAS can operate in four modes:
Medium Range mode for surveillance and aircraft control out to 100 nautical miles;
Point Defense mode to track and engage air targets within 20 nautical miles;
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Mixed mode which combines the above modes
Emission Control (EMCON) mode where only selected sectors are scanned as desired
by the operator.
The Mk 23 TAS can track up to 54 targets and provide targeting information for small
AAW missiles such as Sea Sparrow or RAM The TAS system is also compatible with standard
fire control computers, Mk 12 IFF, AN/SLQ-32, vertically launched Sea Sparrow, SAR-8,
Radiant Mist and RAM systems The following table summarizes the MK 23 TAS characteristics:
MK 23 TAS Characteristics
Range 100 nm
Power 200 kw (peak)
Frequency 1 -2 GHz
Scan rate 19.1 rpm
Coverage 360° azimuth, to 75° elevation
Antenna Dimensions 10.7x26.7x6.3 ft
Antenna Weight 2000 lb
System Weight 9000 lb
Average Electric Power 58 kw
Cost S3.0M
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c. Aviation/Navigation Support Elements
(1) Aviation/Navigation Support Elements Considered
(a) Raytheon Collision Avoidance System V (RAYCAS V)
(b) TACAN (Replacement System)
(c) ANAVRN-6(V)1 Global Positioning System (GPS)
(d) AN/SRN-25 Omega C+F
(e) ANAVSN-5 Inertial Navigation System (INS)
(f) ANAVQN-l(V) Fathometer/Sonar
(2) Discussion of Tradeoffs
A tradeoff table scoring all feasible candidate elements against the design priorities would
normally be evaluated prior to element selection However, a detailed analytical tradeoff study
was beyond the scope of this design project. The following discussion is included to support the
considerations of the Design Team.
With the exception of RAYCAS, all aviation/navigation elements listed above represent
the most modern variant of element type which are standard in the Fleet The RAYCAS system
would allow for reduced manning during special evolutions such as entering or leaving port, and
transiting of high traffic shipping lanes. The Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) Replacement
System was selected as standard equipment onboard DDG-5 1 and future US surface combatant
ships. GPS would provide the primary navigation information and would also be used as an
update reference for the ANAVSN-5 The ANAVSN-5 would provide the stabilization data
necessary for the fire control systems Omega would provide a backup system for navigation.
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The fathometer is standard equipment on ships without an ASW sonar system, and the
ANAVQN-l(V) is considered the most modern fathometer element.
(3) Aviation/Navigation Support Elements Selected
Considering relatively unique functional characteristics and standard use aboard US naval
surface combatants, the newest variants of the equipment discussed above will be installed
onboard the CMX.
d. Electronic Warfare Elements




(2) Discussion of Tradeoffs
A tradeoff table scoring all feasible candidate elements against the design priorities would
normally be evaluated prior to element selection However, a detailed analytical tradeoff study
was beyond the scope of this design project. The following discussion is included to support the
considerations of the Design Team.
Although highly rated by the Fleet, the AN/WLR-1H was rejected for the CMX primarily
due to its requirement for an operator to manually scan the radio/radar spectrum. SLQ-32(V2)
lacked the self-defense effectiveness required for the CMX. SLQ-32(V3) was specifically
selected due to its active jamming capability.
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(3) Electronic Warfare Elements Selected
The AN/SLQ-32(3) was selected as the electronic support (ESM) and countermeasures
system (ECM). This computerized system employs an internal library of transmission
characteristics which it compares with detected signals in order to automatically categorize
threats. Defensive reactions such as chaff, Torch and electronic jamming can be automatically
triggered in the highest alert mode of operation. The system is fully integrated with the Advanced
Combat Direction System (ACDS) and could direct ESM input to alert other fire control systems
2. Command, Control and Communications (C) Elements
(1) C3 Elements Selection
A tradeoff table scoring all feasible candidate elements against the design priorities would
normally be evaluated prior to element selection. However, a detailed analytical tradeoff study
was beyond the scope of this design project The following discussion is included to support the
considerations of the Design Team.
The Command, Control and Communications (C 3 ) suite must be capable of supporting
both the OfTboard Command Launch (OCL) of the SM-2 missiles in the vertical launchers and the
self-defense combat system of the CMX. Thus, the CMX C 3 suite would incorporate some
components of the OfTboard Casualty Control Launch (OCCL) system (currently under feasibility
study) and the future Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS). Although a fully capable
ACDS system greatly exceeds the requirements of the CMX, partial implementation of this system
would be required in order to implement the future high speed data links and computer power
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required for both the OCL and self-defense of the CMX. The following elements and systems
would comprise the C 3 suite:
(a) ACDS
This system is the successor to the current Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS). ACDS
would initially utilize several UYK 43 computers, and transition to even more powerful and
state-of-the-art computers is expected for implementation in the CMX. ACDS would possess the
data storage, computational, and display graphics capability to handle the increased surveillance
volume of the accompanying AEGIS ship. ACDS would incorporate Link 1 1 Model 5 (LEMF)
and the new Link 16 which has outstanding data security and data transfer rate This system
would allow local commanders to program an expert system's rule-database, for rapid
auto-engagement of threats in accordance with current local tactical conditions. Finally, the
system would be built with specific attention to reduced manning for both operation and
maintenance
(b) Link 16
Link 16 would connect the Navy to the Joint Tactical Information System (JTIDS). This
system would handle extremely high data transfer rates with high security. This system would be
the primary joint data net of the future.
(c) Link 11 Model 5
The next generation Link 11, Link Eleven, Model Five (LEMF), would possess greater
data handling capability with higher security as compared to the current tactical data link.
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(d) OTCIXS ( AN/USQ-64(V)7 )
The Oflficer-In-Tactical-Command Information Exchange System is the battle group's
local command-and-control communication net. Current systems have low data transfer rates,
typically on the order of 2400 baud. Future variants promise significantly improved data
throughput.
(e) TADIXS A and B ( AN/USQ-64(V)8 and AN/USQ-101 )
The Tactical Digital Information Exchange System is a one-way broadcast from satellites
to fleet units. It provides ocean surveillance data to the fleet units.
(0 CUDIXS
The Common User Digital Information System would carry two-way general service
messages.
(g) OCL System 1
OCL System 1, as postulated by the Design Team, would provide necessary hardware and
software to accomplish the offboard launch of the CMX's SM-2, Tomahawk or Harpoon missiles.
This system would include the high speed data link, computer systems, multiplexed fiber-optic
data bus, interface hardware CMX navigation/position sensors, and VLS control hardware.
(h) IVCS
A fiber optic Interior Virtual Communications System would provide own ship integrated
interior communications. The system would be multiplexed to handle nearly infinite information.
77
These relatively light weight fiber-optic cables would be redundantly routed throughout the ship
to improve survivability.
Other elements which support the above selections include
AN/UYK-43 Computers (Next Generation)




AN/UYQ-62 C2P VER 1 Link Processor
ANAVSC-3(V)3 UHF SAT Transmitter/Receiver








VHF (30-88) VRC-46 RPL
VHF (115-156) Upgrade
UHF Basic Radios
UHF AJ HAVE QUICK
78
3. CEC/OCL Weapons Systems/Engagement Elements
The following missiles would be installed onboard the CMX as dictated by the TOR and
ORD
a. Standard Missile SM-2
Improved SM-2 missiles launched from VLS would provide the offboard command launch
(OCL) AAW and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). Block IV and future variants of
these missiles would provide the main battery for fleet AAW defense for the next fifteen to twenty
years. SM-2 missiles fired from the CMX would be controlled by an AEGIS equipped
"command" ship.
b. Tomahawk
The Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TASM) will be the primary unmanned strike
weapon for the U.S. Navy over the next twenty years. CMX would carry TASM as well as future
variants of Tomahawk cruise missiles The CMX would have the capability to initiate Tomahawk
launches or to respond to a launch command via OCL System 1
.
c. Harpoon (AGM/RGM/UGM-84)
Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles would provide potent ASUW capability for the CMX
and the OCL ship. Future Harpoon variants are expected to have increased range and improved
flight profile characteristics. In addition, VLS launch capability is expected to be achievable by
the year 2010.
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4. Self-Defense Weapons Systems/Engagement Systems
a. Self-Defense AAW Elements
(1) Self-Defense AAW Elements Considered
(a) FIM-92 Stinger Missiles
(b) RAM
(c) Sea Sparrow
(d) MK 45 Lightweight 5" Gun
(e) MK 75 OTO Melara 76 mm Gun
(f) MK 38 Bushmaster 25 mm Gun
(g) MK 15CIWS20mmGun
(h) Goal Keeper
(2) Discussion of Tradeoffs
The table on the following page indicates the tradeoff analysis conducted for the selection
of engagement elements. A brief discussion of the salient points of the selection process is
included below. Other, soft-kill engagement decoy and deception elements have been included as
standard equipment of modern US naval combatants.
CMX air defenses will be integrated with the defense in depth concept: the outer air battle
will be conducted by tactical carrier aviation assets. The intermediate air defense will be primarily
accomplished by AEGIS combatants with SM-2 missiles Local ship defense would then require a
moderate range AAW capable major caliber gun or a short range AAW missile, a last ditch
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low effectiveness and high ship cost, a major caliber gun system was rejected. While the Sea
Sparrow systems have slight cost advantages over the RAM system and effectiveness data is
relatively evenly matched, the future upgrade capability of the vertically launched Evolved Sea
Sparrow (ESS) was a major factor favoring the its selection. The lower ship cost due to
vertical launch installation, and the potential reliability and maintainability advantages from the
VLS configuration further support the selection ofESS over RAM.
Self-defense AAW engagement elements are designed to eliminate threats which have
leaked through each of the outer defensive layers. The lack of an established support base for the
Goalkeeper gun was a marked disadvantage. Low cost and survivability were favorable factors
contributing to the Bushmaster achieving the lowest ranking. The potential to upgrade the
Vulcan Phalanx CIWS by re-gunning, in addition to its high effectiveness were considered to be
significant factors and as such, the Team decided to overrule the decision matrix results and select
the CIWS over the Bushmaster
(3) Self-Defense AAW Elements Selected
(a) Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESS) Missile and MK 91 Fire Control System
The ESS missile is anticipated to be a greatly improved local AAW defense missile which
is based upon the current RIM-7M Sea Sparrow missile. The ESS would incorporate totally new
components for the rocket motor, aerodynamic control system, and auto-pilot while retaining
compatibility with vertical launch capability. These missile enhancements would greatly improve
its kill probability against future ASCMs which will operate at higher speeds and with greater
maneuverability. The system would normally be operated in conjunction with the MK 23 TAS for
target tracking and assignment. The MK 91 FCS can accept designations from a variety of
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sensors including surface/navigation radars, infrared detection systems, and OCL systems. (The
MK 91 FCS would receive OCL cueing, filtered through local tactical computer assets, as alerts
for probable outer defense leakers). However, the MK 91 system would still need to develop the
fire control problem to support mid-course missile guidance. The ESS missile uses semi-active
mid-course guidance with both IR and anti-radiation terminal homing Two dual MK 91 radar
illuminators would be installed on the CMX to provide the ESS guidance and illumination signals
The dual "headlight" configuration of the MK 91 installation contains one antenna for transmitting
and one antenna for receiving Significant characteristics are included in the following tables:
ESS Missile Characteristics
Range 10-20 nm (max)




Warhead 90 lbs HE
Cost -S150K
MK 91 Fire Control System
Installation & Characteristics
Weight 14430 lbs
Volume 480 ft 3
Average Electric Power unknown
Cost unknown
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(b) MK 15 CIWS Phalanx
Two close-in weapons system (CIWS) systems would be installed to provide extremely
close-in, last-ditch AAW self-defense for the CMX. CIWS is a self-contained weapon system
The system contains its own search and track radar (VPS-2), fire control system and 20 millimeter
gatling gun. The system can operated independently in an automatic mode and can also receive
designation sectors from other sensors Interfaces with other CMX sensors would be
incorporated to ensure a smooth hand-off of any local self-defense "leakers." Maximum range is
2 nautical miles with an effective range of 0.8 nautical miles Rate of fire is 3000-4500 rounds
per minute with approximately 1500 rounds in the magazine. The entire system weighs 12446
pounds and has a working circle of 216 inches.
(c) MK 36 Mod 2 SRBOC
Chaff and other decoys are employed for defensive deception of enemy radars, particularly
homing radars of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Each MK 36 Super Rapid-Blooming-Chaff
(SRBOC) launcher consists of six 130 mm tubes. Cartridges available are Torch IR decoy, Super
Chaffstar, Super Hiram Ill/Super Hiram IV(IR), and Super Gemini RF/IR. Chaff or decoy launch
could be initiated manually or automatically during ASCM defensive reaction modes.
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b. Self-Defense ASUW Elements
(1) Harpoon (AGM/RGM/UGM-84)
As previously discussed, Harpoon would be used in conjunction with the CEC/OCL
concept. In addition, the CMX would have the capability to launch Harpoon independently to
support ASUW self-defense.
(2) Tomahawk
A previously discussed, CMX would have the capability to initiate Tomahawk launches
independently or to respond to a launch command to support the CEC/OCL concept. The CMX
would also have the capability to launch Tomahawk independently to support ASUW
self-defense.
c. Self-Defense ASW Elements
(1) Surface Ship Torpedo Defense Phase 1
Phase I of the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense system employs passive defense by utilizing
a trailed underwater acoustic emitter The current phase 1 system is the improved Nixie
SLQ-36. The installation at the CMX fantail would include a pair of winches with two Nixie
bodies. Each towed body is approximate 6 inches by 3 1 inches. The decoys would trail the ship
through ports in the transom. Only one decoy would be operated at a time, although two would
be installed for redundancy.
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5. Aviation Elements
The CMX would posses the capability to carry an embarked helicopter or an unmanned
aviation vehicle (UAV). While UAVs are used by foreign navies for tactical reconnaissance,
there are no UAVs in use which have attack capability. Such UAVs are technologically feasible in
the near future and thus remain a candidate for the CMX combat system. Conventional
helicopters, such as the SH-60B/F have proven to be versatile and capable performers in the Fleet
Recent Gulf War experience has indicated the effectiveness of attack helicopters such as the
AH-1W Seacobra for ships operating in littoral waters.
The CMX aviation elements employed would be selected based on the deployment mission
and the assessment of the Fleet CINC's operational commander. The CMX would be able to
carry helicopters up to the size of the SH-60B/F.
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C. EVALUATION OF SELF-DEFENSE COMBAT SYSTEM
The Combat System, as defined above, was evaluated against expected threats to
determine its capability to protect the CMX from anti-ship missiles that leak through the outer air
defenses of the task force. The threat weapon models developed by the Design Team, are
representative of the likely threat missiles the CMX would encounter (see Appendix B). These
threat missiles were used to conduct the evaluation of the combat system for the CMX.
1. Threat Parameters
The following table from Appendix B, lists the characteristics of the threat missiles that
were used to evaluate the combat system performance of the CMX:
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The Trasher missile is an air launched high speed anti-radiation missile designed to
suppress the radars of a target. The warhead is small at 10 kilograms but designed to destroy the
relatively unprotected antennas of the radar system.
The Takeover missile is an air launched anti-ship missile with active radar guidance and a
large 1000 kilogram warhead. It cruises to the target at an altitude of 50,000 feet with a terminal
dive to the target at a 50° angle and is designed to sink or severely disable ships through its large
blast effect and penetrating warhead.
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The Seagull missile is a ship or air launched subsonic sea skimming anti-ship missile It
has a semi-armor piercing warhead of 1 10 kilograms. It uses active radar for guidance and is
designed to disable a ship by blast damage within the hull of the ship
The Sunstroke missile is an air or surface launched high speed sea skimming anti-ship
missile. The warhead is relatively small at 50 kilograms but the high speed of the missile
decreases the likelihood that it will be shot down Also, the warhead is designed to disable a ship
by blast effects.
2. CMX Combat System Parameters
In this section, parameters of the CMX engagement elements were analyzed to evaluate
the effectiveness of the CMX self-defense combat system The results of four Anti-ship Missile
Defense (ASDM) engagements are presented From the results of the saturation engagement of
an AEGIS cruiser (see Blue Water Engagement scenario, Chapter II, Section B), the maximum
number of leakers the CMX would be expected to engage is 3 missiles. Only AAW threats were
analyzed. This does not imply that the ASW, ASUW or mine-countermeasures defense areas are
not important or not in need of study. Resources and time constraints, however, preclude similar
studies in these areas. The basic methodology presented in this report would also be used to
study these other defensive warfare area.
For point-defense, the CMX would use a combination of defensive weapons. The
proposed electronic warfare system is the SLQ-32(V3) which features threat warning, active
jamming and automatic threat engagement capabilities The proposed defensive missile system is
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the Sea Sparrow system. While the Evolved Sea Sparrow system is proposed for installation in
the CMX, the characteristics of this system are largely unknown except that the new missile will
be more capable than the current missile. Thus, this evaluation was conservative in nature. The
final layer of self-defense is the MK 15 Phalanx Close In Weapons System (CIWS). The










w/CHAFF, TORCH *•— m» •«
Active jamming,
false targets
MK 15 CIWS 3650 fps 0.81 0.05 Impact
VLS Sea Sparrow 1.5Mach 8 0.75 Proximity fused
warhead
The probability of kill (Pk) of each engagement element against each threat was estimated
to be as follows:
Table 4-5. CMX Engagement Elements' Probability of Kill (Pk)




Trasher 0.3 0.1 0.7
Takeover 0.8 0.4 0.8
Sunstroke 0.5 0.4 0.6
Seagull 0.7 0.4 0.7
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3. Assumptions And Definitions
In general, the inbound target was assumed to be non-maneuvering, with the exception of
the terminal flight prior to impact. Also, a target hit was considered to be a kill of the incoming
threat. It was also assumed that the combat system would be in full readiness condition.
(1) Radar Horizon: For the threats considered a conservative assumption was made
that the radar antennas would be located 50 feet above the surface of the ocean.
The radar horizon equation is given by:
rh=1.23(/H^" + yH radaf
where: rh = radar horizon in nm
H^ = height of target above surface in feet
H
ndiI
= height of own ship radar above the surface in feet
Using an assumed target height of 30 feet the radar detection distance was
15.75 nm.
(2) Operational Arcs: The ship's weapon and sensor array were assumed to have a
360° arc of fire and detection capability.
(3) Engagement rules: To determine whether a particular threat could be engaged,
the following timing rules were used:
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(a) A minimum often seconds time delay was assumed from the time of
detection to the time of classification, and assignment to the fire control
system.
(b) A minimum of 2 seconds time delay was assumed from the time of
assignment to the fire control system, to the time the first missile would be
launched.
(c) The minimum launch interval would be 1 second between missile launches.
(d) A minimum of 4 seconds was used from the time-of-kill assessment to the
time of weapon re-engagement.
(e) The threat missiles would be engaged at the maximum range of the
self-defense system
(f) The threat missiles would be detected at a range of 50 nm or the radar
horizon which ever would be applicable.
(g) AJ1 threat missiles would be launched at their maximum range.
(h) The ship's self-defense engagements would be serial in nature and would not
interfere with each other.
(4) Definition of kill—The incoming threat would either be caused to miss the ship or
be damaged to such an extent that the warhead and/or debris of the missile would
present no threat to the ship systems or personnel.
4. Threat Engagement Profiles
In this section, engagements of the four threat missiles against the CMX combat system
were analyzed. In these analyses, the probability of killing the threat missile was calculated for the
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CMX defensive system engaging the incoming missile. For multiple missiles launched at the
CMX, it was assumed that each missile would be engaged such that they would not interfere with
each other, and the CMX self-defense systems would not be saturated by the incoming missile
raid.
The engagements are presented in time line format, with t=0 at the threat impact time, and
positive values representing the time to impact of the threat missile. These time lines are shown in
detail in Appendix D. A summary of the timelines is also included at the end of this section The
timeline was analyzed until the threat had theoretically impacted the ship This method allowed
analysis of weapon system capabilities in terms of reaction times and capability of engaging the
threat to the time of impact
a. Trasher Missile Engagement
The Trasher missile was launched at its maximum range of 40 miles at an altitude of 5000 feet
which is about 4000 feet above the radar horizon at a distance of 40 miles The missile was
detected 5.9 seconds later at a range of 37.3 miles. Ten seconds later the missile was classified as
a threat and assigned to the fire control system for engagement. The SLQ-32 automatically
engaged this immediate threat and began active jamming and launched CHAFF. Forty six seconds
from impact, the ship launched a Sea Sparrow missile with another launched one second later.
These two missiles engaged the inbound missile at 8.0 and 7.9 miles respectively. Four seconds
later the combat system had determined if it had killed the incoming missile and if it had not, it
would launch another set of two missiles 12 and 1 1 seconds before impact. These missiles
engaged the threat at ranges of 2.1 and 1.9 miles respectively. Finally at a range of 0.81 miles the
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MK 15 Phalanx Close in Weapons System engaged the target for 0.8 seconds The cumulative
kill probability for this threat missile was;
Pk = 1 - (1 - 0. 1)(1 - 0.7) 4 (1 - 0.3) = 0.994897
If three such missiles were launched at the CMX the expected number of hits would be
#hits = 3(1 - 0.994897) = 0.01 5309
b. Takeover Missile Engagement
The Takeover missile was launched at its maximum range of 300 miles at an altitude of
50,000 feet. The missile was detected at a range of 50 miles, 84 seconds before impact. Ten
seconds later the missile was classified as a threat and assigned to the Fire Control System for
engagement Seventy two seconds before impact the SLQ-32 began active jamming and fired
CHAFF The missile began its dive 17.2 seconds before impact. The fire control system
recalculated the intercept solution and fired Sea Sparrow missiles at 14 and 13 seconds before
impact. These missiles intercepted the inbound missile at a range of 2 7 and 2 5 miles. At a range
of 0.8 miles and 1 .3 seconds before impact the MK 1 5 CIWS engaged the target. The total
Probability of kill for this engagement was;
Pk = 1 - (1 - 0.4)(1 - 0.8) 2 (1 - 0.8) = 0.995
If three missiles were launched at the CMX the expected number of hits would be
#hits = 3(1 -0.9952) = 0.0144
94
c. Seagull Missile Engagement
The Seagull missile was launched at its maximum range of 15 miles and it immediately
descends to an altitude of 1 5 meters It was detected 1 10 seconds before impact at a range of
14.3 miles. Ten second later it was classified as a threat and assigned to the Fire Control System
to be engaged. At 90 seconds before impact the SLQ-32 began active jamming and launched
CHAFF. The probability of kill for this engagement was 0.4. Two Sea Sparrow missiles were
also launched at this time, one second apart These missiles intercepted the incoming missile at a
range of 8.0 and 7.9 miles respectively Because this missile was relatively slow six additional Sea
Sparrow missiles engaged the target at ranges of 5.0, 4.9, 2.9, 2.8, 1.4 and 1.3 miles. Finally the
MK 15 CIWS engaged the target 6.3 seconds before impact at a range of 0.8 miles. The total
probability of kill for this engagement was
Pk = 1 - (1 - 4)(1 - 0.7) 8 (1 - 0.7) = 0.999988190
If three missiles were launched against the CMX the expected number of hits would be
#hits = 3(1 - 0.9999881902) = 0.0000354291
d. Sunstroke Missile Engagement
The Sunstroke missile was launched at its maximum range of 65 miles and immediately
descends to an altitude of 10 meters. This threat was detected 32 seconds before impact at the
radar horizon of 14.9 miles. Ten seconds later the missile was classified as a threat and assigned
too the fire control system for engagement. At a range of 9.3 miles and 20 seconds before impact
the SLQ-32 began active jamming and launches CHAFF. Also, at this time, two Sea Sparrow
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missiles were launched, at a one second interval. These missiles intercepted the target 7.5 and 7.1
seconds before impact. Finally the MK 15 CIWS engaged the threat 1.7 seconds before impact at
a range of 0.81 miles. The probability of kill for this engagement was
Pk = 1 - (1 - 0.4)(1 - 0.6) 2 (1 - 0.5) = 0.95
If three missiles were launched at the CMX the expected number of hits would be
#hits = 3(1 -0.952) = 0.141
5. Threat Engagement Summary
In summary, the CMX is capable of meeting the minimum probability of kill against each
on the threat missiles. The Sunstroke missile presents the biggest threat to the CMX. However
this type of missile, while under development in several countries, is currently not in any
inventory. In addition, the self-defense missiles carried by the CMX will certainly evolve beyond
the current Sea Sparrow missile This will enable the CMX to maintain its excellent self-defense
capability against the current missiles likely to engage the CMX.
A summary of these results is provided in the following table:
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Table 4-6. CMX Threat Engagement Summary
Threat Missile CMX Probability of
Kill (Pk)
Expected Number of







D. COMBAT SYSTEM DEFINITION SUMMARY
Candidates for elements of the CMX combat system were selected from open sources.
Characteristics of the candidates systems were analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively by
the Design Team. The elements which survived the selection process were then evaluated against
probable future threats. The evaluation section clearly demonstrates the high effectiveness of the
CMX combat system. However, further analysis beyond the scope of this project would be
required to evaluate the effectiveness of the CEC and OCL elements selected
The table below, summarizes the element selection for combat system functional areas
resulting from the tradeoff studies of various candidate systems.
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Table 4-7. Combat System Element Tradeoff Selection
Elements Considered Elements Selected
AN/SPS-55 AN/SPS-64









AN/SPS-48 MK 23 TAS
Air Search & AN/SPS-49
Tracking MK 23 TAS
RIM-7 ESS RIM-7 ESS
AAW RIM-116RAM MK 15 Phalanx CIWS
Self-Defense Stinger
Engagement MK 45 5" Gun
MK 75 76mm Gun
MK 15 Phalanx CIWS
MK 38 Bushmaster
Goal Keeper
The following table summarizes element selection for combat system functional areas for
which detailed tradeoff studies were either not required based on the TOR/ORD requirements or
were beyond the scope of this project:
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Surface Ship Torpedo Defense Phase I
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V. FEASIBILITY STUDIES
Feasibility Studies are a series of top level tradeoff studies which determine the
relationship between military effectiveness and cost ofnew ship design concepts. The studies
considered the military effectiveness of sensors and weapons, speed, endurance, survivability,
reliability, maintainability and other factors related to the mission requirements. The goal of the
Feasibility Studies was to identify alternative ship concepts that offered balance between cost and
military performance, from which tradeoff studies were conducted to determine which was best.
Having determined the major payload of the ship in the Combat System Definition in terms
of specific elements, their size, weight, volume, power and service requirements were used as a
starting point for determining the ship's hull mechanical and electrical characteristics. These
determinations were made using the NAVSEA, computer based, ship design program known as
the Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool (ASSET).
Using known ship characteristics, based on operational requirements, payload definition
and other ship design concepts such as hull type, main propulsion, electrical distribution, (etc.),
ship configuration data banks were established in the program, one for each specific ship
configuration to be analyzed, from which computational modules were executed. These modules
addressed specific area of ship design, including hull geometry, hull structure, resistance,
propulsion, machinery, weight, space, hydrostatics, seakeeping, manning and cost. The output of
the program was the iteratively calculated, converged solution of the major ship characteristics for
each configuration.
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Sections A and B of this chapter discuss the scope of design concepts considered for the
CMX and model configurations used to analyze these concepts, and the outputs of the analyses
produced by ASSET. Sections C and D present the tradeoff analysis and final ship design concept
selected which was developed for the CMX.
103
A. DESIGN CONCEPTS CONSIDERED
This section presents a description of the ship design concepts considered for the CMX. It
was not the intention of the Design Team to consider all possible aspects of modern ship design in
this project, but rather to explore a range of design options that would represent a well rounded
survey, on which to base the Feasibility Studies.
Many factors limited the scope of options to be studied with primary consideration given
to the:
Ship Design Philosophy
Ability to model the design in ASSET
Amount of design data available
Time constraints
The following sections describe the design options. Prominent features or advantages of
the options are presented which justify their consideration. In some cases, comparison of more
than one option was sought, in others, decisions were made by the Team to eliminate options




The hull types considered can be grouped in two broad classes, destroyer/cruiser and
auxiliary hulls. Based on the results of the scenario and ROM studies it was apparent that this
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vessel would not be much larger than 10,000 long tons and would need to have a sustained speed
greater than 26 knots These features in addition to the limitations of the analysis tools,
influenced the design team's decision to investigate using a cruiser/destroyer hull. Within this
class of hull type, there were a number of standard hulls from which to begin the analysis We
selected two hull forms, the DD 963 and the DDG 5 1 . The auxiliary hulls were not in the
available data base, however they were shown to be unable to meet the speed requirements of the
CMX
b. Double Bottom
The use of a double bottom improves vessel survivability, provides a convenient fuel
stowage location and adds structural members which strengthen the hull girder. For these
reasons we examined this feature in our feasibility study design.
c. Hull Flare
The use of hull flare has been shown to have the beneficial effects of reducing the reflected
signature of the ship and improving seakeeping ability The DDG-51 has 10° of flare to reduce its
signature. The Design Team chose to analyze a similar flare as well as perpendicular side walls.
2. Main Propulsion
a. Drive Mechanism
Two major drive mechanisms were examined. The first, was a conventional main engine,
mechanically connected to the shaft via reduction gears. For the configuration of a single main
engine room (discussed in the following machinery room arrangements section), a cross-connect
gear was assumed to be installed. Mechanical drive has the advantage of low technical risk and
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good reliability. However, it requires a great deal of hull volume since all elements of the drive
train, with the exception of the propeller, must be contained within the hull and must be aligned in
an inflexible way.
The use of electric drive with podded propulsion was also considered. In this
configuration, the drive train consists of two main engines with generators, electrical cabling and
podded propulsors containing main propulsion motors. The primary advantages of podded
electric drive propulsion are; greater flexibility in engineroom placement, greater operational
flexibility, reduced ship service generator requirements, and improved propeller performance.
The first three advantages also contribute to a more survivable ship design. The disadvantages
are; greater technical risk (particularly associated with the generator cooling and the pod
connections) and possible increased ship draft
b. Main Machinery Room (MMR) Arrangement
Two variations of main machinery rooms were analyzed A conventional two MMR
arrangement and a single MMR were considered for the mechanical propulsion ships.
Traditionally, two main machinery room arrangements perceived to provide enhanced
survivability. Recent analysis as discussed in Rains, 1992, has challenged this perception and a one
engineroom configuration, with the engineroom located low and as far aft in the ship as possible,
may improve the survivability of the vessel. Furthermore, combining the main machinery into a
single room reduces the amount of hull volume occupied by propulsion systems, allowing for a
smaller vessel and/or increased payload.
The Electric Drive/Podded Propulsion vessel was analyzed with a two main machinery
room configuration. The Design Team felt that the need to protect the interconnecting cabling
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did not compromise survivability. To the contrary, the Team felt that the flexibility in placement
of these two main machinery rooms provided for potential optimization with respect to
survivability considerations In addition, separating the main engines distributed the electrical
generating capability.
c. Main Engines
The choices for main propulsion were limited to gas turbine and diesels based on the
results of the ROM Studies. It was decided that nuclear propulsion, for political and economical
reasons, was not a viable option Conventional steam propulsion was ruled out due to high
manning requirements, low power-to-weight ratio, and demanding preventive maintenance
requirements. Gas turbine and diesel engines were considered with two possible configurations, a
conventional 2 MMR ship and a single MMR ship
3. Electrical Distribution
a. Generators
A variety of generators was considered, including diesels, gas turbine and propulsion
derived. It was anticipated that the generators would not have a significant impact on the
conventional ship configurations, therefore different generator selections would be considered so
as to maximize power density and reduce maintenance and training requirements. Use of
generators types already existing in the fleet would support these goals
b. Propulsion Derived Ship Service Power
Propulsion derived ship service power has several advantages: improved fuel economy,
improved engineroom layout flexibility, and improved survivability. The disadvantages are: use of
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unproven technology, social resistance to a new generation scheme, and relatively unknown
reliability and maintainability. The PDSS ship is expected to have reductions in weight, volume
and cost. This option was considered in conjunction with the electric drive ship to achieve greater
flexibility in speed reduction.
4. Auxiliaries
a. Dispersed
Conventional ship designs are configured with centralized auxiliaries There is usually
extensive interconnecting piping, and numerous fittings exist which permit isolation of damaged
sections and system reconfiguration via cross-connection To limit the size and weight which
auxiliary systems add to the ship, and to improve survivability, the Team considered incorporating
the use of dispersed auxiliaries into the CMX design
b. Zonal Auxiliaries
Zonal Auxiliaries is typified by the co-location of the major auxiliary systems with the
systems that are being serviced. The systems are sized to handle the local load, and are repeated
when multiple loads exist throughout the ship. For example, rather than having one Electronics
Cooling system for the entire ship, a separate system exists for each major zone or enclave. This
arrangement improves survivability, since the support systems will be located near the
components serviced. Damage may be localized to a particular area within an enclave and other
enclaves would not be affected. This configuration may introduce additional maintenance




Material selection can play an important role in the cost and weight of the ship. The
Design Team examined the effects of using different materials for the hull Mild and High Tensile
Strength (HTS) were considered
b. Superstructure
Historically, the design standard for superstructure blast overpressure had been 3 psi.
Beginning with the DDG-51, the Navy has begun to use 7 psi as the blast standard
Commensurate with this requirement, the Design Team decided to use the 7 psi standard.
c. Piping
Advances have been made in the applications of composite materials for ship's piping
Significant weight reductions can be achieved by the use of composites in piping systems. The
design team examined the effect of using composite piping in the ROM study of Appendix B,
however ASSET does not model this concept
6. Steaming Requirements
a. Range
The CMX would be forward deployed for a large portion of its operational life.
Moreover, it may spend significant time on station and would need to have a range similar to the
vessels with which it may be deployed The amphibious vessels have ranges on the order of 8000
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miles. This was selected as the desirable range. A minimum desired range of 6000 miles was
established to ensure that the CMX would be no more range limited than current combatants in
the fleet.
b. Speed
As established by the Requirements Document, the speeds for the CMX were considered
as follows:
Cruise Speed — the speed on which endurance range is based. The required cruise
speed was 20 knots.
Sustained Speed — the speed at which engine load is equal to 80% of rated capacity.
With a required sustained speed of 28 knots, the Design Team established a minimum
sustained speed of 26 knots to permit design flexibility.
Maximum Speed — the speed achieved at full load on the main engines The Design
Team established no maximum speed requirement
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B. ASSET MODELS
The ASSET (Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool) software, was developed by
Boeing under contract from David Taylor Research and Development Center and the Naval Sea
Systems Command It is a compiled FORTRAN program which allows a ship design team to
interactively synthesize the various aspects of ship design in a real time computing environment.
The program is composed of multiple modules which include hull geometry, hull structure, hull
subdivision, ship resistance, propulsion, machinery analysis and arrangement, weight, space,
hydrodynamics, cost analysis, sea keeping analysis and manning analysis The naval architecture
and machinery modules may be run under a synthesizing control program which iterates the
design until all aspects converge to within a specified tolerance The CMX Feasibility Studies
were conducted using the ASSET program
The Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) studies cited in Chapter 2 and contained in
Appendix B to this report provided the initial input for the ASSET feasibility study models.
Specific operational requirements, combat system payload, and ship design philosophy were
interactively combined within the framework of the design concepts described in the previous
section. Further, historical hull form and machinery arrangement data served to constrain the
bounds of the feasibility study. As a result of this synthesis of requirements, capabilities and
desires, three CMX ship models were developed for analysis.
This section includes a description of these three models and the parameter variations
analyzed with each model which incorporated the design concepts previously discussed. The




CMX 1 defines the baseline ship model for CMX feasibility studies. The CMX 1 model
was derived from the Spruance class destroyer hull form and machinery arrangement. While
Spruance class destroyers have two MMRs, each of which contain two LM2500 gas turbine
engines driving one propulsion shaft, CMX 1 has only one LM1600-VAN2 gas turbine engine
driving one propulsion shaft, in each main machinery room. The LM1600-VAN2 is a
regenerative gas turbine which has a rated output power of 26,250 HP. This use of one gas
turbine engine per shaft departs from the standard Navy practice as exemplified by the Spruance
class destroyer, the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate, the Ticonderoga class AEGIS cruiser, and
the Arleigh Burke class AEGIS guided missile destroyer. However, because the gas turbine
engine has been proven to be highly reliable, we decided that one per shaft was sufficient.
All Spruance class combat system elements were removed from the ASSET model
payload database, and replaced with a new combat system payload database that incorporated
the elements selected for the CMX (see Chapter 4) Of particular note, the CMX 1 baseline
model has six VLS banks each of which contain SM-2, Tomahawk, vertically launched ASROC,
and vertically launched Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles. Other major combat system detection and
engagement elements included in the CMX 1 model are:
Radiant Mist electro-optical surface search and track sensor
AN/SPS-64 navigation and surface search radar
MK 23 TAS (and air search radar)
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SLQ-32 (V3) ESM/ECM system
Two MK 1 5 Vulcan Phalanx CIWS
MK 91 Fire Control System with two dual directors
ACDS with Link 1 1 (model five) and Link 16
Offboard Command Launch System 1
Hanger, crew and logistics support for aviation assets of size, up to the SH-60B/F
CMX 1 employs three Allison DDA-501-K34 gas turbine generators each rated at 2500
kW to provide ship service electrical power This model incorporates features currently required
by the latest Navy standards, in addition to some which may be required by future standards or
achieved by probable technological advances These features include the following:
Controllable pitch propellers
Trail shaft operation at endurance speed for fuel economy
Gas turbine exhaust infrared suppression
Exclusive use of 60 Hz electrical distribution (no 400 Hz)
7 psi superstructure blast overpressure design
Partial Collective Protection System (CPS)
Modern Vidmar cabinet spare parts stowage
Current habitability and berthing standards
Minimal superstructure size for reduced detection signature
Reduced manning concepts
Very low noise (<84 dB) engine enclosures
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b. CMX 2
CMX 2 uses the CMX 1 hull form, payload and systems, but CMX 2 was arranged with
one main machinery room containing both LM1600-VAN2 propulsion engines.
Additionally, variants ofCMX 2 were run using diesel engines for main propulsion.
Configurations using two engines per shaft and one engine per shaft were modeled.
c. CMX 3
CMX 3 incorporates the same payload as CMX 1 and CMX 2. However, its hull form
was derived from the DDG 51 class instead of the Spruance class destroyer. The CMX 3 hull has
greater flare and greater beam at the main deck level as compared to CMX 1 and CMX 2. CMX
3 further departed from CMX 1 and CMX 2 (and current ships) by using podded electric drive for
main propulsion The CMX 3 machinery arrangement utilized two main machinery rooms.
CMX 3 uses the same LM1600-VAN2 propulsion turbines as the previous CMX models.
Each of the two LM1600-VAN2 turbines are used to drive a propulsion generator and a 2500
kW Variable Speed Constant Frequency (VSCF) cyclo-converter generator. The propulsion
generators power a propulsion bus which supplies power to the two electric drive pods. The
propulsion generators are the alternating current (AC) synchronous type with liquid cooled stators
and air cooled rotors. The AC power from the propulsion generators is rectified prior to the
propulsion bus. The electric drive motors are direct current (DC) type, and a helium refrigeration
system was incorporated to provide supercooling of the DC pod motors. Each propulsion pod
drives a contrarotating propeller system The propeller system was attached to the forward end of
the pod to improve the flow stream characteristics into the propellers and thereby improve
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propeller efficiency. The forward propellers have five blades and the after ones have seven blades
in order to provide torque balance and hydrodynamic efficiency.
As noted above, two 2500 kW VSCF generators provide propulsion derived ships service
(PDSS) power. Additionally, two Allison DDA-501-K17 gas turbine generators each rated at
2500 kW are installed in separate auxiliary machinery rooms (AMR). These generators are
installed transversely in order to reduce the AMR volume and area consumed by the AMRs.
2. Parameter Variations
CMX 1 was established as the baseline model for the feasibility studies Each CMX
model, however has a baseline configuration from which the following parameter variations were
analyzed
a. Number of VLS Modules
The baseline ship for each CMX model includes six VLS modules. A five VLS module
variant was modeled and analyzed to determine marginal ship impact
b. Steaming Requirements
Ship endurance range was modified from 8000 nautical miles to 7000 nautical miles for
each of the three CMX models.
c. Waste Heat Boilers




The following tables provide the principle characteristics of each CMX model
configuration, and the parameter variations for each model, as determined using the ASSET
program.
For the CMX 2 diesel configuration, the two engines (one per shaft) proved too large
vertically, for the size engineroom provided in the baseline CMX 2 model. When smaller engines
were used (two per shaft), it became difficult to fit the four engines in the single machinery room
ship. The net effect of using diesel propulsion engines was an increase in displacement of
approximately 2000 LT. Since these results have significant negative impact on the CMX design,
no table is provided.
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LBP feet 592 577 579 592
BEAM (DWL) feet 61.8 60.3 604 61.8
BEAM
Weather Deck
feet 61 8 60.3 60.4 61.8
DEPTH
Station 10
feet 47 45.8 45.9 47
DRAFT (DWL) feet 20.1 196 19.7 20.1
GM T feet 64 66 5.7 6.4
c„ 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
e, 0.82 0.82 082 082
A (light ship) tons 6,655 6,120 6,320 6,655
A (full load) tons 9,520 8,840 8,890 9,520
v
c
knots 20 20 20 20
Range nm 8,000 8,000 7,000 8,000
v„ knots 28.4 28.6 286 284
V
mil knots 298 30 30 29.8




3 6.6 x 10 5 6.4 x 10 5 6.4 x 10 5 6.6 x 10 5
24 Hour Average
Electric Load
kw 2,050 1,900 1,974 2,050
Average Cost $M 468 448 454 468
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LBP feet 592.6 578.7 580.5 592.8
BEAM (DWL) feet 61.9 60.5 60.7 61.9
BEAM
Weather Deck
feet 61.9 60.5 60.7 61.9
DEPTH
Station 10
feet 47 45.9 46.1 47.1
DRAFT (DWL) feet 20.2 19.7 19.8 20.2
GM T feet 6.3 6.6 5.7 6.4
C
>
0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
c, 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
A (light ship) tons 6,686 6,186 6,415 6,686
A (full load) tons 9,559 8,901 8,984 9,571
v
c
knots 20 20 20 20
Range nm 8,000 8,000 7,000 8,000
v., knots 28.5 286 28.6 28.5
Vmil knots 29.9 30 30 29.9




3 61,149 59,357 59,581 61,373
24 Hour Average
Electric Load
kw 2,150 1,994 2,074 2,255
Average Cost $M 471.2 451.7 459.1 471.1
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LBP feet 555.3 5398 551 554.8
BEAM (DWL) feet 57.7 56.1 57.3 57.7
BEAM
Weather Deck
feet 668 64.9 66.3 66.7
DEPTH
Station 10
feet 44.1 429 43.7 44
DRAFT (DWL) feet 184 179 183 184
GM T feet 3.8 4 3.6 3 8
Cn 0.56 056 0.56 0.56
c, 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
A (light ship) tons 6,111 5,618 6,060 6,079
A (full load) tons 7,844 7,207 7,662 7,820
v
c
knots 20 20 20 20
Range nm 8,000 8,000 7,000 8,000
vu knots 29.4 29.5 29.4 29.3
Vmil knots 30.7 30.8 30.7 30.7




3 56,986 54,997 56,451 56,942
24 Hour Average
Electric Load
kw 2,059 1,893 2,030 2,159




The tradeoff matrix for the model selection between CMX 1, CMX 2 and 3 is presented
on the following page. Salient selection factors are discussed below.
Average ship costs for CMX 1 and CMX 2 were within one percent for comparable
parameter variations. CMX 3 cost decreases were greater than three percent. Thus, CMX 3 is
rated most favorable in the cost design factor.
All three CMX models were run using six VLS modules. ASSET, however does not
incorporate the exact dimensions of the VLS modules into the volume calculations. As a check of
the ASSET models, the actual areas and volumes for the VLS modules were compared to those
output from the model runs. As a result, although the ASSET program converged on a solution
for CMX 1, with six VLS modules, the Team felt that only five VLS modules would actually fit in
the CMX 1 hull. Therefore, the CMX 1 model was given a lower rating for CEC/OCL
Effectiveness than CMX 2 and CMX 3.
All CMX models had the same self-defense capabilities and were judged to have equally
superior self-defense capability.
CMX 1, with two main spaces and conventional mechanical arrangement and shafting,
was rated low in survivability. CMX 2, with both main engines in one main space and
conventional mechanical arrangement and shafting, was rated as average. CMX 3 was rated
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redundant propulsion electrical power cabling and reduced sonar and synthetic aperture radar
detectability achieved through flow improvements related to its podded propulsion.
With two main spaces for a small-to-moderate sized ship, CMX 1 would be expected to
require above average manning CMX 2 would require average manning. Due to projected
reliability of electric drive systems, and the requirement for depot level vice organization level
maintenance of the actual propulsion pods, CMX 3 would require lower manning than its
mechanical drive counterparts.
The inability to perform at-sea organization level repairs to the podded propulsion
components is viewed as a greater negative effect than the projected positive effect of improved
reliability. Thus, CMX 3 is rated lower than CMX 1 and CMX 2 in R, M & A.
The first generation electric drive system is expected to have greater potential for future
growth and upgrade as compared to the relatively mature technology of mechanical drive.
CMX 1 would employ standard two machinery room layout of reduction gearing and
shafting. However, electric propulsion is currently not a Fleet standard Thus the CMX 3 rating
suffers in this area.
All CMX variants were judged to have equal and average COTS utilization factors.
CMX 3 offers several advantages over the conventional mechanical drive ships. As noted
above, the podded propulsors are expected to be less detectable by sonar or by synthetic aperture
radar. The contrarotating propellers will face a more ideal flow stream due to lack of shafting and
support struts in the forward flow path. Due to reduced propeller loading, each contrarotating
propeller is sized smaller than a single conventional propeller. Thus for a given RPM at a smaller
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diameter, propeller tip velocities will be reduced. This results in reduced cavitation. The
orientation of the propulsion pods will reduce trailing vortices and other normally distinguishable
wake characteristics Due to the arrangement flexibility afforded by electrical transmission as
compared to mechanical transmission, the main machinery spaces can be separated greater
distances along the length of the ship The adjoining exhaust ducting and hot gases will be more
distributed as compared to conventional ships This results in a reduced probability of IR
detection in any one "search" area Additionally, the more widely separated ER characteristics
may "confuse" the IR homing device in an enemy anti-ship cruise missile.
With regard to specifications (weights, volumes, power requirements, etc.), CMX 1 was
rated low due to the weights associated with the conventional mechanical drive CMX 2 was
slightly improved with its reduced shafting and gearing requirements. CMX 3 was rated above
average due to the weight and volume reduction achieved with electric podded propulsion.
CMX 2 and 3 were rated lowest with respect to political/societal issues due to their
unconventional configurations. CMX 1, with its single engine per shaft, was rated average.
All three CMX models were rated equal with respect to the other design priority factors
had no effect on the overall CMX selection. No significant discussion points are noteworthy.




Results of the ASSET runs demonstrating the parameter variations are shown on the
following pages.
The following table shows the percent changes resulting from the model parameter
changes. Electric heat showed little change for both CMX 1 and 2 due to their similar
configurations, and was deleted from the CMX 2 column. For comparison, however, the changes
for the diesel configuration ofCMX 2 are included.
The figures show these results in a bar graph format, comparing the actual values of the
ship characteristics.
These results show that the parameter changes result in more desirable ship characteristics



































































































































































































Figure 5- 1a. Parameter Changes


















Figure 5-1 b. Parameter Changes
D CMX 1 CMX 2 E CMX 3













































D. FINAL DESIGN CONCEPT
As described in the previous section, the model selected for the CMX design was that of
CMX 3 (heretofore referred to as CMX). The discussion below, describes additional ASSET
analyses that were done to arrive at the final synthesized CMX hull, upon which the Preliminary
design would be developed:
Enlarging the superstructure forward and adding superstructure aft near the
after-MMR uptakes This provides more superstructure than specified by ASSET,
however, it was felt that this was necessary since ASSET historically underestimates
the amount required The after deckhouse allowed the intakes to be higher above the
waterline to minimize seawater ingestion, and provides some of the volume required
for a helicopter hangar.
Fixing the values for manning and accommodations
Determining the size, type and number of turbine generators.
Estimating the expected size and weight of the C 3 systems.
Positioning of the transverse watertight bulkheads to accommodate the desired VLS
bank arrangement, and meet the enclaving and floodable length requirements.
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VI. PRELIMINARY DESIGN
In the Preliminary Design Phase of the ship design process, the model selected through the
Feasibility Studies is further developed in sufficient detail to facilitate establishing Contract Design
Specifications.
The objectives of the preliminary design are to quantify ship performance, refine design
estimates and reduce or eliminate major risks Through the course of this phase the following
design baseline elements are established:
Detailed ship geometry
Combat system baseline
Lines and arrangement drawings
Intact and damaged stability analysis
"Three digit" weights
Master Equipment List (MEL)
Class "C" cost estimate
This chapter presents the detailed development of the CMX model selected through the
Feasibility Studies (Chapter 5). These detailed discussions reference the ASSET model output for
the Final Design Concept CMX, which is included in Appendix F.
For the purpose of this project, to limit the scope of the preliminary design phase for the
CMX. only specific areas of the elements listed above will be developed in this chapter. These
areas include a discussion of the Combat System Architecture and development of the Hull,
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Mechanical and Electrical systems design (sections A and B). The Naval Architecture analysis is
presented in section C. Sections D and E are the Ship Arrangements drawings and Enclaving
concept, and a discussion of the Manning Organization is included in section F.
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A. GENERAL COMBAT SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section presents a detailed description of the physical and functional characteristics of
the combat system architecture developed for the CMX While the Combat System Definition
(Chapter 4) outlined various specific equipments which would be installed in the CMX, selected
primarily from the pool of systems available today, this section discusses how the Design Team
postulated these systems may be incorporated into the CMX using technology which is currently
being developed or may be available by the year 2010.
Included in this section are the combat system physical and functional block diagrams,
functional flow diagrams and descriptions, and a discussion of the battle organization for the
CMX
1. Combat System Integration and Management
The Design Team postulated a very advanced, highly integrated combat system for the
CMX. It would take advantage of the tremendous leaps currently being made in computational
power and system integration. There would be a relatively small Combat Information Center
(CIC), which would function as the primary control station for all ship self-defense and OCL
functions. A separate Maintenance Control Center/Auxiliary Combat Information Center
(MCC/ACIC), located in a separate enclave, would provide limited redundancy. It would
function primarily as the maintenance control center, but would contain sufficient equipment to
provide OCL functions if there were damage to CIC.
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To the maximum extent possible, all consoles would be identical in appearance, but be
configured for different functions as provided by host software for the console. This concept
postulates the development of a Standard Multi-function Console (SMC), consisting of a
reconiigurable tablet or keyboard section, and a monitor section. The screens would be touch
sensitive to allow the use of a pointer or finger to activate commands. The console would be
programmable with rule-based expert knowledge, and configured with scanning modules enabling
it to recognize specific users and tasks The current overabundance of console types and
variations could be reduced by the development of an SMC.
All major elements would be connected via fiber optic data buses. A scaled down
version of the highly acclaimed National Data Highway, the bus contains multiple parallel paths
controlled by two independent workstations functioning as servers, providing reconfiguration and
processing capability. Rapid developments in fiber optics hold the promise of incredibly large
bandwidths in a reliable, secure and flexible environment. Wiring would be dramatically reduced.
The use of distinct, distributed parallel busses could improve the survivability of the vessel
A Combat System Operating Program (SYS-OP) was postulated, which would allow
operators in CIC to remotely control the operation and employment of the combat system in all
modes and report the status of all combat system elements to a Combat System Readiness Logic
System (SYS-READ) program. The operators in MCC/ACIC would monitor the combat system
readiness via the SYS-READ, and provide secondary control of the SYS-OP system.
Specific capabilities and requirements of the systems and components described above are
detailed in the following sections.
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a. Embedded Support System Requirements
The combat system for the CMX would require significant support services. This
would include 60 Hertz electrical power, chilled water, sea water, ventilation including humidity
control and high pressure air. Significant piping weight reductions and improved survivability can
be achieved by the use of zonal auxiliaries The CMX would have two auxiliary system zonal
modules, each with a complete set of auxiliaries (including electrical generation), capable of
supporting the ship's primary OCL mission (see Hull, Mechanical and Electrical section) The
Engineering Control Center/Damage Control Center (ECC/DCC), would monitor the status and
direct the operation of this equipment through similar systems to the SYS-OP/SYS-READ,
configured for the engineering plant (see Hull, Mechanical and Electrical section).
b. Readiness Assessment, Fault Detection and Identification Requirements
As indicated in the previous section, control, operation and monitoring of the combat
system would be accomplished through the use of the SYS-OP/SYS-READ program systems.
SYS-READ would interface with SYS-OP and use the status reports generated by each
component to make an assessment of the combat system readiness. It would constantly monitor
processing performance and reassign processors based on system time lags. Processes would be
prioritized and it would recognize low priority routine events such as programmed maintenance
during combat situations.
SYS-OP would coordinate an embedded fault detection system. Failure of components
would be flagged and diagnostic routines, incorporated in the software, would be run in the
background or directly by the operators in MCC/ACIC. The equipment could be monitored for
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performance, both on a simplistic level (i.e., is the equipment on?), or up to a more sophisticated
level such as power surges, ground fault detection or fiber optic splice failures.
Through SYS-READ, automated status logic could report the ship's readiness rating
directly to the Commanding Officer and higher authority, provide an input for work requests or
provide an equipment run time input for scheduling maintenance. Beyond providing status,
SYS-READ could also provide indications of equipment operating condition, impending failure,
required maintenance and provide recommendations for equipment reconfiguration in failure
conditions or under battle damage The system could also provide the capability to accomplish an
emergency function when a missile hit is impending If the ship is damaged, the SYS-READ
could provide updated status to ECC/DCC and provide recommendations to the operators, via
SYS-OP
c. System Readiness Logic
The SYS-OP/SYS-READ program systems would satisfy the detailed Test Requirements
Analysis document which would be developed in the final stages of preliminary design. Thus,
SYS-READ would both determine that a fault conditions exists with a given element and the
location of the fault. At this level, SYS-OP/SYS-READ would assign a readiness rating to each
major element of the combat system. The elemental ratings would follow the standard mission
readiness rating system which is established by NWP 10-1-11, Status of Resources and Training
System (SORTS). These ratings are displayed in the following table:
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Readiness Rating Levels
Rating Description of Capability
Ml 90 to 100 percent
M2 70 to 89 percent
M3 60 to 69 percent
M4 1 to 59 percent
M5 No Capability
SYS-READ would combine the element readiness ratings using pre-programmed logic
algorithms and re-programmable rule-based expert system algorithms The Combat System
Readiness Logic Diagrams provide a graphic view of the readiness conditions for elements of the
combat system which comprise the functional areas of detection, control, and engagement.
Example Readiness Logic Diagrams for OCL, AAW (Self-defense) and ASUW (Self-defense)
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M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 M2
VLS 1 VLS 2 VLS 3 VLS 4 VLS 5 VLS 6
M5
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d. Reconfiguration and Repair Requirements
Fault tolerance and reconfigurability are crucial for the survival of the CMX The use of
fiber optic cables would allow for multiple paths for data flows The sequential elements would
use a 'primary' data path until failure is detected. The data path would then be switched to an
alternate path and SYS-OP/SYS-READ would be notified of the failure. Failure of a processor
node would also be detected and an alternative processor would be selected to perform those
functions. Again SYS-OP/SYS-READ would be notified of the failure. Systems similar to those
of the AEGIS and MK 1 17 FCS would be used to allow the system to attempt a 'hot recovery'
(where an alternative copy of the program with crucial data is stored in spare memory), or a
'warm start' (where the computer reloads the computer program and critical data). An additional
level of reliability can be achieved by a 'hot spare' computer, where a dedicated spare computer,
complete with program and data, would be ready to come on line as soon as failure is detected
The CMX would have this last feature readily available as ACIC would have a manned spare
SMC ready come on line in the event that CIC is damaged beyond use (Falatko, 1990).
Security considerations would also be incorporated to allow for the possibility of
deployment of nuclear capable missiles As with conventional weapons, during combat, the
Auxiliary CIC would have sufficient manning or electrically provided interlocks to allow for
proper command and control of Special Weapons if CIC is lost
e. Survivability Management Requirements
The combat system architecture is crucial in ensuring survivability. The proposed concept
is to disperse the computers throughout the ship. Individual, specialized computers would be
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located near the sensors whose data they process; a radar computer near the radar equipment. In
addition, other specialized computers, like signal processors, would be located near the equipment
they support. Thus, sensors and the serving computer are likely to be lost at the same time,
following the "series-connected-equipment" survivability concept. Less specialized functions
could be accomplished by multipurpose computers, which could be allocated to workstations
integral with the Standard Multi-function Consoles (SMC). Loss of these computers would
permit reconfiguration within the SYS-OP/SYS-READ network to restore service. These
computers can be standardized and may even be commercial products ruggedized for Naval
service. The use of modern multipurpose computers would enable functions to be switched as
required
f. Embedded Training Requirements
The combat system would have an embedded training capability. Scenarios would be
easily programmable or available for use by the ship to provide realistic, real time training The
training module would incorporate as much of the combat system as possible. Positive control
would always be provided for weapons safety. The system would be able to be interface with
other ships or shore training facilities to allow task force level, integrated training. This would be
especially important for the OCL capabilities.
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2. Combat System Diagrams
a. Physical Architecture
The physical architecture of the CMX combat system describes the functional layout of
the combat system elements from the viewpoint of the information flow and data buses. The
CMX combat system data buses would be fiber optic and thus capable of virtually unlimited data
bandwidth when compared to current standards The data bus structure would be arranged in an
H-architecture. Each functional information flow path (i.e. detection or control), however,
would be arranged into a ring Thus, the sensor data bus, the system information data bus, and
the command and control data bus would appear as rings tied together in an H-architecture.
These "rings" would exits on a single, multiplexed fiber optic data bus, separated by distinct
frequencies or wavelengths and with a given bandwidth..
The physical cabling layout on the ship would be redundant to improve survivability, with
two separate data buses.
Functional and physical layout of the CMX combat system architecture are shown on the
following pages. The drawings are shown in the H-"ring" configuration. The physical layout
drawings have been arranged by warfare area to concisely demonstrate the architecture Further,
support services such as electrical power, chill water, and service air have also been omitted for
simplicity.
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3. Functional Flow Diagrams
Functional Flow Diagrams were developed for an AAW/OCL engagement by the CMX
combat system. The Tier diagram provides an overview of the functional flow of system
information for such an engagement. Tier 1 drawings which describe the general Tier black
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B. HULL, MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
This section presents a detailed discussion of the hull, mechanical and electrical systems
developed for the CMX. The Feasibility Studies (Chapter 5) identified the major components of
these systems, and this section discusses how the Design Team postulated these systems may be
incorporated into the CMX.
Included in the section are the propulsion and ship service electrical distribution diagrams
for the CMX
1. Engineering System Integration and Management
The Design Team postulated that Engineering Control and Monitoring Systems are
connected by a redundant fiber optic network These systems are fully integrated with the ships
combat system, as discussed in the previous section. Electrical power, air conditioning and
ventilation requirements, and other services would be controlled using programs based on
rule-based expert systems, and aligned to provide optimum ship mission effectiveness. Graceful
degradation of support services would be incorporated in the control algorithms.
Engineering control consoles would be re-configurable, self-contained, multi-function
units similar in concept to the combat system multi-function consoles using a primary engineering
control program (ENG/SYS-OP) and a primary engineering readiness monitoring system,
(ENG/SYS-READ). Engineering control and monitoring subsystems would include:
a AUX/SYS-OP and AUX/SYS-READ for control and monitoring of auxiliary
systems;
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b. DC/SYS-OP and DC/SYS-READ for control and monitoring of damage control
systems,
c. EE/SYS-OP and EE/SYS-READ for control and monitoring of ships service
electrical systems.
2. Hull
The CMX hull has a 1 degree flare angle which is similar to that of the DDG 5 1 . The
flare angle both improves seakeeping ability and aids in radar cross-section reduction The CMX
does not have a bow mounted sonar dome The CMX hull incorporates a double bottom to
improve survivability, strengthen the girder, and provide for tankage volume. The hull girder is
composed of standard three-eighths inch medium strength steel plate, and the main deck is made
from high strength HY-80 steel. The detailed midships section design is derived from the ASSET
structural module (see Section C, Naval Architecture)
The weather deck is raised up to the 01 level from the aft deckhouse to the bow. From
the aft deckhouse to the stern, the main deck is the weather deck. This aft weather deck section
also forms the helicopter landing area and part of the aviation hangar storage area. The aviation
hangar fully retracts into the aft superstructure and can be expanded aft over approximately 40%
of the landing area.
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3. Main Propulsion
The CMX has two main machinery rooms that contain an LM 1 600-VAN2 regenerative
gas turbine. Each of the two LM 1600-VAN2 gas turbines is rated at 26,400 HP and drive both a
main propulsion generator, and a local propulsion derived ship service (PDSS) generator. The
gas turbine and the propulsion generator are directly coupled, with each machine rated at 3600
rpm. The PDSS generator, rated at 6000 rpm, is connected to the power turbine though a gear.
The gas turbine and its two associated generators are mounted on a common bedplate in the
athwartships direction This arrangement was selected to more efficiently use interior space. The
Team believed that modern turbine designs were able to compensate for the additional thrust
bearing loading and loading cycles due to the athwartships arrangement
The regenerative LM 1600-VAN2 main turbines were selected primarily due to their high
output power-to-weight ratio, output power-to-volume ratio, and outstanding specific fuel
consumption. Regeneration improves fuel economy such that the cruising specific fuel
consumption may be of the order of 0.328 lbm/hp-hr. Additionally, the LM 1600 is expected to
demonstrate the high reliability of the GE marine gas turbine line which includes the venerable,
reliable LM 2500.
Use of electric drive involves some technical risk to the Navy. However, in all cases of
main propulsion equipment selection, commercial industrial applications currently exist. The
propulsion generators incorporate liquid cooling for both the rotor and the stator. Demineralized
water provides the primary local component cooling via integral tubes, sheets, or heat exchangers.
The demineralized water is cooled by auxiliary seawater via an external heat exchanger. The
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propulsion generators produce three phase, 6300 volt, variable frequency power to a solid state
main propulsion power conditioner and frequency control system The propulsion power
conditioner incorporates silicon controlled rectifiers (SCR) in a cycloconverter arrangement. The
main propulsion cycloconverter SCRs are commutated (or switched on and off) by the cyclic
sinusoidal variation of the propulsion generator output Dynamic braking load banks are used for
rapid maneuvering between forward and reverse directions And, while electronic frequency
control down to zero Hertz is possible, as output frequency is reduced so is the electrical power
factor (Hensler, 1989). At rated speed, the propulsion generator would operate at a relatively
efficient power factor of 80 At near zero speed, the output power factor drops down to
approximately 0.05. Electrical power factor correlates directly with efficiency, thus higher power
factors are more desirable. Therefore, an optimized combination of engine speed control,
propulsion frequency control, and ship speed control would need to be incorporated into the main
propulsion control system. While beyond the scope of this study, such a control system with an
interface of the engine control into the ship control fiber optic network is considered feasible.
Current research in electric drive systems indicates that a prime mover power turbine RPM can be
maintained in the range of 2400 to 3600 RPM with a feasible frequency changer and control
system (Hultgren, 1992). Design specifications of such a system would be prepared prior to
detailed contractor design.
Based on the ASSET data contained in Appendix F, the propulsion generators are rated at
24.8 megawatts (MW). The propulsion switchgear would be grounded via high resistance filters
to reduce potential damage to the high voltage propulsion system due to arcing ground faults.
(High voltage distribution system on nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are grounded for similar
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reasons.) Further, the propulsion electrical system would incorporate advanced design air-cooled
circuit breakers. These air-cooled circuit breakers would be designed to minimize transient
voltage harmonics which occur after typical high voltage breaker interruption operation.
The CMX uses podded propulsion motors which drive contrarotating propellers via
epicyclical gears. (As noted in Chapter 5, contrarotating propellers have size, loading, and
cavitation advantages over a single propeller.) A vector control system for the motor armature
current and excitation field would be interfaced with the propulsion power and frequency control
system Based on the results of the ASSET Machinery module analysis, at the maximum speed
of 30.3 knots, the output shaft horsepower (SHP) is 21,950 horsepower per pod But, in a
departure from the ASSET machinery module analysis, the propulsion motors would be
oversized and rated at 35,000 horsepower (-26 MW) in order to ensure sufficient overload
margin for relatively high speed casualty operations on a single pod. To achieve such high power
in a small volume, the propulsion motors would use liquid cooling for both the rotor and the
stator in the same manner as the propulsion generator. (Use of water cooling for the large main
drive motors reduces the technical risk as compared to the use of supercooled drives motors that
were considered in the feasibility study of the previous chapter.)
The proposed layout of the propulsion electrical system is shown on the following page.
1
162

























4. Electrical Distribution System
The CMX uses a 450 volt, 60 Hertz (Hz) ring bus for electrical power distribution. Two
propulsion derived ship service generators with variable speed constant frequency cycloconverters
(VSCF) each rated at 3000 kW would normally be on-line to provide ship service power. The
PDSS generators are high speed variable frequency machines and would be driven through a
power takeoff gear from the main LM 1600-VAN2 turbines The PDSS generators would have
liquid cooled rotors and stators to allow for a higher power density. The variable frequency
PDSS generator output power would be converted to steady and reliable 60 Hz by a solid state
silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) cycloconverter system.
An Allison 501-K34 gas turbine would drive the single conventional ships service
generator. This generator runs at constant speed to produce 60 Hz power and is rated at 3000
kW. Although chosen by the Team as a backup, startup, or anchor generator, this ship service
gas turbine generator set could be combined with one LM 1600-VAN2/propulsion
generator/PDSS generator to provide for efficient ship powering during long duration patrol
operations The SSGTG backup role actually includes two operational modes, 1) a backup for a
PDSS generator and 2) an emergency backup for casualty propulsion at minimal electric service
power. For case 1), the integrated power management control portion ofENG/SYS-OP would
automatically start the backup SSGTG in the event of a PDSS casualty. The SSGTG would also
be brought on-line during certain routine PDSS maintenance and testing conditions. For case 2),
the CMX could operate at speeds up to 10 knots while providing approximately 1400 kW for
ship service electrical loads.
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Management of the CMX electrical distribution system would be automated by the
multi-function propulsion control console computer system. This electrical power management
and control system would be an embedded function of ENG/SYS-OP. System monitoring would
be accomplished through the use of a fiber optic data bus as part ofENG/SYS-READ The
system monitoring data would be incorporated into a loadshed system, programmed with
rule-based expert system code, which would also receive input from the combat system SYS-OP
control program. In this manner, casualties and battle damage would be handled with the same
"graceful degradation" as the combat systems
The CMX does not use a separate 400 Hz distribution system Power conversion for
sensitive electronic loads would be accomplished downstream of load centers prior to the
respective load through Navy Standard Electronic Power Supply Systems in accordance with
MIL-STD-2306, (General Requirements for Electronic Equipment Specifications, 18 Jun 91).
The electrical distribution system and a block diagram of the proposed Navy Standard
Electronic Power Supply are provided on a following pages.
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Figure 6-10. Ship Service Electrical Distribution (Ring Bus)
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CMX auxiliaries are distributed zonally where possible. The Team decided that full
implementation of zonal auxiliaries remains a long range ship design goal based on possible gains
in ship impact costs (i.e., net cost reductions as a gain) and improved survivability. However, an
innovative zonal auxiliary design far exceeded the time and manpower constraints of this design
project.
The CMX uses six 100 ton air conditioning (AC) plants. The AC plants are distributed in
three zones (forward, amidships, and aft) with a pair of 100 ton AC units in each of the zones.
Use of two smaller units provides advantages by allowing more flexible in-zone lineups at low
cooling loads during cold weather operations and by allowing in-zone redundancy for
maintenance The AC plants would use an advanced refrigerant similar to R-134a which meets
current policy regarding potential atmospheric ozone depletion Each AC plant would have an
associated air to chill water cooling coil. Chill water would be piped for in-zone circulation with
only limited inter-zone ties for use during casualties. Operation and monitoring of the AC plants
and chill water system would be accomplished by the AUX/SYS-OP and AUX/SYS-READ
modules in the ENG/SYS-OP and ENG/SYS-READ systems, respectively.
Two reverse osmosis (RO) water plants are installed on the CMX. The RO plants are
located in the forward and aft auxiliary machinery rooms. The RO plants would provide potable
water to storage tanks via an automatic brominator water treatment system. Four potable water
pumps would provide water service from the storage tanks to the ship's potable water distribution
system. Hot water heaters would be locally installed where required and electrically powered.
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Two low capacity, medium pressure, air compressors provide ship service air. Automatic
type II dehydrators would be installed in a distributed manner near local service air loads such as
radar waveguides which have special low humidity or filtering requirements. Emergency starting
air flasks, for all gas turbine engines, would be another primary ship service air load.
The ship's food storage refrigeration system is located in the auxiliary machinery room in
the midships section below the mess facilities Standard freeze, chill and thaw boxes would be
maintained at the required temperatures. Control and monitoring of the ship's refrigeration system
is accomplished through the AUX/SYS-OP and AUX/SYS-READ modules.
The CMX would have two distinct types of ventilation systems: 1) a specially filtered and
monitored type used for each of two partial collective protection systems (CPS), and 2) a
standard type for ventilation outside of the partial CPS zones The CMX would incorporate
higher capacity fans and a greater number of fans Having additional fans will allow for shorter
ventilation duct length from the load space to the environment as compared to a typical current
ventilation system Also, reduced CMX manning would require fewer CMX berthing spaces to be
ventilated. The net effect is a reduction in wasted volume used for ventilation ducting.
Ventilation system control and monitoring is accomplished through AUX/SYS-OP and
AUX/SYS-READ modules with an additional interface to DC/SYS-READ and DC/SYS-OP
systems.
Other necessary mechanical systems such as collection, holding and transfer (CHT), pod
steering, fuel oil transfer, fuel oil service, and aviation fuel service are shown on the CMX
arrangement drawings (see Section E, Arrangements).
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6. Damage Control Systems
The firemain system is arranged in five zones with a total of eight fire pumps. Standard
Navy titanium fire pumps rated at 1000 gallons per minute (gpm) would be installed. Each main
machinery room contains one fire pump Each of the other three zones contains two fire pumps.
The fire pumps and major fireman valves would be remotely operable from Engineering Central
Control. Local control panels for the three non-propulsion zones are also installed in Repair
Lockers II, V, and III. Control and Monitoring would be accomplished through DC/SYS-OP and
DC/SYS-READ systems
Two partial collective protection zones would protect vital ship, combat system, and
engineering control stations located in zones which roughly coincide with the ship's two
deckhouses
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C. SHIP SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT
The previous sections discussed the postulated integration and management systems for
the combat systems and engineering plant systems The Design Team expects that the control and
monitoring of these equipment groups would be accomplished through systems programmed with
rule-based expert system code, and linked through executive level data systems called System
Operating Programs (SYS-OP) and System Readiness Logic Programs (SYS-READ)
The Design Team further postulated that all ship's executive level systems would be linked
on a command level through a similar data systems called Ship System Operating Program
(SHIP/SYS-OP) and Ship System Readiness Logic Program (SHIP/SYS-READ)
Overall ship system control will be integrated by the SHIP/SYS-OP and
SHIP/SYS-READ systems SHIP/SYS-OP would ensure that all ship operation and support
systems are aligned to effectively fight the ship in all battle conditions Thus, for example
SHIP/SYS-OP would completely integrate the control programs for the combat systems
(CS/SYS-OP) and engineering systems (ENG/SYS-OP)
In this capacity, during an OCL missile engagement, SHIP/SYS-OP would provide
command level, automated or control-by-negation commands to position the ship to fire the
appropriate VLS missiles. Specific ship's speed and heading, or other configuration commands
necessary to achieve the optimum firing position (based upon OCL incoming data link
queries/requests channeled via CS/SYS-OP), would be transmitted to all executive level systems,
such as ENG/SYS-OP or a Maneuvering System Operating Program (MAN/SYS-OP). The
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commands are cued to the operators through the Standard Multi-function Console (SMC),
configured for a particular system operation. Then, depending upon the CMX commanding
officer's pre-programmed standing orders, the commands would be executed either manually or
automatically, to realign ship systems according to the new control priorities. In-progress training
modules would be switched off, or to a background standby mode. Once the commands are
executed, for example electrical power, chill water and other required support systems would be
aligned to provide maximum mission support.
Similarly, SHIP/SYS-READ would provide ready access to all of the ship monitoring
systems incorporated in the executive level readiness logic programs (CS/SYS-READ,
ENG/SYS-READ) Condition monitoring of all ship systems would be automatically recorded
and stored Thus, additional watchstanders are not required for menial logkeeping tasks And,
the ship monitoring data could be displayed by user request on any of the ship's multi-purpose
consoles in either of the engineering, combat system or other control stations.
A block diagram of showing the organization of the Ship System Integration And
Management, which has been detailed on the subsystem level for engineering systems, is shown


























As described in the Feasibility Study, additional ASSET analyses were done to arrive at
the final synthesized CMX hull, upon which the remainder of the naval architecture analysis was
performed.
The naval architecture software package, General HydroStatics (GHS), manufactured by
Creative Systems, Inc., was used in conjunction with ASSET to perform the analysis. This
section provides descriptions of the procedures used to evaluate the naval architecture
characteristics of the CMX and presents the results. The areas analyzed include the following:
Hull Geometry and Coefficients
Curves of Form
Floodable Length and Intact Stability
Structural Report
Weight Report
Discussion of these topics are included in the text of this section and the associated graphs
are on the pages following the text.
1. Hull Geometry and Coefficients
The resulting hull parameters and coefficients are given in Table 6-1, the variation of the
coefficients with ship's draft is shown in Figure 6-13, and the lines drawings of the CMX in Figure
6-14. All of the above were calculated by ASSET, and the lines drawings created with
AUTOCAD* using the hull offset data produced by ASSET.
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2. Curves of Form
The Displacement and Other Curves of Form as generated by GHS are shown in Figure
6-15. The reason for using the GHS software to produce these curves instead of ASSET was
that ASSET does not calculate the actual trim for the ship being analyzed Rather, it uses
historical data based on previous designs GHS, on the other hand, uses the offsets provided by
ASSET and allows the user to input as precise of a load distribution as desired From this data, it
then determines trim angle and the curves of form for that trim angle Since a fairly accurate load
distribution was input to GHS for later structural analyses, it was felt that the curves produced by
GHS were somewhat more accurate than those estimated by ASSET.
3. Cross Curves of Stability
The cross curves of stability provide a display of the ship's righting arm for various angles
of heel over the range of likely ship displacements. For the CMX, these curves were produced
using GHS and are shown in Figure 6-16.
4. Floodable Length and Intact Stability
a. Floodable Length
The floodable length curve is used to determine the allowable compartment lengths which
will ensure that the margin line is not submerged should the compartments spanning the defined
factor of subdivision become flooded. As described in Design Data Sheet (DDS) 079-1, Stability
and Buoyancy ofNerval Surface Ships, the factor of subdivision for combatants is 15% of the
All GHS calculations were performed using the offsets of the CMX hull produced by ASSET.
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LBP and the margin line is taken to be three inches below the bulkhead deck . The standard
values of permeability given in Principles ofNaval Architecture, Vol. 1 (p. 190) are:
Cargo & stores 0.6
Accommodations & voids 0.95
Machinery spaces 0.85
For compartments containing VLS banks, a permeability of 0.70 was assumed.
Initially, the span of the ship between the two superstructures was divided into three
compartments. The end compartments contained two VLS banks each, and the center was
devoted to messing, berthing and office spaces. Using the floodable length curves produced by
ASSET and superimposing the prescribed factor of subdivision upon them, the compartmentation
was determined to be inadequate just aft of amidships That is, to meet the floodable length
criteria, the permeability in the center compartment needed to be less than 0.80, and this was
unlikely based on the intended use for this compartment. Therefore, an additional watertight
bulkhead was placed in each of these three compartments, allowing the CMX to meet the
floodable length criteria. This result is shown in Figure 6-17. Also, the calculation of the V-lines
for the transverse bulkheads was not performed because the CMX does not have non-watertight
penetrations below the bulkhead deck. Unlike most combatants, there is no need for access at this
point because passage is blocked at nearly every bulkhead by the VLS banks or engine ducting
b. Intact Stability
Intact stability analysis was performed by ASSET for beam winds and high speed turns.
As shown in Figure 6-18, the CMX meets all of the criteria described in DDS 079-1 for stability
with 100 knot beam winds. For the case of high speed turns, the CMX heeling angle of 21°
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exceeded the maximum specified of 15°. The main reason for this is the high maximum speed of
the CMX and—although not accounted for by ASSET—this excess would likely be amplified by
the increased maneuverability of podded propulsion Although the reason for this criterion is not
one of survivability but of crew comfort, it was decided to install a "rudder angle limiter" which
would gradually limit the maximum rudder angle allowed as ship speed increased above 22 knots.
The Design Team envisioned that this automatically engaged device, could also be quickly
overridden at the discretion of the Officer of the Deck Figure 6-19 shows the intact turning
stability for high speed turns This figure assumes the rudder angle limiter is engaged and meets
all of the criteria specified in DDS 079-1
5. Structural Report
The structural design of the ship is largely dependent on the longitudinal load distribution
along the hull girder. ASSET uses historical data based on the hogging and sagging bending
moment of 13 previous ship designs, and the current ship's section modulus to calculate the
primary stresses. These stresses are then used to calculate the midship section scantlings for the
component materials specified. Thus, the midship section of the CMX shown in Figure 6-20 is
only remotely related to the actual stresses seen at this station. Although more accurate load
distribution data cannot be input into ASSET, it can be used by GHS to produce more precise
bending moment diagrams. The procedure used to do so was as follows:
a. Using the weight tables provided by ASSET and the rough ship layout determined by
the team, the loads were divided into three groups:
(1) local loads which could be assigned specific locations;
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(2) distributed loads related to the hull structure,
(3) other distributed loads.
b. The local loads were assigned specific points or local distribution ranges along the
hull, as applicable. For example, a CIWS mount was assumed to exist at a point,
while a main engine and its support systems was assumed to be uniformly distributed
over a range of about 20 feet centered about their estimated position in the ship.
These calculations are shown in Table 6-2.
c. To determine the distribution of the hull structure load, the hull sectional area curve
was added to a curve representing the cross-sectional area of the inner bottom (it was
felt that the structure making up the inner bottom was too significant to be ignored
when calculating the distribution of the hull structure load). The resulting curve was
normalized and the total structural weight distributed using this curve and Simpson's
Rule (see Table 6-3 and Figure 6-21).
d. In a similar manner, the remaining loads were distributed as a function of the hull
sectional area curve alone. This was felt to be appropriate since the distribution of
these loads is closely related to that of the volume of the hull. The calculations are
shown in Table 6-3, and the curve in Figure 6-21
.
After the total load distribution was calculated, it was input to GHS and the bending
moment curves calculated for hogging and sagging under the influence of a trochoidal wave. The
results are shown in Figures 6-22 and 6-23 for hogging and sagging, respectively.
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6. Weight Report
The loads which were used above to determine the load distribution were calculated by
ASSET and are shown in Appendix F. Most of the items associated with the combat systems—in
addition to the turbine generators, main engines, drive train, superstructure parameters, and hull
materials—were specified by the Design Team early during the Feasibility Studies.
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BEAM @ DWL (ft) 57.2
BEAM @ Weather Deck 65.6
DEPTH @ STA 10 (ft) 43.1
DRAFT @ DWL (ft) 19.1
Hull Volume (ft3 ) 1.03 x 10
6







BM T (ft) 17.7
GM T (ft) 2.86
GM L (ft) 1,659
KG (ft) 26.5
LCB/LCP 0.51
Waterplane Area (ft2 ) 25,170
Wetted Surface (ft2 ) 33,930
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Figure 6-16. Cross Curves of Stability
r m m n n
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FP to fwd end
(LT) of load (ft)
Distance from







110 Landing Pad 10.7 501.06 57800 0.14 16
150 Fwd Deckhouse 128.58 152.00 210.00 2.22 56.77
150 Aft Deckhouse ! 94.52 | 427.00 491 00 1.48 i 53.73
200 Fwd Propulsion ! 19665 ! 194 68 213.83 10.27 19.54
200 ! Aft Propulsion I 19665 | 450.00 469.15 10.27 19.54
310. 340 Sep SS GTG i 28.33 156.38 169.15 2.22 21.84
310. 340 Fwd VSCF Gen : 14.93 194.68 204.26 1.56 21.84











2.90 430.85 443.62 0.23 45.92
710 Fwd CIWS 6.60 162.77 162.77 n/a 69.31
710 Aft CIWS 6.60 488.30 488.30 n/a 69.31
720 VLS Bank *1 74.50 68.62 98.94 2.46 32.16
720 VLS Bank #2 1 74.50 98 94 114.89 4.67 32.16
720 VLS Bank #3 1 149.00 118 09 148.40 4.91 32.16
720 VLS Bank #4 ; 14900 215.43 245.74 4.91 32.16
720 VLS Bank #5 i 149.00 248.94 279.26 4.91 32 16 1
720 VLS Bank #6 149.00 362.23 392.55 4.91 32.16
720 VLS Bank #7 1 14900 395.74 426.06 4.91 32.16
780 Helo Weapons 2.70 481.91 481.91 n/a 50.27
Total (LT) 1695.10
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Survivability is one of the high priority design considerations. One technique to improve
survivability is the use of enclaves. Enclaving is achieved by locating redundant equipment at
different locations in the ship, reducing the overall ship vulnerability. This maximizes the ability of
the ship to maintain capability in a particular warfare area, even when damaged. Cost is
considered in implementing this concept by not needlessly duplicating systems with the sole
purpose of increase survivability. However, by zoning required combat systems, propulsion and
auxiliary equipment into regions which can function independently, or nearly independently,
enclaves can be developed which achieve these goals
The primary mission of this ship is to deliver missiles to an engagement, at low cost. This
capability must be maintained though the ship may incur damage Consideration of this primary
mission along with the relatively robust combat system architecture, led the Design Team to view
the division of the ship into five enclaves, two of which are each capable of accomplishing the
ship's primary mission upon the loss of the other, three of which contain limited ship's capabilities.
The two enclaves have components of the combat system, electrical generation system and
auxiliary capability to enable the ship to launch missiles The figure on the following page shows
these enclaves.
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The first enclave consists of the first two VLS 'half modules' and some auxiliary systems
The second enclave includes the Gas Turbine Generator, one Main Engine, CIC, the bridge and
the forward mast, two VLS modules and some auxiliary systems. The third enclave includes two
VLS cells, messing facilities, most berthing and some auxiliary systems The fourth enclave
includes the second Main Engine, the Alternate CIC, Engineering Control Center, Damage
Control Center, the Aft Mast and one VLS module. The fifth enclave includes some auxiliary
equipment and almost all aviation elements. Important features of this enclave configuration
include the following:
The CMX propulsion system was considered to be at least as survivable as a current
combatant. The power distribution system will be constructed using armored cable,
which is considered to be more survivable than a shaft Additionally, the Gas Turbine
Generator can provide vital loads and emergency propulsion up to an estimated 10
knots, in the event that both main Engines are disabled As with modern combatants,
however, damage incurred in the vicinity of the screws will cripple mobility.
The sensors have been arranged to provide adequate coverage while separating those
of similar function. For example, Radiant Mist is separated from the MK 23 TAS.
The self-defense components have also been separated. While not shown, the evolved
Sea Sparrow missiles will be distributed amongst the enclaves, to maintain AAW
capability even on the loss of one or more VLS module.
Provision must be made to control Special Weapons. The Alternate CIC will have the
equipment necessary for targeting and launching any weapon. The design Team
proposed stationing a senior officer at ACIC, however some method would be
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required to retain commanding officer's permission to fire (COPTF) in the system, in
the event that CIC is damaged. An alternative is to accept the loss of special weapons
capability if CIC is lost and insufficient senior officers remain, which may be
appropriate in today's environment.
The fan rooms have been arranged to facilitate a partial collective protective system.
Only the second and fourth enclaves will be protected to minimize costs.
In summary, the enclaving scheme provides for a high degree of readiness and mission
capability upon the loss of one enclave, "graceful degradation" is achieved. In addition, this




ASSET provided the Design Team with required areas for the disparate functions a ship
needs to operate. The Design Team prepared arrangements drawings for these functions The
Team's primary concern was with establishing that all required functions could be accommodated
in a sensible and reasonable manner. Additionally, the Team incorporated concerns for
survivability, maintainability and habitability when allocating spaces. Another source that the
Team drew upon was the crew of the USS Cowpens (CG63). During a visit between quarters,
the team visited the Cowpens As we expected, many of the crew had definite opinions of how
their ship could be improved and what worked right The Team incorporated those inputs that
made sense into our design. Space was successfully allocated for all functions required by
ASSET. Figures 6-25 through 6-28 depict the internal arrangements of all internal decks.
Specific choices made include the following:
Messing and most berthing was centrally located The centralized galley will provide
all meals to the three messes. During high tempo operations, when the messmen may
be required elsewhere, the food service will make prepared meals similar to improved
airline meals. These spaces are located near the midships to present low value targets
to weapons which aim for the center of the ship.
Most auxiliary equipment is separated into one of two enclaves.
Control Stations (eg CIC, ECC ) are placed lower in the ship to reduce vulnerability.
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VLS cells are distributed to three zones. This makes the loss of more than V3 of the
VLS cells to a single hit unlikely, given that the ship is not lost by that hit.
The Gas Turbine Generator has a crossover in the intake and exhaust ducts. This was
forced by a need to move the exhaust stack away from the forward mast, while
providing sufficient height to the intake. During the Team's visit to the Cowpens, the
Chief Engineer expressed a concern for sea water ingestion Additional analysis would
need to be performed to determine the pressure drop and subsequent derating of the
GTG However, since the design is not limited by power generation, this is not
expected to have a major impact.
All aviation components have been located as close to the hangar as possible.
The CIWS Ammunition stowage was placed in the hull. The Cowpens reported that
the external lockers reached elevated temperatures when painted any color other than
white. Internal storage removes this solar load, but is close enough to the weapons.
The are few rooms with large electronic cabinets The CMX has relatively few
sensors, and the Team expected that computer sizes will continue to shrink.
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The design Team also prepared detailed drawings of the Combat Information Center
(CIC) as shown in Figure 6-29. This designs reflect the belief in reduced manning that will accrue
from the implementation of expert systems, distributed computer architecture and
interchangeability of equipment To achieve these goals greater interaction is required between
the combat systems designers, the engineering systems designers and the fleet operators
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A topside arrangement was also performed., ensuring that all sensor and engagement
elements had effective arcs of coverage and sufficient height of eye. In addition, the elements
which had similar or redundant features were separated between the forward and after
superstructures in order to reduce the vulnerability of the combat system The two major
equipment locations are approximately 250 feet apart which decreases the likelihood that a single
threat weapon could destroy the entire combat system effectiveness An overview of topside
arrangement is shown in Figure 6-30.
The forward superstructure and mast have a CIWS mount, Mk 91 FCS illuminator,
SLQ-32, SPS-64, UHF SATCOM, MK 36 SRBOC launcher, Radiant Mist and IFF antenna
array. The after superstructure and mast have the TACAN, MK-23 TAS, Lamps III
communications, SLQ-32, CIWS, MK 91 FCS illuminator, UHF SATCOM, and MK 36 SRBOC
launcher. In addition the smaller antennas (not shown) are located on the forward or after
yardarms.
During the topside arrangements phase, the arcs of coverage of the various weapons
systems were checked for adequate coverage and minimal interference. This was done solely on a
geometric scale and did not involve the use of any blockage assessment models.
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Figure 6-30. Topside Arrangement
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4. Arcs of Coverage
Raw data for combat system engagement and detection element arcs of coverage is
provided in the table below. Overall 360 degree coverage is provided for each of the major
categories. A graphical view of the arcs of coverage is provided in Figure 6-3 1 on the following
page.
Arcs of Coverage
Engagement Elements 360 degrees
CIWS fwd 235 degrees total from -75 degrees R to 160 degrees R
aft 255 degrees total from 100 degrees R to -5 degrees R
MK91 FCS fwd 235 degrees total from -160 degrees R to 75 degrees R
aft 255 degrees total from 5 degrees R to -100 degrees
SLQ-32 V(3) fwd 1 80 degrees total from degrees R to 180 degrees R
aft 1 80 degrees R to degrees R
Detection Elements 360 degrees
Radiant Mist 350 degrees total from -175 degrees R to 175 degrees R
SPS-64 170 degrees total from -85 degrees R to 85 degrees R
MK 23 TAS 340 degrees total from 10 degrees R to -10 degrees R
SLQ-32 V(3) fwd 1 80 degrees total from degrees R to 180 degrees R
aft 1 80 degrees R to degrees R
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Figure 6-31. CMX Arcs of Coverage
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G. BATTLE ORGANIZATION AND MANNING
Cost constraints and technology advances force the designer of modern warships to
examine manning considerations. Commensurate with the ship requirements and design
philosophy, the Design Team examined the battle organization and with the goal of reducing
manning requirements. The Team considered several important factors:
The numbers of personnel exposed to physical risk must be reduced in the current
social and political environment,
Automation and computation advances would contribute to reducing the required level
of manning;
Current damage control procedures and equipment require extensive manpower,
Manning has a significant impact on lifecycle cost,
The CMX has been designed with the goal of reducing manning by at least 40%, as
compared to an existing combatant of the same tonnage This reduction had been achieved in
part, due to the limited Required Operational Capabilities of the CMX as compared to other
combatants. The CMX would have no sonar suite and no main deck gun, which contributed
dramatically to reducing manning requirements.
All offensive weapons would be stored in VLS modules. The current and foreseeable
VLS weapons have limited onboard maintenance requirements. This again reduced the manning
associated with the weapons system.
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1. Battle Organization
To establish the battle organization requirements, the Design Team compared the
watchstations required for current platforms ranging in size and complexity, from an FFG to the
AEGIS cruiser. These battle organizations were then modified to incorporate the manning
considerations previously discussed. The following paragraphs describe the watchstanders that
would be required for the CMX, including a brief description of the duties assigned and any




The Design Team postulated that the bridge of the CMX would be manned as follows;
OOD - responsible to the Commanding Officer for the safe operation of the ship;
JOOD (when assigned) - assists the OOD in the safe operation of the ship (training
watchstation),
BMOW - supervise enlisted bridge watchstanders Assists JOOD as required.
Coordinates ship evolutions using alarms and announcements,
Helm/Leehelm - responsible for steering the ship and coordinating engine orders with
the ECC;
QMOW - responsible for maintaining the navigation of the ship, making course/speed
recommendations to the OOD,
Lookouts (forward and aft) - responsible for the detection of visual contacts;
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Messenger - Assists the BMOW as required (training watchstation)
(2) CIC and MCC/ACIC
The CIC manning was dramatically reduced due to several factors:
Reduced missions and capabilities (eg no sonar or gun);
Enhanced, reconfigurable equipment,
"Expert" computer system (programmed with with rule-based code) employment (see
section A, Combat System Integration and Management),
The CIC on the CMX would be the Primary OCL station The Maintenance Control
Center/Auxiliary CIC would have the capability to support OCL launch independently The CMX
combat system would be an advanced network with computer system, enhanced with artificial
intelligence programming, to assist the operators Since the CMX would not have significant
long range sensors, it would not be a major source of target input data into the link. It would
primarily be concerned with the tactical threat to own ship and maintaining the ability to provide
OCL weapons to the battlegroup During normal steaming the Maintenance Watch would be
located at the MCC/ACIC. If a casualty occurs to CIC, additional personnel would be assigned
to man MCC/ACIC and sufficient computational power, electric backup and communication
equipment would be available to ensure that OCL capability would be maintained.
Based on these concepts, CIC on the CMX would be manned as follows;
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TAO - responsible to the Commanding Officer for the tactical employment of the ships
sensors and weapons systems;
CICWO- Officer in charge of CIC functions. Assistant to the TAO.;
CICWS - Supervises the CIC watchstanders in detecting and tracking and contacts;
Surface Tracker - Responsible for maintaining the updating of all tactical surface
contacts;
Air Tracker - Responsible for maintaining the updating of all tactical air contacts;
TIC/OCL Officer - Responsible for monitoring and maintaining the OCL system, and
tracking and correlating EW contacts,
Magazine Rover - Responsible for inspection of the magazines, small arms and self
defense weapons,
Maintenance Watch (MCC/ACIC) - Responsible monitoring the ship's computer
systems, initiates repair actions and reconfigurations the combat systems;
Messenger - Assists the CICWS as required (training watchstation).
(3) Engineering
The manning requirements for the engineering plant were reduced by adopting the same
type of organization and equipment control and monitoring as was postulated for the combat
system. The Engineering Control Center (ECC) would be combined with Damage Control
Central (DCC). The EOOW would oversee both functions during routine operations. As the ship
is electric drive and only has two main engines and two GTG's, the Design Team felt that there
could be one operator responsible for both the main engines and electrical generators. The
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Engineering SYS-OP/SYS-READ system (see section B, Hull, Mechanical and Electrical) would
assist that operator during casualties. As discussed, this computer system would monitor the
ship's equipment status, the electrical load and the requirements of the combat system. This
system would also provide load shedding logic to the Main Engine Control Panel.
In a similar manner, there would be an Auxiliaries Control Panel (ACP) watch. This
watch would be capable of operating all auxiliaries remotely including the air compressors,
reverse osmosis (RO) units, refrigeration and air conditioning plants and trash disposal system.
Damage Control would be centrally coordinated at the Damage Control Panel (DCP).
A subset of the Engineering Readiness System, the Damage Control Readiness System
(DC/SYS-READ) (see section B, Hull, Mechanical and Electrical), would incorporate space
sensors providing indications including temperature and water level to the DCP. If video is
included in DC/SYS-READ then a visual indication of the status of the space can be provided as
well. This watch, the DC Rover, would also rove the ship, checking equipment status. While the
DC Rover is touring the ship, the other ECC watchstanders would monitor the DCP as required.
Based on these concepts, the Team postulated the engineering plant for the CMX would
be manned as follows:
EOOW - Senior engineering plant watchstander, responsible to the OOD for safe
operation of engineering equipment, including main propulsion, electrical and
auxiliaries,
Main and Electrical Control Panel (MECP) operator - Responsible for the safe
operation and monitoring of the main engines and electrical distribution system;
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Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP) watch - Responsible for the safe operation and
monitoring of the auxiliary systems,
Engineering Plant Supervisor (EPS) - Senior roving watch, responsible for supervising
locally operations directed or required by ECC/DCC;
Main Machinery Rover - Responsibly for inspecting and monitoring the local integrity
of the main machinery equipment and spaces (training watchstation),
DC Rover- Responsible for the operation and monitoring of damage control
equipment, both remotely from DCC, and locally when required. Maintains the status
of the Damage Control Panel (DCP)



































































A much higher state of readiness is required for the CMX during Condition I. More
watchstations are manned and the personnel assignments are carefully chosen to employ the
experience of the personnel in the most effective manner. The additional Condition I
watchstations include the following:
Combat System Maintenance Supervisor (CSMO) - responsible for supervising entire
ship's computer systems,
Helo Director - responsible for safe operations, helo preparations and loadouts;
Helo Approach Control - responsible helo guidance during takeoffs and landings,
Weapons Liaison Officer (WLO) - directs operations of the CIWS systems.
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ASSET provided a first approximation of the crew size required, based on parametric
studies of historical ships (see Appendix F) The Design Team performed an analysis of the
manning to determine if the projected manning was feasible. One of the priorities of the ship
design was to reduce the manning required. This will dramatically reduce lifecycle costs of the
ship but does require changes in the way ships are managed.
Some technological advances, discussed in other sections, must be incorporated into the
ship organization to accomplish significant manning reduction. Some long practiced traditions
must also be modified to allow this level of manning One such tradition is the method of
accomplishing routine preservation The Design Team felt the system of preservation used by
foreign navies, such as the British Royal Navy, should be considered In this system, most major
preservation is done by contractors The ship is granted a pool of money which it spends on
preservation, as required This reduces the crew size as we are not using highly trained sailors to
accomplish low wage work. The ASSET program indicated that about one third of the required
man-hours were not available. Using programs like the painting scheme described above, should
make up the shortfall
The following tables show the projected manning for the CMX. The first table shows the
breakdown of the officers and crew, and the following table shows the breakdown of the crew by
rate.
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Manning Breakdown (Officers and Crew)
DEPT DHs DOs CPOs <E7 SUBTOTAL
CO 1
ADMIN/MEDICAL 1* 1 6 6
NAV/OPS 3 3 34 45
ENGINEERING 1 3 3 43 50
COMBAT 1 3 5 45 54
SUPPLY 1 2 18 18
AIR DET 3 1 7 11
TOTALS 4 12 15 150 185
* XO to act as ADMIN/MEDICAL DH
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As the Design Team concluded the technical aspect of the project, a review of the
requirements was conducted The Design Team feels the CMX design meets or exceeds the goals
established. The vessel is very near the design budget, delivers a significant number of weapons
efficiently, has a very effective self-defense suite and incorporates new technologies in an
innovative manner.
The electric drive, podded propulsion system, the ship integration and management
computer system, and the availability of VLS configured variants of certain advanced weapons
pose some technical risk for the CMX design However, the Team's research in these areas
indicates that all elements are achievable within the next 1 5 years
As students, the Team made a conscious effort to minimize the impact of traditional
design practices in various areas Our approach to manning, equipment automation, preservation
and missile control was intended to challenge some paradigms we believe constrain ship design.
Another area the Team wanted to consider was zonal auxiliaries Time constraints prevented
complete development of this area, but it has the potential for a positive effect on survivability.
The Design Team feels that the product is a good first iteration of a large capacity missile
carrier design. Its capabilities and limitations have been thoroughly explored and hopefully, within
the scope of the student project.
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A. CONCLUSIONS
With respect to the goal of familiarizing the members of the Student Design Team with the
nuances involved in the design ofUS Navy ships, the project was clearly a success.
>
i
In retrospect, certain effects which most strongly impacted the system design were not
engineering in nature. For example, the Team encountered various boundary conditions which
necessarily limited the scope and accuracy of the design. Of these conditions, the most limiting
was that of time. The restricted number of man-hours which could be devoted to the design of
the CMX limited the project to one "loop" around the design spiral, and only allowed a cursory
investigation into some regions on that loop, i.e., the structural design.
The next most significant boundary condition was the Team's lack of experience in using
the tools of the trade Specifically, a large portion of our effort was devoted to learning how to
use ASSET and AUTOCAD®. As a result, we were not able to investigate numerous types of
monohulls or other hull forms. This, however, was not the purpose of this academic exercise.
Another impact was that of Design Team organization Because the group contained no
experts in any one field, the division of labor was somewhat arbitrary (based to a small extent on
individual interests). Thus, the design and/or analysis of a given system was largely dependent
upon the "designated expert's" ability to master the subject. More than anything else, this
technical weakness on the Team's part occasionally led to efforts having to be reworked once the
inadequacies of a system's design became apparent.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
For the Design Team, the most significant gap in the design process was bridging between
feasibility studies and preliminary design. Although it is an excellent tool for monohull feasibility
studies, the ASSET program lacks the flexibility to easily analyze other types of hull forms, and
does not provide the details necessary to develop a preliminary design (even given the limited
scope of preliminary design that was within the student team's capabilities) We, therefore, make
the following recommendations for future TSSE research efforts:
Enhance ASSET'S capabilities with respect to non-conventional type hull designs;
specifically, SWATH-type hull forms
Incorporate into ASSET the ability to specify the dimensions of the payload items
This would make the hull volume design calculations much more reliable.
Build-in to ASSET a data bank of commonly used payloads, i.e., radars, sonars and
missiles
Develop a hydrodynamic analysis code which would take output from a CAD drawing
and determine its hydrodynamic characteristics This would allow the design and
analysis of exotic hulls without the encumbrance of having to specify all of the details
required by ASSET. When coupled with the output ofROM studies, one could
quickly examine many hull forms to ferret out the most promising choices among the
numerous possibilities, without being forced to commit to a specific hull design early
in the feasibility studies.
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Develop a routine—either an addition to ASSET or a separate finite element
code—which would allow detailed structural analysis of the midships section.
Develop databases that would allow the performance ofROM and
measure-of-effectiveness (MOE) studies.
Finally, the Design Team felt strongly that the knowledge and insight gained from the ship
visit was invaluable, and should be incorporated as a permanent part of the TSSE curriculum.
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Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Tarfet Range PK
Tkonderoga




20 SUB 5 06
MK 26 Launcher (1) SM-2 MR 24 SURF HORJZ 0.75
AIR 35 0.75




70 SURF 15 0.8
MK 15 Phalanx
CIWS(2)




6 SUB 6 0.7
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Target Range PK
Tkonderoga
VLS
MK41 VLS SM-2 MR
BLOCK II
61 SURF HORJZ 0.75
AIR 35 0.75
MK41 VLS SM-2 MR
BLOCK II




12 SUB 5 06
Tomahawk 12 SURF 450 0.7




70 SURF 15 0.8
MK15 Phalanx
CIWS (2)




6 SUB 6 0.7
MK141(2) Harpoon 1C 8 SURF 80 08
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12 SUB 20 0.7
Tomahawk 12 SURF 450 0.75




35 SURF 15 0.8
MK 15 Phalanx
CIWS (2)
20mm Burst 16 SURF 0.3 0.2
AIR 0.8 0.8
MK32 324MM TT (2) MK50
Barracuda
6 SUB 6 0.7
MK141(2) Harpoon 1C 8 SURF 80 0.8













12 SUB 20 0.7
Tomahawk 12 SURF 450 0.75




35 SURF 15 0.8
MK15 Phalanx
CIWS (2)
20mm Burst 16 SURF 0.3 0.2
AIR 0.8 08
MK32 324MM TT (2) MK50
Barracuda
6 SUB 6 0.7
MK141(2) Harpoon 1C 8 SURF 80 08
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Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Q»> Tarjet Range PR
KJdd Mk26 Rail
Launcher








20 SUB 5 06
Tomahawk 12 SURF 450 075




70 SURF 15 0.8
MKI5 Phalanx
CIWS(2)
20mm Burst 16 SURF 0.3 02
AIR 08 0.8
MK32 324MM TT (2) MK50
Barracuda
6 SUB 6 07
MK141(2) Harpoon 1C 8 SURF 80 08
231
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Target Range PK
Kirov
(Kirov)
SA-N-6 VLS Grumble 96 SURF HORIZ 0.6
AIR 50 0.7
SS-N-19 VLS Shipwreck 20 SURF 250 0.8
AK-630 (4) 20mm Burst 60 SURF 16 0.75
AIR 1.6 0.75




100mm Burst 240 SURF 65 0.5
AIR 4.3 0.4
RBU 6000 Morur Shell 16 SUB 3.2 0.25
RBU 1000 Mortar Shell 12 SUB 0.5 0.3
SS-N-14 E45-75A 14 SUB 30 0.3
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Target Range PK
Kirov
(Frunze)
SA-N-6 VLS Grumble 96 SURF HORIZ 0.6
AIR 50 0.7
SS-N-19 VLS Shipwreck 20 SURF 250 0.8
AX-630 (4) 20mm Burst 60 SURF 1.6 0.75
AIR 1.6 0.75




130mm Burst 120 SURF 6.5 0.5
AIR 4.3 0.4
RBU 6000 Mortar Shell 16 SUB 3.2 0.25
RBU 1000 Mortar Shell 12 SUB 0.5 0.3
SS-N-14 E45-75A 14 SUB 30 0.3
533mm TT SET-65 8 SUB 11 0.55
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Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qt> Tartet Range PK
Kirov
(Kalinin)
SA-N-6 VLS Grumble 96 SURF HORIZ 06
AIR 50 0.7
SS-N-19 VLS Shipwreck 20 SURF 250 0.8
CADS N- 1(6) 30mm Burst 90 SURF 16 0.75
AIR 16 0.75
CIWS Missile 48 AIR 6 0.7




130mm Burst 120 SURF 9.5 0.5
AIR 5 04
RBL! 12000 Mortar Shell 10 SUB 6 0.2
RBI' 1000 Mortar Shell 12 SUB 0.5 0.3
SA-N-9 VLS (4) SA-N-9 144 AIR 8 0.7
533mm TT SET-65 8 SUB 11 0.55
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Target Range PK
Slava
SA-N-6 VLS Grumble 64 SURF HORIZ 0.6
AIR 50 0.7
SS-N-12 Sandbok 16 SURF 300 08
AK-630 (4) 20mm Burst 60 SURF 16 0.75
AIR 1.6 0.75




130mm Burst 120 SURF 9.5 0.5
AIR 5 0.4
RBU6000 Mortar Shell 10 SUB 3.2 0.25
SA-N-9 VLS (4) SA-N-9 144 AIR 8 0.7
533mm TT SET-65 4 SUB 11 0.55
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Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Q«y Target Range PK
Sovremmenny
SA-N-7 Gadfly 44 SURF 15 0.6
AIR 15 0.7
SS-N-22 Sunburn 8 SURF 65 0.8




1 30mm Burst 240 SURF 9.5 0.5
AIR 5 04
RBU 1000 Mortar Shell 12 SUB 0.5 0.3
SA-N-9 VLS (4) SA-N-9 144 AIR 8 0.7
533mm TT SET-65 8 SUB 11 0.55
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Target Range PK
Udaloy
SA-N-9 VLS SA-N-9 64 AIR 8 0.7
AK-630 (2) 20mm Burst 60 SURF 16 0.75
AIR 1.6 0.75




100mm Burst 240 SURF 6.5 0.5
AIR 4.3 0.4
RBU 6000 Mortar Shell 16 SUB 32 0.25
533mmTT SET-65 8 SUB 11 0.55
SS-N-14 E45-75A 14 SUB 30 0.3
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Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Q»> Target Range PK
Mod
UdaJoy
SA-N-9 VLS SA-N-9 64 AJR 8 0.7
AX-630 (2) 20mm Burst 60 SURF 16 75
AJR 16 0.75




130mm Burst 120 SURF 9.5 05
AIR 5 0.4
J33mmTT SET-65 8 SUB 11 055
SS-N-14 E45-75A 8 SUB 30 03
CADSN-1(2) 30mm Burst 30 SIHF 1.6 075
AIR 1.6 075
CIWS Missile 16 AIR 6 0.7
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qty Target Range PK
krivaJi
SA-N-9 VLS SA-N-9 64 AIR 8 0.7
AK-630 (2) 20mm Burst 60 SURF 16 075
AIR 16 075




130mm Burst 120 SlfRF 9.5 0.5
AIR 5 0.4
533mmTT SET-65 8 SUB 11 0.55
SS-N-14 E45-75A 8 SUB 30 0.3
CADSN-1(2) 30mm Burst 30 SURF 1.6 0.75
AIR 16 0.75
CIWS Missile 16 AIR 6 0.7
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Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Q»y Target Range PK
Nanuchka II
SS-N-2C Styx 4 SURF 43 065
SA-N-4 Gecko 20 SURF 8 0.55
AIR 8 0.5
57 mm/ 70 57mm Burst 120 SURF 2.7 025
AIR 2.7 0.15
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qt> Target Range PK
(Hall
AK-230(2) 30mm 240 SURF 1.6 0.3
AIR 1.6 0.3
SA-N-5 Grail 4 AIR 3 0.3
SS-N-2B Styx 4 SURF 25 0.4
Ship Class Weapons system Ammunition Qtj Target Range PK
Combattante
IIG
Otomat Mk 1 Otomat 4 SURF 32 0.75
DARDO 40 mm Burst 120 SURF 2.2 06
AIR 2.2 0.75
Compact 76mm 76 mm Burst 120 SURF 43 04
AIR 2.7 0.4





To conduct combat system performance and effectiveness analyses, the Design Team
developed a set of threat weapons models
A survey of the current threat weapon inventory was conducted using the open literature
found in the Naval Postgraduate School Library. Based upon this survey, a list of threat weapons
was developed that the Team felt were representative of the likely threat missiles the CMX would
encounter. Using open literature allowed the Team to keep this portion of the design unclassified
and reduced the time that would be needed to evaluate all possible threats
1. General Descriptions






The Trasher missile is an air launched high speed anti-radiation missile designed to
suppress the radars of a target. The warhead is small at 10 kilograms but designed to destroy the
relatively unprotected antennas of the radar system.
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The Takeover missile is an air launched anti-ship missile with active radar guidance and a
large 1000 kilogram warhead. It cruises to the target at an altitude of 50,000 feet with a terminal
dive to the target at a 50° angle and is designed to sink or severely disable ships through its large
blast effect and penetrating warhead.
The Seagull missile is a ship or air launched subsonic sea skimming anti-ship missile. It
has a semi-armor piercing warhead of 1 10 kilograms. It uses active radar for guidance and is
designed to disable a ship by blast damage within the hull of the ship.
The Sunstroke missile is an air or surface launched high speed sea skimming anti-ship
missile. The warhead is relatively small at 50 kilograms but the high speed of the missile
decreases the likelihood that it will be shot down. Also, the warhead is designed to disable a ship
by blast effects.
2. Threat Weapon Parameters
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This appendix evaluates the saturation level of an AEGIS cruiser to incoming threat
missiles. This saturation level was then used to evaluate the performance of the present battle
group configuration with and without the CMX present. The assumptions used to develop the
time line for the saturation engagement are as follows:
A maximum of sixteen SM-2 Block 4 missiles are in the air simultaneously.
AJ1 threat missiles are launched simultaneously at maximum range.
Engagement with SM-2 missiles begins at the maximum range of the SM-2.
Each threat missile is engaged with two SM-2.
The launch interval of SM-2 missiles is 1 second.
The launch interval of 1 second will provide sufficient separation during terminal
homing such that no more than four SM-2 missiles will be in terminal homing at the
same time.
There is no fratricide between SM-2s.
Each SM-2 can only engage one threat missile.
The probability of kill (Pk) for the SM-2 against any threat missile is 0.7.
The time interval between SM-2 missile end of flight and launching of another SM-2 is
0.1 seconds.
Takeover and Seagull missiles, as described in Appendix B, were used as the threat
missiles for the analysis Their characteristics are listed in the following table The time line data



































The results obtained from this analysis are:
Maximum of thirty-two Takeover missiles may be engaged with 2.9 leaking through to
the ship's inner defense zone.
Maximum of twenty-nine Seagull missiles may be engaged with 2.7 leaking through to
the ship's inner defense zone.
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Takeover Missile: Mach 3.4 High Altitude w/50 deg Dive
Horizontal Slant SM-2 Total SM-2
Time Range Altitude Range Missiles Missiles
(sec) (nro) (ft) (nm) SM-2 in the air Launched
480.0 300.2 50,000 300.3 Missiles Launched
400.0 249.5 50,000 249.7
300.0 186.2 50,000 186.4
287.0 177.9 50,000 178.1 Missiles Detected
277.0 171.6 50,000 171.8 Missiles Classified andAssigned to FCS
275.0 170.3 50,000 170.5 Launch against Threat #1 1 1
274.0 169.7 50,000 169.9 Launch against Threat #1 2 2
273.0 169.1 50,000 169.3 Launch against Threat #2 3 3
272.0 168.4 50,000 168.6 Launch against Threat #2 4 4
271.0 167.8 50,000 168.0 Launch against Threat #3 5 5
270.0 167.2 50,000 167.4 Launch against Threat #3 6 6
269.0 166.5 50,000 166.7 Launch against Threat #4 7 7
268.0 165.9 50,000 166.1 Launch against Threat #4 8 8
267.0 165.3 50,000 165.5 Launch against Threat #5 9 9
266.0 164.6 50,000 164.8 Launch against Threat #5 10 10
265.0 164.0 50,000 164.2 Launch against Threat #6 11 11
264.0 163.4 50,000 163.6 Launch against Threat #6 12 12
263.0 162.7 50,000 163.0 Launch against Threat #7 13 13
262.0 162.1 50,000 162.3 Launch against Threat #7 14 14
261.0 161.5 50,000 161.7 Launch against Threat #8 15 15
260.0 160.8 50,000 161.1 Launch against Threat #8 16 16
131.6 79.5 50,000 79.9 Threat #1 Hitf 15
131.5 79.4 50,000 79.9 Launch against Threat #9 16 17
131.2 79.2 50,000 79.6 Threat #1 Hit? 15
130.7 78.9 50,000 79.3 Threat #2 Hit? 14
130.5 78.8 50,000 79.2 Launch against Threat #9 15 18
130.2 78.6 50,000 79.1 Threat #2 Hit? 14
129.8 78.3 50,000 78.8 Threat #3 Hit? 13
129.5 78.2 50,000 78.6 Launch against Threat #10 14 19
129.3 78.0 50,000 78.5 Threat #3 Hit? 13
128.8 77.7 50,000 78.2 Threat #4 Hit? 12
128.5 77.5 50,000 78.0 Launch against Threat #10 13 20
128.3 77.4 50,000 77.8 Threat #4 Hit? 12
127.9 77.1 50,000 77.6 Threat #5 Hit''. 11
127.5 76.9 50,000 77.3 Launch against Threat #1
1
12 21
127.4 76.8 50,000 77.3 Threat #5 Hit? 11
126.9 76.5 50,000 77.0 Threat #6 Hit? 10
126.5 76.3 50,000 76.7 Launch against Threat #1 11 22
126.4 76.2 50,000 76.7 Threat #6 Hit? 10
126.0 75.9 50,000 76.4 Threat #7 Hit? 9
125.5 75.6 50,000 76.1 Threat #7 Hit 8
125.5 75.6 50,000 76.1 Launch against Threat #12 9 23
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125.0 75.3 50,000 75.8 Threat #8 Hit 8
1246 75.0 50,000 75.5 Threat #8 Hit'' 7
124.5 75.0 50,000 75.5 Launch against Threat £12 8 24
123.5 74.4 50,000 74.8 Launch against Threat #13 9 25
122.5 73.7 50,000 74.2 Launch against Threat #13 10 26
121.5 73.1 50,000 73.6 Launch against Threat #14 11 27
120.5 72.5 50,000 72.9 Launch against Threat #14 12 28
119.5 71.8 50,000 72.3 Launch against Threat #15 13 29
118.5 71.2 50,000 71.7 Launch against Threat #1
5
14 30
117.5 706 50,000 71.0 Launch against Threat #1
6
15 31
116.5 69.9 50,000 70.4 Launch against Threat #16 16 32
63.7 36.5 50,000 374 Threat #9 Hit'' 15
63.6 364 50,000 37.3 Launch against Threat #17 16 33
63.3 36.2 50,000 37.1 Threat #9 Hit'' 15
628 35.9 50,000 368 Threat #10 Hit'' 14
62.6 35.8 50,000 36.7 Launch against Threat #17 15 34
62.3 35.6 50,000 36.5 Threat #10 Hit'' 14
61.8 35.3 50,000 36.3 Threat #11 Hit? 13
61.6 35.1 50,000 36.1 Launch against Threat #1
8
14 35
61.3 35.0 50,000 36.0 Threat #1 1 Hit'' 13
60.9 34.7 50,000 35.7 Threat #12 Hit'' 12
60.6 34.5 50,000 35.5 Launch against Threat #1 13 36
60.4 344 50,000 35.4 Threat #12 Hit'' 12
59.9 34.1 50,000 35.1 Threat #13 Hit? 11
59.6 33.9 50,000 34.9 Launch against Threat #19 12 37
59.4 33.7 50,000 34.8 Threat #13 Hit 11
59.0 33.5 50,000 34.5 Threat #14 Hit? 10
58.6 33.2 50,000 34.3 Launch against Threat #19 11 38
58.5 33.2 50,000 34.2 Threat #14 Hit 10
58.0 32.9 50,000 33.9 Threat #15 Hit? 9
57.6 32.6 50,000 33.7 Launch against Threat #20 10 39
57.5 32.5 50,000 33.6 Threat #15 Hit 9
57.0 32.2 50,000 33.3 Threat #16 Hit 8
56.6 32.0 50,000 33.0 Launch against Threat #20 9 40
56.5 31.9 50,000 33.0 Threat #16 Hit 8
55.6 31.3 50,000 32.4 Launch against Threat #21 9 41
54.6 30.7 50,000 31.8 Launch against Threat #21 10 42
53.6 30.1 50,000 31.2 Launch against Threat #22 11 43
52.6 29.4 50,000 30.6 Launch against Threat #22 12 44
51.6 28.8 50,000 30.0 Launch against Threat #23 13 45
50.6 28.2 50,000 29.4 Launch against Threat #23 14 46
49.6 27.5 50,000 28.8 Launch against Threat #24 15 47
48.6 26.9 50,000 28.2 Launch against Threat #24 16 48
30.4 15.4 50,000 17.5 Threat #17 Hit 15
30.3 15.3 50,000 17.4 Launch against Threat #25 16 49
29.9 15.1 50,000 17.2 Threat #17 Hit 15
29.4 14.7 50,000 16.9 Threat #18 Hit 14
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29.3 14.7 50,000 16.9 Launch against Threat #25 15 50
28.9 14.4 50,000 16.6 Threat #18 Hit? 14
28.3 14.1 50,000 16.4 Threat #19 Hit'' 13
28.3 14.0 50,000 16.3 Launch against Threat #26 14 51
27.8 13.7 50,000 16.1 Threat #19 Hit'' 13
27.3 13.4 50,000 15.8 Launch against Threat #26 14 52
27.3 13.4 50,000 15.8 Threat #20 Hit? 13
26.7 13.1 50,000 15.5 Threat #20 Hit? 12 :
26.3 12.8 50,000 15.3 Launch against Threat #27 13 53
26.2 12.7 50,000 15.2 Threat #21 Hit? 12
25.7 12.4 50,000 14.9 Threat #21 Hit? 11
25.3 12.1 50,000 14.7 Launch against Threat #27 12 54
25.1 12.0 50,000 146 Threat #22 Hit? 11
24.6 11.7 50,000 14.3 Threat #22 Hit? 10
24.3 11.5 50,000 14.2 Launch against Threat #28 11 55
24.0 11.3 50,000 14.1 Threat #23 Hit? 10
23.4 11.0 50,000 13 8 Threat #23 Hit'' 9
23.3 10.9 50,000 13.7 Launch against Threat #28 10 56
22.9 106 50,000 13.5 Threat #24 Hit'7 9
22.3 10.2 50,000 13.2 Threat #24 Hit? 8
22.3 10.2 50,000 13.2 Launch against Threat #29 9 57
21.3 9.6 50,000 12.7 Launch against Threat #29 10 58
20.3 9.0 50,000 12.2 Launch against Threat #30 11 59
19.3 8.3 50,000 11.8 Launch against Threat #30 12 60
18.3 7.7 50,000 11.4 Launch against Threat #3
1
13 61
17.3 7.1 50,000 10.9 Launch against Threat #3 14 62
17.2 7.0 50,000 10.9 Missile Terminal Dive
16.3 6.4 50,000 10.5 Launch against Threat #32 15 63
15.3 5.8 50,000 10.2 Launch against Threat #32 16 64
12.9 5.3 37,572 8.2 Threat #25 Hit? 15
12.5 5.1 36,378 7.9 Threat #25 Hit? 14
12.1 4.9 35,185 7.7 Threat #26 Hit? 13
11.7 4.8 34,021 7.4 Threat #26 Hit? 12
11.3 4.6 32,886 7.2 Threat #27 Hit? 11
10.9 4.4 31,751 6.9 Threat #27 Hit? 10
10.5 4.3 30,645 6.7 Threat #28 Hit? 9
10.1 4.1 29,539 6.4 Threat #28 Hit? 8
9.8 4.0 28,463 6.2 Threat #29 Hit? 7
9.4 3.8 27,444 6.0 Threat #29 Hit? 6
9.1 3.7 26,396 5.7 Threat #30 Hit? 5
8.7 3.5 25,407 5.5 Threat #30 Hit? 4
8.4 3.4 24,476 5.3 Threat #3 1 Hit? 3
8.1 3.3 23,574 5.1 Threat #31 Hit? 2
7.8 3.2 22,701 4.9 Threat #32 Hit? 1
7.5 3.1 21,915 4.8 Threat #32 Hit?
0.0 0.0 30 0.0
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Each incoming missile is engaged by 2 SM-2 Blk 4 missiles
EachSM-2hasaPkof0.7
Incoming missile raid size is 32 missiles per ship
Pk for each incoming missile is 0.91
U of leakers is 0.09x32=2.88 missiles
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Seagull Missile: Mach 0.7 15 meter Sea Skimmer
Horizontal Slant SM-2 Total SM-2
Time Range Altitude Range Missiles Missiles
(sec) (nm) at) (nm) SM-2 in the air Launched
115.0 15.0 45.0 15.0 Missiles Launched
110.0 14.3 45.0 14.3 Missiles Detected
100.0 13.0 45.0 13.0 Missiles Classified andAssigned to FCS
98.0 12.8 45.0 12.8 Launch against Threat #1 1 1
97.0 12.7 45.0 12.7 Launch against Threat #1 2 2
96.0 12.5 45.0 12.5 Launch against Threat #2 3 3
95.0 12.4 45.0 12.4 Launch against Threat #2 4 4
94.0 12.3 45.0 12.3 Launch against Threat #3 5 5
93.0 12.1 45.0 12.1 Launch against Threat #3 6 6
92.0 12.0 45.0 12.0 Launch against Threat #4 7 7
91.0 11.9 45.0 11.9 Launch against Threat #4 8 8
90.0 11.7 45.0 11.7 Launch against Threat #5 9 9
89.0 11.6 45.0 11.6 Launch against Threat #5 10 10
88.0 11.5 45.0 11.5 Launch against Threat #6 11 11
87.0 11.3 45.0 11.3 Launch against Threat #6 12 12
86.0 11.2 45.0 11.2 Launch against Threat #7 13 13
85.0 11.1 45.0 11.1 Launch against Threat #7 14 14
84.0 11.0 45.0 11.0 Launch against Threat #8 15 15
83.0 10.8 45.0 10.8 Launch against Threat #8 16 16
79.5 10.4 45.0 10.4 Threat #1 Hit? 15
79.4 10.4 45.0 10.4 Launch against Threat #9 16 17
78.7 10.3 45.0 10.3 Threat #1 Hit? 15
78.4 10.2 45.0 10.2 Launch against Threat #9 16 18
77.8 10.2 45.0 10.2 Threat #2 Hit'' 15
77.4 10.1 45.0 10.1 Launch against Threat #10 16 19
77.0 10.0 45.0 10.0 Threat #2 Hit? 15
76.4 10.0 45.0 10.0 Launch against Threat #10 16 20
76.2 9.9 45.0 9.9 Threat #3 Hif? 15
75.4 9.8 45.0 9.8 Threat #3 Hit? 14
75.4 9.8 45.0 9.8 Launch against Threat #1
1
15 21
74.6 9.7 45.0 9.7 Threat #4 Hit? 14
74.4 9.7 45.0 9.7 Launch against Threat #1 15 22
73.8 9.6 45.0 9.6 Threat #4 Hit? 14
73.4 9.6 45.0 9.6 Launch against Threat #12 15 23
73.0 9.5 45.0 9.5 Threat #5 Hit? 14
72.4 9.4 45.0 9.4 Launch against Threat #12 15 24
72.2 9.4 45.0 9.4 Threat #5 Hit? 14
71.4 9.3 45.0 9.3 Launch against Threat #13 15 25
71.4 9.3 45.0 9.3 Threat #6 Hit? 14
70.5 9.2 45.0 9.2 Threat #6 Hit? 13
70.4 9.2 45.0 9.2 Launch against Threat #13 14 26
69.7 9.1 45.0 9.1 Threat #7 Hit? 13
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69.4 9.1 45.0 9.1 Launch against Threat #14 14 27
68.9 9.0 45.0 9.0 Threat #7 Hit9 13
684 8.9 45.0 8.9 Launch against Threat #14 14 28
68.1 8.9 45.0 8.9 Threat #8 Hit? 13
67.4 8.8 45.0 8.8 Launch against Threat #1
5
14 29
67.3 8.8 45.0 8.8 Threat #8 Hit? 13
66.4 8.7 45.0 8.7 Launch against Threat #15 14 30
65.4 8.5 45.0 8.5 Launch against Threat #16 15 31
64.4 84 45.0 8.4 Launch against Threat #16 16 32
64.4 8.4 45.0 8.4 Threat #9 Hit? 15
63.6 8.3 45.0 8.3 Threat #9 Hit? 14
63.4 8.3 450 8.3 Launch against Threat #1
7
15 33
62.7 8.2 45.0 8.2 Threat #10 Hit? 14
62.4 8.1 45.0 8.1 Launch against Threat #1 15 34
61.9 8.1 45.0 8.1 Threat #10Hit? 14
61 4 8.0 45.0 8.0 Launch against Threat #18 15 35
61.1 8.0 45.0 8.0 Threat #1 1 Hit? 14
60.4 7.9 45.0 7.9 Launch against Threat #1
8
15 36
60.3 7.9 45.0 7.9 Threat #1 1 Hit? 14
59.5 7.8 45.0 7.8 Threat #12 Hit? 13
59.4 7.7 45.0 7.7 Launch against Threat #19 14 37
58.7 7.7 45.0 7.7 Threat #12 Hit? 13
58.4 7.6 45.0 7.6 Launch against Threat #19 14 38
57.9 7.6 45.0 7.6 Threat #13 Hit? 13
57.4 7.5 45.0 7.5 Launch against Threat #20 14 39
57.1 7.4 45.0 7.4 Threat #13 Hit? 13
56.4 7.4 45.0 7.4 Launch against Threat #20 14 40
56.3 7.3 45.0 7.3 Threat #14 Hit? 13
55.5 7.2 45.0 7.2 Threat #14 Hit? 12
55.4 7.2 45.0 7.2 Launch against Threat #21 13 41
54.7 7.1 45.0 7.1 Threat #15 Hit? 12
54.4 7.1 45.0 7.1 Launch against Threat #21 13 42
53.8 7.0 45.0 7.0 Threat #15 Hit? 12
53.4 7.0 45.0 7.0 Launch against Threat #22 13 43
53.0 6.9 45.0 6.9 Threat #16 Hit? 12
52.4 6.8 45.0 6.8 Launch against Threat #22 13 44
52.2 6.8 45.0 68 Threat #16 Hit? 12
51.4 6.7 45.0 6.7 Threat #17 Hit? 11
51.4 6.7 45.0 6.7 Launch against Threat #23 12 45
50.6 6.6 45.0 6.6 Threat #17 Hit? 11
50.4 6.6 45.0 6.6 Launch against Threat #23 12 46
49.8 6.5 45.0 6.5 Threat #18 Hit? 11
49.4 6.4 45.0 6.4 Launch against Threat #24 12 47
49.0 6.4 45.0 6.4 Threat #18 Hit? 11
48.4 6.3 45.0 6.3 Launch against Threat #24 12 48
48.2 6.3 45.0 6.3 Threat #19 Hit? 11
47.4 6.2 45.0 6.2 Launch aeainst Threat #25 12 49
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47.4 6.2 45.0 6.2 Threat #19 Hit? 11
46.5 6.1 45.0 6.1 Threat #20 Hit? 10
46.4 6.1 45.0 6.1 Launch against Threat #25 11
45.7 6.0 45.0 6.0 Threat #20 Hit? 10
45.4 5.9 45.0 5.9 Launch against Threat #26 11
44.9 5.9 45.0 5.9 Threat #21 Hit? 10
44.4 5.8 45.0 5.8 Launch against Threat #26 11
44.1 5.8 45.0 5.8 Threat #21 Hit? 10
43.4 5.7 45.0 5.7 Launch against Threat #27 11
43.3 5.6 45.0 5.6 Threat #22 Hit? 10
42.5 5.5 45.0 5.5 Threat #22 Hit? 9
42.4 5.5 45.0 5.5 Launch against Threat #27 10
41.7 5.4 45.0 5.4 Threat #23 Hit? 9
41.4 5.4 45.0 5.4 Launch against Threat #28 10
40.9 5.3 45.0 5.3 Threat #23 Hit? 9
40.4 5.3 45.0 5.3 Launch against Threat #28 10
40.1 5.2 45.0 5.2 Threat #24 Hit? 9
39.4 5.1 45.0 5.1 Launch against Threat #29 10
39.2 5.1 45.0 5.1 Threat #24 Hit? 9
38.4 5.0 45.0 5.0 Threat #25 Hit? 8
38.4 5.0 45.0 5.0 Launch against Threat #29 9
37.6 4.9 45.0 4.9 Threat #25 Hit'' 8
36.8 4.8 45.0 4.8 Threat #26 Hit'' 7
36.0 4.7 45.0 4.7 Threat #26 Hit? 6
35.2 4.6 45.0 4.6 Threat #27 Hit'' 5
34.4 4.5 45.0 4.5 Threat #27 Hit? 4
33.6 4.4 45.0 4.4 Threat #28 Hit? 3
32.8 4.3 45.0 4.3 Threat #28 Hit? 2
32.0 4.2 45.0 4.2 Threat #29 Hit? 1
31.2 4.1 45.0 4.1 Threat #29 Hit*7
0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0
Each incoming missile is engaged by 2 SM-2 Blk 4 missiles
EachSM-2hasaPkof0.7
Incoming raid size is 29 missiles per ship
Pk for each incoming missiile is 0.91












ROUGH ORDER OF MAGNITUDE (ROM) STUDIES
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) studies provided the basis for the selection of ship
performance requirements In this context, "rough" order of magnitude indicates a general degree
of reasonableness. The results of the ROM studies were combined with engineering judgment,
system engineering concepts and design team discussion (and debate) to produce a first draft of
realistic requirements for the Operational Requirements Document (ORD).
Computer programs, developed by Decision Engineering Company for Dr Dean Rains,
facilitated the ROM studies The Decision Engineering cruiser and destroyer modeling program,
"SHIP" is written in program modules using the Basic computer language and runs on an IBM PC
compatible computer. SHIP incorporates polynomial models for various propulsion, auxiliary and
combat systems for hull sizes and hull forms based on modern cruisers and destroyers. SHIP can
accurately model the Spruance class destroyer (DD 963), the Ticonderoga class cruiser (from CG
52 onward) and the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer (DDG 51) The program
includes models for new technologies ranging from planetary main reduction gears to integrated
electric drive with pods. The program contains affordability analysis modules and can provide
acquisition cost estimates based on production factors and projected life cycle. Basic naval
architecture and hydrodynamic parameters are included in the computer analysis. In summary, to
support the ROM studies, the program provided a non-graphical, first order description of a
cruiser or destroyer type ship with specific machinery and combat systems arrangements.
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A. SHIP MODELS
The design team analyzed a three ship subset of the six CMX variants which were used for
the evaluation scenarios. The CMX ships modeled for ROM studies included the CMX v3 with 3
VLS, the CMX v4 with 4 VLS, and the CMX v6 with 6 VLS. This selection was based primarily
on time and data base constraints. The initial hull form for all ship models was a DDG/DDV with
a higher length to beam ratio in order to accommodate additional VLS installations. All ship
models used the following systems, subsystems or equipments:
LM2500-30 gas turbine prime movers for main propulsion
Vertical exhaust stacks with eductors for reduced IR signatures
Stern wedges for hydrodynamic efficiency
CRP propellers
Fiberoptic data bus with multiplexing
Reduced manning concepts (75% of nominal)
1 helicopter and hangar
MK 49 (mod) 2-D air search radar
Small, self-defense AAW missiles in VLS
2CIWS
No sonar system
Six additional systems and technologies were modeled on an incremental basis. These
technologies included: 1) baseline run, 2) reduced radar cross section by sloping sides and adding
radar absorbing material (RAM) to eductors/stacks, 3) composite shafting and Graphite
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Reinforced (GRP) auxiliary piping, 4) zonal/bilevel auxiliaries with small diesel generators, 5)
composite deckhouse and 6) a cross-connect gear box and planetary main reduction gears It is
emphasized that these models were incremental in that the new system or technology was added
to the previous model. For example, model v3-4 incorporates the systems and technologies for
models v3-l, v3-2, v3-3 and v3-4. Program results are illustrated in the following tables:
CMXv3 Models
v3-l v3-2 v3-3 v3-4 v3-5 v3-6
Cost $M 517 518 509 481 478 471
Displacement tons 6890 6901 6620 5976 5893 5522
Volume ft3 729000 729000 721000 632000 631000 602000
Length ft 537 538 530 512 510 499
Beam ft 59.7 59.7 58.9 56.9 567 55.5
Draft ft 17.4 17.4 17.2 16.6 16.5 16.2
Freeboard ft 15.6 15.6 16.1 14.9 15 1 15.2
Range nm 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000
Vc knots 20 20 20 20 20 20
Vss knots 26 26 26 26 26 26
Vmax knots 29.7 29.7 29.8 30.3 304 30.6
Shafts 2 2 2 2 2 2
Engines 2 2 2 2 2 2
Crew Size 189 189 184 174 174 167
Electric Pwr kw 7500 7500 7500 6300 6300 5600
HVAC tons 520 521 519 510 510 506
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CMXv4 Models
v4-l v4-2 v4-3 v4-4 v4-5 v4-6
Cost $M 551 552 542 514 511 505
Displacement tons 7259 7272 6970 6324 6242 5867
Volume ft3 767000 768000 757000 666000 665000 636000
Length ft 547 547 539 522 520 509
Beam ft 60.8 60.8 59.9 58 57.8 56.6
Draft ft 17.7 17.7 17.5 16.9 16.8 16.5
Freeboard ft 15.8 15.8 16.3 15 15.3 15.4
Range nm 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000
Vc knots 20 20 20 20 20 20
Vss knots 26 26 26 26 26 26
Vmax knots 29.5 29.5 29.6 30.1 30.1 30.4
Shafts 2 2 2 2 2 2
Engines 2 2 2 2 2 2
Crew Size 195 196 189 178 178 171
Electric Pwr kw 7500 7500 7500 6300 6300 5600
HVAC tons 525 525 522 514 513 510
Incremental models one through six were also run for CMX v6. A seventh model with a
flat top deck and additional RAM, and an eighth model with a double hull were run. These
additional runs were selected to demonstrate further cost reduction through configuration and
technology selection. With CMX v3-l through -6
,
CMX v4-l through -6 and CMX v6-l
through -8 demonstrated as reasonable missile carriers, the goal of the studies was directed
toward the effect of cruising range, sustained speed, number of shafts and so forth. These
parameters varied for CMX v6-8, and are identified by an alphabet letter following v6-8, e.g.,
CMX v6-8f Then, additional parameters were varied on CMX v6-8k. The v6-8k models are
labeled CMX-v6-8k where the additional alphabet letter before the '8' identifies the run.
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CMXv6 Models
v6-l v6-2 v6-3 v6-4 v6-5 v6-6 v6-7 v6-8
Cost $M 616 617 608 581 578 572 573 575
Displacement tons 7889 7898 7612 6989 6891 6510 6543 6659
Volume fe 831000 831000 825000 731000 729000 699000 705289 707614
Length ft 562 562 555 522 537 527 528 531
Beam ft 62.5 62.5 61.7 60 59.7 58.6 58.7 59
Draft ft 18.2 17.7 18 17.5 17.4 17.1 17.1 17.2
Freeboard ft 162 16.2 168 15.4 15.7 15.7 15.8 15.5
Range nm 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000
Vc knots 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Vss knots 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Vmax knots 29.1 29.1 29.2 29.6 29.7 29.9 29.9 29.8
Shafts 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Engines 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Crew Size 198 198 195 181 178 174 175 177
Electric Pwr kw 7500 7500 7500 7000 7000 6300 6300 6300
HVAC tons 531 531 530 521 520 516 517 518
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Varied Parameters for CMX v6-8 Model
v6-8b v6-8c v6-8f v6-8g v6-8h v6-8i v6-8j v6-8k
Cost $M 582 575 554 566 566 568 607 572
Displacement tons 7196 6658 6206 6529 6529 6777 7593 7057
Volume ft3 747000 708000 656000 680000 680000 696000 788000 718000
Length ft 545 531 519 528 528 534 555 542
Beam ft 60.6 59 57.7 58.6 58.6 59.4 61.7 60.2
Draft ft 17.7 17.2 168 17.1 17.1 17.3 18 17.5
Freeboard ft 15.4 15.5 15.1 14.9 14.9 14.8 15.6 14.7
Range nm 8000 6000 6000 6000 6000 7000 8000 8000
Vc knots 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Vss knots 26 28 25 20 28 28 28 26
Vmax knots 29.5 29.8 27.3 29.9 29.9 29.8 32.4 29.5
Shafts 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Engines 2 2 2* 2 2 2 3 2
Crew Size 189 177 170 175 175 179 195 187
Electric Pwr kw 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 7000 6300
HVAC tons 523 518 512 515 515 518 527 520
indicates LM1600 gas turbines
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Additional Variations for Model CMX v6-8k
v6-a8k v6-b8k v6-c8k v6-d8k v6-e8k v6-f8k v6-g8k
Cost $M 572 596 578 594 595 589 574
Displacement tons 7057 7941 7529 7923 7766 7769 7294
Volume ft3 718000 834000 793000 833000 829000 829000 743000
Length ft 542 563 553 563 559 559 548
Beam ft 60.2 626 61.5 62.5 62.1 62 1 60.8
Draft ft 17.5 18.3 17.9 18.2 18.1 18 1 17.7
Freeboard ft 14.7 16.2 15.9 16.2 16.5 16.5 14.9
Range nm 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000
Vc knots 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Vss knots 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Vmax knots 29.5 29.1 28.7 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.5
Shafts 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Engines 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Crew Size 187 201 195 200 198 198 190
Electric Pwr kw 6300 7000 PDSS 7000 7000 7000 6300
HVAC tons 520 531 527 531 530 530 523
B. SHIP PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
The preceding analysis indicated a range of desirable performance characteristics based on
existing or developing technology, which is achievable at a reasonable cost. These results
provided a basis for the first draft of the ORD. These results further supported choices for the




The threat engagement profiles are presented in the following tables. Shown are the
timelines for the CMX combat system engagements of the Trasher, Takeover, Sunstroke and
Seagull missiles.
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Trasher Missile: Mach 2.5 Anti-Radiation
Horizontal Slant Incremental Cumulative
Time Range Altitude Range Sea Kill Kill
(sec) (nm) (ft) (nm) Sparrow CIWS EW/ChafT Probability Probability
85.9 40.0 5,000.0 400 Missile Launched
80.0 37.3 4,660.3 37.3 Missile Detected
70.0 32.6 4,081.5 326 Missile Classified as Threat and Assigned toFCS
60.0 27.9 3,502.7 280 Engage 0.1 0.1
50.0 23.3 2,923.9 23.3
46.0 21.4 2,692.4 21.4 Launch
45.0 21.0 2,634.5 21.0 Launch
40.0 186 2,345.1 18.6
30.0 14.0 1,7663 14.0
20.0 93 1,187.6 9.3
19.0 88 1,129.7 8.9
18.0 8.4 1,071.8 8.4
17.3 8.0 1,0284 8.0 Hit 9 07 0.73
17.0 7.9 1,013.9 7.9
16.9 169 1,008.1 7.9 Hit9 0.7 0.919
16.0 7.5 956.1 7.5
15.0 7.0 898.2 7.0
14.0 6.5 840.3 6.5
130 6 1 782.4 6 1
12.0 5.6 724.5 5.6 Launch
11.0 5.1 6667 5 1 Launch
10.0 4.7 608.8 4.7
9.0 4.2 550.9 4.2
8.0 3.7 493.0 3.7
7.0 3.3 435.1 3.3
6.0 2.8 377.3 2.8
5.0 2.3 319.4 2.3
4.5 2.1 290.5 2.1 Hit9 0.7 0.9757
4.1 1.9 269.0 1.9 Hit? 0.7 0.99271
4.0 1.9 261.5 1.9
3.0 1.4 203.6 1.4
2.0 0.9 145.8 0.9
1.8 0.8 134.2 0.8 Engage 0.3 0.994897
1.0 0.5 87.9 0.5
0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0
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Takeover Missile: Mach 3.4 High Altitude w/50 deg Dive
Horizontal Slant Incremental Cumulative
Time Range Altitude Range Sea Kill Kill
(sec) (nm) m (nm) Sparrow CIWS EW/ChafT Probability Probability
480.0 300.2 50,000 300.3 Missile Launched
400.0 249.5 50,000 249.7
300.0 186.2 50,000 186.4
200.0 122.8 50,000 123.1
100.0 59.5 50,000 60.0
90.0 53.1 50,000 53.8
84.0 49.3 50,000 50.0 Missile Detected
80.0 46.8 50,000 47.5
74.0 43.0 50,000 43.8 Missile Classified and Assigned to FCS
72.0 41.7 50,000 42.6 Engage 0.4 0.4
600 34.1 50,000 35.1
50.0 27.8 50,000 29.0
40.0 21.5 50,000 23.0
30.0 15.1 50,000 17.3
20.0 8.8 50,000 12.1
19.0 8.2 50,000 11.7
18.0 7.5 50,000 11.2
17.2 7.0 50,000 10.9 Missile Terminal Dive
17.0 6.9 49,504 10.8
16.0 6.5 46,593 10.1
15.0 6.1 43,683 9.5
14.0 5.7 40,773 8.9 Launch
13.0 5.3 37,863 8.2 Launch
12.0 4.9 34,952 7.6
11.0 4.5 32,042 7.0
11.0 4.5 32,042 7.0
10.0 4.1 29,132 6.3
9.0 3.7 26,222 5.7
8.0 3.3 23,312 5.1
7.0 2.8 20,401 4.4
6.0 2.4 17,491 3.8
5.0 2.0 14,581 3.2
4.3 1.7 12,515 2.7 Hit? 0.8 0.88
4.0 1.6 11,613 2.5 Hit? 0.8 0.976
3.0 1.2 8,761 1.9
2.0 0.8 5,850 13
1.3 0.5 3,813 0.8 Engage 0.8 0.9952
1.0 0.4 2,940 0.6
0.0 0.0 30 0.0
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Sunstroke Missile: Mach 2.5 10 Meter Sea Skimmer
Horizontal Slant Incremental Cumulative
Time Range Altitude Range Sea Kill Kill
(sec) (njn) (ft) (nm) Sparrow CrWS EW/ChafT Probability Probability
140.0 65.2 30.0 65.2 Missile Launched
120.0 55.9 30.0 55.9
110.0 51.2 30.0 51.2
100.0 46.6 30.0 46.6
90.0 41.9 30.0 41.9
80.0 37.3 30.0 37.3
70.0 32.6 30.0 326
60.0 28.0 300 28.0
50.0 23.3 30.0 23.3
40.0 18.6 30.0 186
32.0 14.9 30.0 149 Missile Detected
30.0 140 30.0 14.0
22.0 10.2 30.0 10.2 Missile Classified as Threat and Assigned to FCS
200 9.3 300 9.3 Launch Engage 04 0.4
19.0 8.9 30.0 89 Launch
18.0 8.4 300 8.4
17.0 7.9 30.0 7.9
16.0 7.5 30.0 7.5
15.0 7.0 30.0 7.0
14.0 6.5 30.0 6.5
13.0 6.1 30.0 6.1
12.0 5.6 30.0 5.6
110 5.1 30.0 5.1
10.0 4.7 30.0 4.7
9.0 4.2 30.0 4.2
8.0 3.7 30.0 3.7
7.5 3.5 30.0 3.5 Hit? 0.6 0.76
7.1 3.3 30.0 3.3 Hit? 0.6 0.904
7.0 3.3 30.0 3.3
6.0 2.8 30.0 2.8
5.0 2.3 30.0 2.3
4.0 1.9 30.0 1.9
3.0 1.4 30.0 1.4
2.0 0.9 30.0 0.9
1.7 0.8 30.0 0.8 Engage 0.5 0.952
1.0 0.5 30.0 0.5
0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0
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Seagull Missile: Mach 0.7 15 meter Sea Skimmer
Horizontal Slant Incremental Cumulative
Time Range Altitude Range Sea Kill Kill
(sec) (nm) (ft) (nm) Sparrow CIWS EW/ChafT Probability Probability
115.0 15.0 45.0 15.0 Missile Launched
110.0 14.3 45.0 14.3 Missile Detected
100.0 13.0 45.0 13.0 Missile ClassifiedAs Threat andAssigned to FCS
90.0 11.7 45.0 11.7 Launch Engage 0.4 0.4
89.0 11.6 45.0 11.6 Launch
80.0 10.4 45.0 10.4
70.0 9.1 45.0 9.1
61.3 8.0 45.0 8.0 Hit? 0.7 0.82
60.7 7.9 45.0 7.9 Hit? 0.7 0.946
60.0 7.8 45.0 7.8
56.0 7.3 450 7.3 Launch
55.0 7.2 45.0 7.2 Launch
50.0 6.5 450 6.5
40.0 5.2 450 5.2
38.2 5.0 45.0 5.0 Hit'' 0.7 0.9838
37.5 4.9 45.0 4.9 Hit? 0.7 0.99514
33.0 4.3 45.0 4.3 Launch
32.0 4.2 45.0 4.2 Launch
30.0 3.9 45.0 3.9
22.5 2.9 45.0 2.9 Hit? 0.7 0.998542
218 2.8 45.0 2.8 Hit? 0.7 0.9995626
20.0 2.6 45.0 2.6
16.0 2.1 45.0 2.1 Launch
15.0 2.0 450 2.0 Launch
10.9 1.4 41.0 1.4 Hit? 0.7 0.99986878
10.2 1.3 40.0 1.3 Hit? 0.7 0.999960634
10.0 1.3 350 1.3
9.0 1.2 34.0 1.2
8.0 1.0 33.0 1.0
7.0 0.9 32.0 0.9
6.3 0.8 31.0 0.8 Engage 0.7 0.9999881902
6.0 0.8 31.0 0.8
5.0 0.7 30.0 0.7
4.0 0.5 30.0 0.5
3.0 0.4 30.0 0.4
2.0 0.3 300 0.3
1.0 0.1 300 1




ASSET/MONOSC VERSION 3.2 OUTPUTS
1. DESIGN SUMMARY
SHIP COMMENT TABLE
FINAL VERSION OF CMX (I HOPE) BASED ON CMX3 WITH:
ELECTRIC POD PROPULSION WITH VSCF AND SEPERATE SS GENERATORS;
ELECTRIC HEAT VICE WASTE HEAT BOILERS;
SOLVED TO ACHIEVE 8000 NM ENDURANCE @ 20 KTS;
MARGINS AGREED TO IN CLASS ON (9/93);
USED A COMBINATION OF GEOSIM AND DDG-51 BC * S TO ACHIEVE HULL FORM;
TWO SEPARATE DECK HOUSES (FORE AND AFT);
PAYLOADS TO SUPPORT 6 VLS BANKS (384 CELLS);
NON-SUPERCONDUCTING ELECTRIC PROPULSION MOTORS
PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS - FT WEIGHT SUMMARY - LTON
LBP 577.7 GROUP 1 - HULL STRUCTURE 3402.0
LOA 607.4 GROUP 2 - PROP PLANT 393.3
BEAM, DWL 57.2 GROUP 3 - ELECT PLANT 263.4
BEAM, WEATHER DECK 65.6 GROUP 4 - COMM + SURVEIL 179.1
DEPTH @ STA 10 43.1 GROUP 5 - AUX SYSTEMS 887.0
DRAFT TO KEEL DWL 19.1 GROUP 6 - OUTFIT + FURN 510.2
DRAFT TO KEEL LWL 19.1 GROUP 7 - ARMAMENT 912.0
FREEBOARD @ STA 3 33.2
GMT 2.9 SUM GROUPS 1-7 6546.9
CP 0.559 DESIGN MARGIN 0.0
CX 0.818
LIGHTSHIP WEIGHT 6546.9







INM nl ^ u
FULL LOAD DISPLACEMENT 8416.8
TRANSMISSION TYPE: ELECT FULL LOAD KG: FT 26.5
MAIN ENG: 2 RGT @ 26400.0 HP
SHAFT POWER/SHAFT:
PROPELLERS: 2 - CR
21949.7 HP
- 14.9 FT DIA
SEP GEN: 1 GT @ 3000.0 KW
PD GEN: 2 VSCF e 3000.0 KW
24 HR LOAD 2343.2
MAX MARG ELECT LOAD 4706.1
OFF CPO ENL TOTAL
MANNING 17 15 150 182
ACCOM 19 17 165 201
MILITARY PAYLOAD WT - LTON 1798.3
USABLE FUEL WT - LTON 1052.7
AREA SUMMARY - FT2
HULL AREA - 78264.2
SUPERSTRUCTURE AREA - 11327.6
TOTAL AREA 89591.8
VOLUME SUMMARY - FT3
HULL VOLUME - 1033448.2
SUPERSTRUCTURE VOLUME - 116073.5
TOTAL VOLUME 1149521.6
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HULL BC IND-DDG 51
MIN BEAM, FT 30.00
MAX BEAM, FT 110.00
HULL FLARE ANGLE, DEG
FORWARD BULWARK, FT 4.00




BEAM @ WEATHER DECK, FT
DRAFT, FT
DEPTH STA 0, FT
DEPTH STA 3, FT
DEPTH STA 10, FT
DEPTH STA 20, FT

















HALF SIDING WIDTH, FT
BOT RAKE, FT
RAISED DECK HT, FT
RAISED DECK FWD LIM, STA
RAISED DECK AFT LIM, STA












BARE HULL DATA ON LWL STABILITY DATA ON LWL
LGTH ON WL, FT
BEAM, FT
DRAFT, FT






BARE HULL DISPL, LTON
APPENDAGE DISPL, LTON
FULL LOAD WT, LTON
577.63 KB, FT 11.79
57.16 BMT , FT 17.70
19.07 KG, FT 26.53
33.23 FREE SURF COR, FT 0.10
0.559 SERV LIFE KG ALW, FT 0.00
0.817
0.762 GMT, FT 2.86
25168.26 GML, FT 1659.15





3. HULL SUBDISVISION MODULE SUMMARY
HULL SUBDIV IND-GIVEN
SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND-POD
INNER BOT IND-PRESENT
LBP, FT
DEPTH STA 10, FT
HULL VOLUME, FT3
MR VOLUME, FT3
TANKAGE VOL REQ, FT3
EXCESS TANKAGE, FT3
ARR AREA LOST TANKS, FT2
HULL ARR AREA AVAIL, FT2
577.65 HULL AVG DECK HT,
43.12
NO INTERNAL DECKS
1033448. NO TRANS BHDS
91346. NO LONG BHDS
52129. NO MACHY RMS









4. DECKHOUSE MODULE SUMMARY
DKHS GEOM IND-GIVEN
DKHS SIZE IND-
DKHS MTRL TYPE IND-MS




AREA BEAM, FT 47.52
DKHS FWD LIMIT- STA 5.3
DKHS AFT LIMIT- STA 17.0
DKHS AVG DECK HT, FT 10.00
DKHS NO LVLS
DKHS AVG SIDE CLR, FT
DKHS AVG SIDE ANG, DEG
DKHS NO PRISMS 5
DKHS ARR AREA DERIV, FT2 297.34
DKHS MIN ALW BEAM, FT 30.17
BRIDGE L-O-S OVER BOW, FT 393.21
DKHS SIDE CLR OFFSET, FT
DKHS SIDE ANG OFFSET, DEG
DKHS DECK HT OFFSET, FT
DKHS LENGTH OA, FT 339.06
DKHS MAX WIDTH, FT 53.52
DKHS HT (W/O PLTHS), FT 65.86
OTHER ARR AREA REQ, FT2 66208.12
HULL ARR AREA AVAIL, FT2 78264.20
DKHS ARR AREA REQ, FT2 7295.66
HANGER ARR AREA REQ, FT2 0.00
PLTHS ARR AREA REQ, FT2 0.00
DKHS MAX ARR AREA, FT2 11327.63
DKHS ARR AREA AVAIL, FT2 11327.63





5. SUPERSTRUCTURE DECKHOUSE DATA SUMMARY
NO OF SS DECKHOUSE BLKS 5
DKHS VOLUME, FT3 116073.
DKHS ARR AREA AVAIL, FT2 11327.6
DIST FROM BOW, FT
LENGTH, FT









DIST ABV BASELINE FWD, FT




DEC K H O U S E N U M B E R
1 2 3 4 5
151.92 151.92 151.92 427.46 427.46
57.77 57.77 20.22 63.52 63.52
-26.76 -25.00 -17.23 -22.64 -20.88
-26.90 -25.14 -17.42 -21.00 -19.24
26.76 25.00 17.23 22.64 20.88
26.90 25.14 17.42 21.00 19.24
-25.00 -23.23 -15.47 -20.88 -19.12
-25.14 -23.38 -15.66 -19.24 -17.47
25.00 23.23 15.47 20.88 19.12
25.14 23.38 15.66 19.24 17.47
45.86 55.86 65.86 43.67 53.67
44.31 55.86 65.86 45.04 53.67
10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
32306. 27943. 6650. 24810. 24364.
2939.2 2739.5 651.9 2608.3 2388.7
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6. DECKHOUSE STRUCTURE WEIGHT SUMMARY
DKHS MTRL TYPE IND-MS
FIRE PROTECT IND-NONE
BLAST RESIST IND-7 PSI
WT-LTON
CALCULATED SWBS150 223.1
DKHS STRUCT DENSITY, LBM/FT3 4.18




DECK VOLUME FROM BL
HOUSE FT3 FT
====== =======
NO. 1 32306. 50.40
NO. 2 27943. 60.80
NO. 3 6650. 70.77
NO. 4 24810. 48.94
NO. 5 24364. 58.60
116073. 55.48




HULL STRENGTH AND STRESS
HOGGING BM, FT-LTON 209534.
SAGGING BM, FT-LTON 174688.
MIDSHIP MOI, FT2-IN2 616564.
DIST N.A. TO KEEL, FT 21.84
DIST N.A. TO DECK, FT 21.30
















PRIM STRESS KEEL-HOG, KSI 16.63
PRIM STRESS KEEL-SAG, KSI 13.86
PRIM STRESS DECK-HOG, KSI 16.22
PRIM STRESS DECK-SAG, KSI 13.52
HULL MARGIN STRESS, KSI 2.24






















8. HULL STRUCTURE MODULE WEIGHT DATA
SWBS COMPONENT
100 HULL STRUCTURES






120 HULL STRUCTURAL BULKHDS
121 LONG BULKHDS
122 TRANS BULKHDS






135 5TH DECK+DECKS BELOW
136 01 HULL DECK
























9. APPENDAGE MODULE WARMINGS
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
** WARNING - APPENDAGE MODULE ** (W-FINROTATSHIFT-FINREP)
FWD FINS HAVE BEEN RE-POSITIONED BY SHIFTING FIN ROOT
Z-COORD. -1.30 FT (UPWARD POSITIVE) AND BY ROTATING
ABOUT FIN ROOT 9.00 DEG (CLOCKWISE POSITIVE).
** WARNING - APPENDAGE MODULE ** (W-FINROTATSHIFT-FINREP)
AFT FINS HAVE BEEN RE-POSITIONED BY SHIFTING FIN ROOT
Z-COORD. -1.29 FT (UPWARD POSITIVE) AND BY ROTATING
ABOUT FIN ROOT 8.00 DEG (CLOCKWISE POSITIVE).
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SKEG PROJECTED AREA, FT2
BILGE KEEL IND
BILGE KEEL DISP, LTON
BILGE KEEL LGTH, FT
SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND
SHAFT SUPPORT DISP, LTON
SHAFT DISP, LTON
PROP TYPE IND







NONE RUDDER TYPE IND INTEGRAL
0.0 NO RUDDERS 2
0.0000 AVG RUDDER CHORD, FT 10.55
0.00 RUDDER THK, FT 1.73
0.0 RUDDER SPAN, FT 22.95
RUDDER PROJECTED AREA, FT2 242.1
NONE RUDDER DISP, LTON 11.3
0.0
0.00 FIN SIZE IND CALC
NO FIN PAIRS 2
POD FWD FIN
131.7 CHORD, FT 5.76
0.0 THK, FT .86
SPAN, FT 5.76
CR PROJECTED AREA, FT2 33.2
1.3 DISP, LTON (PER PAIR) 1.1
2 AFT FIN
14.94 CHORD , FT 5.70
THK, FT .85
NONE SPAN, FT 5.70
0.0 PROJECTED AREA, FT2 32.5
DISP, LTON (PER PAIR) 1.1
11. APPENDAGE MODULE, APPENDAGE BUOYANCY AND WEIGHT DATA
APPENDAGE
CENTER OF BUOYANCY
DISP, LTON X, FT Y, FT Z , FT
SHELL 45.2 292.26 0.00 11.92
PODS* 131.7 559.81 11.20 5.31
PROP BLADES* 1.3 543.25 11.20 3.23
RUDDERS* 11.3 574.14 11.20 11.88
FWD ROLL FIN PAIR* 1.1 259.94 24.74 5.15
AFT ROLL FIN PAIR* 0.5 317.71 25.37 5.09
TOTAL, LTON 191.7
* TRANSVERSE C.B. PER SIDE IS SHOWN
SWBS114, SHLL APNDG, LTON 0.00 SWBS565, ROLL FINS, LTON 23.45
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FULL LOAD WT, LTON
AVG ENDUR DISP, LTON
USABLE FUEL WT, LTON
NO FIN PAIRS








TAYLOR BILGE KEEL IND NONE
ITTC SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND POD
FULL LOAD PRPLN SYS RESIST IND CALC
NO TS PROP TYPE IND CR
SONAR DOME IND NONE
NONE RUDDER TYPE IND INTEGRAL
8416.8 CORR ALW 0.00050
8416.8 DRAG MARGIN FAC 0.000
1052.7 TRAILSHAFT PWR FAC 1.15
2. PRPLN SYS RESIST FRAC
0.25 MAX SPEED 0.223




RESID APPDG WIND MARGIN TOTAL LBF
12068. 6493. 566. 0. 34566. 371950.
7988. 5633. 489. 0. 27499. 310738.
1579. 2321. 163. 0. 8676. 141360.





SPEED AND POWER FOR FULL LOAD DISP










2.00 6. 1. 12. 0. 0. 19. 3035.
4.00 43. 9. 56. 1. 0. 110. 8925.
6.00 140. 30. 143. 4. 0. 316. 17179.
8.00 322. 70. 276. 10. 0. 678. 27632.
10.00 615. 137. 461. 20. 0. 1233. 40191.
12.00 1044. 237. 701. 35. 0. 2018. 54792.
14.00 1635. 385. 1001. 56. 0. 3077. 71631.
16.00 2410. 587. 1364. 83. 0. 4444. 90512.
18.00 3395. 894. 1795. 119. 0. 6203. 112299.
20.00 4613. 1579. 2321. 163. 0. 8676. 141360.
22.00 6088. 2205. 2901. 217. 0. 11411. 169027.
24.00 7843. 2988. 3558. 282. 0. 14670. 199189.
26.00 9902. 4138. 4307. 358. 0. 18705. 234435.
28.00 12287. 6475. 5204. 447. 0. 24413. 284115.
30.00 15022. 11142. 6315. 550. 0. 33029. 358768.
32.00 18130. 18772. 7663. 668. 0. 45233. 460624.
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14 PROPELLER MODULE SUMMARY
ENDUR CONFIG IND NO TS
PROP TYPE IND CR
PROP DIA IND GIVEN
PROP AREA IND GIVEN
SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND
MAX SPEED, KT 30.28
MAX EHP (/SHAFT), HP 17283.
MAX SHP (/SHAFT), HP 21950.
MAX PROP RPM 164.1
MAX PROP EFF 0.787
SUSTN SPEED, KT 28.84
SUSTN EHP (/SHAFT) , HP 13749.
SUSTN SHP (/SHAFT) , HP 17426.
SUSTN PROP RPM 154.1






ENDUR EHP (/SHAFT), HP





















NO PROP SHAFTS 2.0
TOTAL PROPELLER WT, LTON 16.75
15. PROPELLER MODULE DETAIL CHARACTERISTICS
PROP ID IND CR 0.7 5EAR
NO PROP SHAFTS 2.
PROP DIA, FT 14.94
NO BLADES 5.
PITCH RATIO 1.28
EXPAND AREA RATIO 0.750
THRUST DED COEF 0.076
TAYLOR WAKE FRAC 0.076
HULL EFFICIENCY 1.000
REL ROTATE EFF 1.000
r*r^wn t t t r\u c
CHARACTERISTICS MAXIMUM SUSTAINED ENDURANCE
SPEED, KT 30.28 28.84 20.00
RPM 164.1 154.1 105.9
THRUST/SHAFT, LBF 201274. 168150. 76494.
EHP/SHAFT, HP 17283. 13749. 4338.
TORQUE /SHAFT, FT-LBF 702323. 557579. 175797.
SHP/SHAFT, HP 21950. 17426. 5494.
ADVANCE COEF (J) 1.156 1.172 1.183
THRUST COEF (KT) 0.317 0.300 0.289
TORQUE COEF (10KQ) 0.740 0.710 0.690
OPEN WATER EFFY 0.787 0.789 0.790
PC 0.787 0.789 0.790
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16. PROPELLER CAVITATION CHARACTERISTICS
MAX SPEED OF ADV, KT 27.98
MAX THRUST, LBF 201274.
MAX PROP RPM 164.1
PROP DIA, FT 14.94
HUB DEPTH, FT 15.84
STD CAV NO 1.41
LOCAL CAV NO ( . 7R) 0.30
MEAN THRUST LOADING COEF 0.18
EXPAND AREA RATIO 0.750
MIN EAR REQUIRED 0.824
BACK CAV ALLOWED, PERCENT 10.0
THRUST LOADING EXCEEDS BURRILL'S CRITERIA
PRINTED REPORT NO. 4 - PROPELLER ARRANGEMENT
PROP DIA, FT 14.94
FULL LOAD DRAFT, FT 19.07
HUB DEPTH FROM DWL, FT 15.84
LONG LOC FROM AP, FT 34.41
HUB POS FROM CL, FT 11.20
TIP CLR FROM BL, FT -4.24
TIP CLR FROM MAX HB, FT 14.23
TIP CLR FROM HULL BOT, FT 3.72
TOTAL PROPELLER WT, LTON 16.75
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17. MACHINERY MODULE WARMINGS
** WARNING - MACHINERY MODULE ** (W-SEPSSGEN2SMALL-MHYMSG)
GENERATING CAPACITY OF SEPARATE SHIP-SERVICE GENERATORS IS INADEQUATE
TO MEET REQUIRED LOAD AT ONE OR MORE CONDITIONS. INCREASE EITHER
NUMBER OF INSTALLED GENERATORS (SS ARR NO ARRAY), NUMBER OF OPERATING
GENERATORS (SEP SS GEN OP ARRAY), OR INCREASE GENERATOR RATING (SEP SS
GEN KW)
.
SEP SS GEN KW (AVAIL) 3000.0
SEP SS GEN KW REQ 3663.7
18. MACHINERY MODULE SUMMARY
TRANS TYPE IND ELECT MAX SPEED, KT 30.28
ELECT PRPLN TYPE IND ACC-AC SUSTN SPEED IND CALC
SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND POD SUSTN SPEED, , KT 28.84
NO PROP SHAFTS 2. ENDUR SPEED IND GIVEN
ENDUR CONFIG IND NO TS ENDUR SPEED,
,
KT 20.00
SEC ENG USAGE IND DESIGN MODE IND ENDURANCE
MAX MARG ELECT LOAD, KW 4706. ENDURANCE, NM 8000.
AVG 24 HR ELECT LOAD, KW 2343. USABLE FUEL WT, LTON 1052.7
SWBS 200 GROUP WT, LTON 393.3
SWBS 300 GROUP WT, LTON 263.4
NO NO ONLINE NO ONLINE
ARRANGEMENT OR SS GEN TYPE INSTALLED MAX+SUSTN ENDURANCE
ELECT PG ARR 1 IND M-CG-PG 2 2 2
ELECT PG ARR 2 IND M-CG-PG
ELECT DL ARR IND MTR-E-E 2 2 2









ENG SELECT IND GIVEN GIVEN
ENG MODEL IND GE--LM1600-VAN; DDA-501-K34
ENG TYPE IND RGT GT
ENG SIZE IND GIVEN GIVEN
NO INSTALLED 2 1
ENG PWR AVAIL, HP 26400. 4600.
ENG RPM 3600.0 14300.0
ENG SFC, LBM/HP-HR 0.328 .473
ENG LOAD FRAC 1.000 .920
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2 MAIN ENGINE (BARE)
2 MAIN ENGINE ENCLOSURE MODULE
2 MAIN ENGINE INTERCOOLER
SEC ENGINE (BARE)





EPIC REV PINION GEAR (02)
FRANCO TOSI REV GEAR (03)
VSCF COMB/STEP-UP GEAR (04)
RACER REDUCTION GEAR (05)
2 SPD SOLAR EPIC GEAR (06)
OFFSET GEAR (07)
OFFSET COMB (2-1) GEAR (08)
OFFSET COMB (3-2) GEAR (09)
2 CR EPIC GEAR (10)
Z DRIVE SPIRAL BVL GEAR (11)
PLANETARY REDUCTION GEAR (12)
CR BI-COUPLED EPIC GEAR (13)
STAR EPIC REV GEAR (14)
2 STAR EPIC REDUCTION GEAR (15)





6.2 3.74 5.85 5.85
1.3 2.27 3.17 3.17
1.1 1.82 7.18 2.04
11.7 10.50 6.13 6.13
9.3 8.63 6.13 6.13
7.8 5.16 4.23 4.23
ELECTRIC PLANT
1 SS ENGINE (BARE)
1 SS ENGINE ENCLOSURE MODULE
1 SS REDUCTION GEAR (17)
1 SEPARATE SS GENERATOR
2 VSCF SS GENERATOR
2 VSCF SS CYCLOCONVERTER
.6 7.50 2.80 2.60
5.6 16.76 6.85 8.56
2.5 4.17 4.05 5.96
9.8 9.71 3.60 5.10
3.6 4.96 2.50 2.50
4.1
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ENG PWR AVAIL, HP
ENG RPM
ENG MASS FL, LBM/SEC
ENG EXH TEMP, DEGF
ENG SFC EON IND
ENG SFC, LBM/HP-HR




















ENG MASS FL, LBM/SEC













ENG PWR, HP 21655.
ENG RPM 3379.6
ENG MASS FL, LBM/SEC 108.5
ENG EXH TEMP, DEGF 617.3





ENG ENDUR RPM IND CALC
NO OPERATING 2
ENG PWR, HP 8498.
ENG RPM 3600.0
ENG MASS FL, LBM/SEC 75.7
ENG EXH TEMP, DEGF 505.5




NOTE - ENGINE OPERATING DATA ARE BASED ON USE OF DFM FUEL.
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CR BI-COUPLED EPIC GEAR (13)
1ST STAGE REDUCTION GEARS
OFFSET GEAR (07)
OFFSET COMB (2-1) GEAR (08)
OFFSET COMB (3-2) GEAR (09)
2 STAR EPIC REDUCTION GEAR (15)
2ND STAGE REDUCTION GEARS
2 CR EPIC GEAR (10)
PLANETARY REDUCTION GEAR (12)
SPECIAL GEARS
EPIC REV PINION GEAR (02)
FRANCO TOSI REV GEAR (03)
VSCF COMB/STEP-UP GEAR (04)
RACER REDUCTION GEAR (05)
2 SPD SOLAR EPIC GEAR (06)
Z DRIVE SPIRAL BVL GEAR (11)
STAR EPIC REV GEAR (14)
2 COMBINING STEP-UP GEAR (16)
1 SS REDUCTION GEAR (17)






GEAR FACE WIDTH, FT
PINION GEAR DIA, FT
REDUCTION GEAR DIA,
SUN GEAR DIA, FT
PLANET GEAR DIA, FT
RING GEAR DIA, FT
RING GEAR THK, FT
NO PLANETS
FT
1.3 2.27 3.17 3.17
6.2 3.74 5.85 5.85
1.1 1.82 7.18 2.04
















22. MACHINERY MODULE - ELECTRIC PROPULSION AND VSCF EQUIPMENT
TRANS TYPE IND-ELECT
ELECT PRPLN TYPE IND-ACC-AC
SWITCHGEAR TYPE IND-ADV
TRANS LINE NODE PT IND-CALC
ELECT PRPLN RATING IND-CALC
TRANS LINE NODE PT X, FT 451.77
TRANS LINE NODE PT Y, FT 14.54




INSTALLED NUMBER 2 2 2
TYPE AC AC AC
FREQUENCY CONTROL YES
DRIVE GEARED GEARED
ROTOR COOLING LIQUID LIQUID LIQUID
ROTOR TIP SPEED, FT/MIN 28500. 28500. 24500.
STATOR COOLING LIQUID LIQUID LIQUID
ARM ELECT LOAD, AMP/ IN 2400. 2400. 2000.
POWER RATING, MW 24.80 18.64 3.00
ROTATIONAL SPEED, RPM 3600. 3600. 6000.
NUMBER OF POLES 4. 4. 12.
LENGTH, FT 10.5 8.6 5.0
WIDTH, FT 6.1 6.1 2.5
HEIGHT, FT 6.1 6.1 2.5
WEIGHT, LTON 11.7 9.3 3.6








DEIONIZED COOL WATER SYS 13.4
PRPLN TRANS LINE 22.8
RECTIFIERS .0
HELIUM REFRIGERATION SYS .0
VSCF CYCLOCONVERTERS 8.2
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23. MACHINERY MODULE - SHIP SERVICE GENERATORS
SS SYS TYPE IND-PD
GEN SIZE IND-GIVEN
ELECT LOAD DES MARGIN FAC 0.050
ELECT LOAD SL MARGIN FAC 0.050
ELECT LOAD IMBAL FAC 0.900
MAX MARG ELECT LOAD, KW 4706.1
MAX STANDBY LOAD, KW 3297.3














































































24. MACHINERY MODULE - INTAKE DUCTS
INLET TYPE IND-PLENUM
DUCT SILENCING IND-BOTH
GT ENG ENCL IND-84 DBA
MAIN ENG
ENG TYPE RGT
INLET DUCT XSECT AREA,FT2 86.1
INLET DUCT XSECT LTH, FT 9.46















GT BLEED AIR SUPPLY
MAIN ENG SEC ENG











GT BLEED AIR SUPPLY
MAIN ENG SEC ENG






NOTE - NUMERIC DATA PRESENTED ABOVE ARE ON A PER ENGINE BASIS,
TRUNK AREA AND VOLUME REQUIREMENTS
AREA,FT2 VOLUME, FT3
ENGINE CATEGORY HULL DKHS HULL DKHS
MAIN ENGINES 209.2 418.5 1890. 4276.
SECONDARY ENGINES 0.0 0.0 0. 0,
SHIP-SERVICE ENGINES 71.7 107.5 685. 1083.
TOTALS 280.9 526.0 2575. 5359.
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25. MACHINERY MODULE - EXHAUST DUCTS
EXHAUST IR SUPPRESS IND-PRESENT
DUCT SILENCING IND-BOTH
GT ENG ENCL IND-84 DBA
EXHAUST STACK TEMP, DEGF
EDUCTOR DESIGN FAC
ENG TYPE
ENG EXH TEMP, DEG
ENG MASS FL, LBM/SEC
EXH DUCT GAS TEMP, DEG
EXH DUCT GAS DEN, LBM/FT3
EXH DUCT MASS FL, LBM/SEC
EXH DUCT AREA, FT2
350.0
1.000













EXH DUCT (TO BOILER/REG)
EXH BOILER (RACER)
EXH REGENERATOR 18.1 30 52
EXH DUCT (TO STACK) 4.9 50 57
EXH SILENCER 6.0 51 06
EXH STACK 1.7 72 16
EXH SPRAY RING .6 51. 24
EXH EDUCTOR 3.2 71. 88
MMR2
MAIN ENG
WT , LTON VCG , FT
SEC ENG
WT,LTON VCG, FT
EXH DUCT (TO BOILER/REG)
EXH BOILER (RACER)
EXH REGENERATOR 18.1 30 52
EXH DUCT (TO STACK) 4.6 49 47
EXH SILENCER 6.0 51 06
EXH STACK 1.7 69 97
EXH SPRAY RING .6 49 78
EXH EDUCTOR 3.2 69 69
NOTE - NUMERIC DATA PRESENTED ABOVE ARE ON A PER ENGINE BASIS.
TRUNK AREA AND VOLUME REQUIREMENTS
AREA,FT2 VOLUME, FT3
ENGINE CATEGORY HULL DKHS HULL DKHS
MAIN ENGINES 353.9 483.1 3196. 4937.
SECONDARY ENGINES 0.0 0.0 0. 0.
SHIP-SERVICE ENGINES 133.4 200.1 1275. 2015.
TOTALS 487.3 683.2 4471. 6952.
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26. MACHINERY MODULE DATA FOR PROPELLERS AND SHAFTS
SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND-POD
SHAFT SYS SIZE IND-CALC
PROP TYPE IND-CR
FWD PROP DIA, FT
AFT PROP DIA, FT
HUB DIA, FT
FWD PROP BLADE WT, LTON
AFT PROP BLADE WT, LTON
FWD PROP HUB WT, LTON
AFT PROP HUB WT, LTON
INR BEND STRESS CON FAC
OTR BEND STRESS CON FAC
INR OVRHG PROP MOM ARM
OTR OVRHG PROP MOM ARM
CR SHAFT TORQUE RATIO
CR SHAFT CLEAR RATIO
EQUIV FP PROP WT, LTON







































































27. MACHINERY MODULE DATA FOR STRUTS, PODS, AND RUDDERS
SHAFT SUPPORT TYPE IND-POD
SHAFT SYS SIZE IND-CALC
PROP DIA, FT 14.94
NO STRUTS PER SHAFT
NO SHAFTS 2

























RUDDER WT (PER), LTON









28. MACHINERY MODULE - ELECTRIC LOADS






OTHER PAYLOAD (60 HZ)





(60 HZ) 130.4 152.8 130.4





















MAX MARG ELECT LOAD

































100 PCT POWER TRANS EFF
25 PCT POWER TRANS EFF
SHIP SPEED, KT
PROP RPM






CP PROP TRANS EFFY MULT
PROPUL PWR (/SHAFT), HP


















30. MACHINERY MODULE -HULL STRUCTURE AND MISCELLANEOUS WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT
160 SPECIAL STRUCTURES
161 CASTINGS, FORGINGS, AND WELDMENTS
162 STACKS AND MASTS
180 FOUNDATIONS
182 PROPULSION PLANT FOUNDATIONS
183 ELECTRIC PLANT FOUNDATIONS
WT,LTON LCG,FT VCG,FT
74.1 430.80 11 .21
3.3 325.55 71 .07
134.1 407.06 11 .30
25.4 239.09 23 .03
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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31. MACHINERY MOUDLE — PROPULSION PLANT WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT WT,LTON LCG,FT VCG,FT
)0 PROPULSION PLANT
210 ENERGY GENERATING SYSTEM (NUCLEAR)
220 ENERGY GENERATING SYSTEM (NON-NUCLEAR)
230 PROPULSION UNITS
233 PROPULSION INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES
234 PROPULSION GAS TURBINES
235 ELECTRIC PROPULSION
240 TRANSMISSION AND PROPULSOR SYSTEMS
241 PROPULSION REDUCTION GEARS
242 PROPULSION CLUTCHES AND COUPLINGS
243 PROPULSION SHAFTING
244 PROPULSION SHAFT BEARINGS
245 PROPULSORS
250 PRPLN SUPPORT SYS (EXCEPT FUEL+LUBE OIL)
251 COMBUSTION AIR SYSTEM
252 PROPULSION CONTROL SYSTEM
256 CIRCULATING AND COOLING SEA WATER SYSTEM
259 UPTAKES (INNER CASING)
260 PRPLN SUPPORT SYS (FUEL+LUBE OIL)
261 FUEL SERVICE SYSTEM
262 MAIN PROPULSION LUBE OIL SYSTEM
264 LUBE OIL FILL, TRANSFER, AND PURIF
290 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS
298 OPERATING FLUIDS


























* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
32. MACHINERY MODULE — ELECTRIC PLANT WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT WT,LTON LCG,FT VCG,FT
300 ELECTRIC PLANT
310 ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
311 SHIP SERVICE POWER GENERATION
313 BATTERIES AND SERVICE FACILITIES
314 POWER CONVERSION EQUIPMENT
320 POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
321 SHIP SERVICE POWER CABLE




340 POWER GENERATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
342 DIESEL SUPPORT SYSTEMS
343 TURBINE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
390 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS
398 OPERATING FLUIDS


















* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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33. MACHINERY MODULE — MAIN 6 AUX MACHINERY ROOMS
NO MAIN MACHINERY ROOMS
NO AUX MACHINERY ROOMS
NO OTHER MACHINERY ROOMS
BULKHEAD LOCATIONS
MR MR —FWD BHD- --AFT BHD-
NO ID BHD NO X, FT X/LBP BHD NO X, FT X/LBP
1 AMR1 4. 151.92 0.263 5. 169.25 0.293
2 MMR1 6. 189.47 0.328 7. 209.69 0.363
3 MMR2 11. 441.90 0.765 12. 462.12 0.800
4 AMR2 12. 462.12 0.800 13. 491.00 0.850
DIMENSIONS
MR MR LENGTH, FT WIDTH, FT HEIGHT, FT
NO ID AVAIL REQ AVAIL REQ AVAIL REQ
1 AMR1 17.33 13.85 51.74 46.56 26.73 21.03
2 MMR1 20.22 17.91 60.78 40.57 35.75 26.76
3 MMR2 20.22 17.91 60.31 40.57 34.89 26.76
4 AMR2 28.88 0.00 52.93 0.00 25.21 0.00
MR MR ROTATION







34. MACHINERY MODULE — MACHINERY ARRANGEMENTS
CLEARANCES (MACHINERY TO MACHINERY)
ENG TO ENG CLR, FT .80
ENG TO GEAR CLR, FT 1.75
OR ENG TO GEN CLR
OR GEAR TO GEN CLR
MTR TO GEAR CLR, FT 1.00
PRPLN ARR TO SS ARR CLR, FT 6.00
AISLE WIDTH CLR, FT 2.80
PORT/CL TB TO GEAR CLR, FT .00
STBD TB TO GEAR CLR, FT .00
SEPARATIONS (BETWEEN HULL AND MACHINERY)
LONG (TO BHD), FT 3.50
TRANS (TO SIDE SHELL), FT 1.00
VERT (TO HULL BOT), FT 1.00









ELECT PG ARR 1 IND
ELECT PG ARR 2 IND







COMPONENT MR ID X
—CG LOC, FT—
Y Z
MAIN ENG MMR1 199..33 -7.91 21.,56
MAIN ENG MMR2 451..77 -7.91 21..56
SS ENG AMR1 158..85 -5.47 17..25
PRPLN MTR 566..04 -11.20 4. 52
PRPLN MTR 566,.04 11.20 4..52
SHAFTING
END POINT LOC, FT
SHAFT TYPE X Y Z SHAFT ANGLE, DEG
PORT SHAFT 549.58 -11.20 3.59 -3.25
STBD SHAFT 549.58 11.20 3.59 -3.25
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35. MACHINERY MODULE — MACHINERY SPACE REQUIREMENTS





PROPULSION REDUCTION GEARS AND GENERATORS
DRIVELINE MACHINERY
REDUCTION AND BEVEL GEARS WITH Z-DRIVE
ELECTRIC PROPULSION MOTORS AND GEARS
REMOTELY-LOCATED THRUST BEARINGS
PROPELLER SHAFT
ELECTRIC PROPULSION MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT
CONTROLS
BRAKING RESISTORS
MOTOR AND GENERATOR EXCITERS
SWITCHGEAR
POWER CONVERTERS




PROPULSION LOCAL CONTROL CONSOLES




ENGINE LUBE OIL CONDITIONERS
SEAWATER COOLING PUMPS
SWBS GROUP 300
ELECTRIC PLANT POWER GENERATION
ELECTRIC PLANT ENGINES






























































3.4X AUXILIARY MACHINERY DELTA
3.511 SHIP SERVICE POWER GENERATION
4.132 INTERNAL COMB ENG COMB AIR
4.133 INTERNAL COMB ENG EXHAUST
4.142 GAS TURBINE ENG COMB AIR
4.143 GAS TURBINE ENG EXHAUST
NOTE: * DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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36. MACHINERY MODULE — SURFACE SHIP ENDURANCE CALCULATION FORM
DESIGN MODE IND-ENDURANCE
ENDUR DISP IND-FULL LOAD
ENDUR DEF IND-USN
SHIP FUEL TYPE IND-DFM
ENG ENDUR RPM IND-CALC
SHIP FUEL LHV, BTU/LBM 18360.
DFM FUEL LHV, BTU/LBM 18360.
1) ENDURANCE REQUIRED, NM 8000.
2) ENDURANCE SPEED, KT 20.00
3) FULL LOAD DISPLACEMENT, LTON 8416.8
3A) AVERAGE ENDURANCE DISPLACEMENT, LTON 8416.8
4) RATED FULL POWER SHP, HP 43899.
5) DESIGN ENDURANCE POWER SHP @ (2)&(3A), HP 10988.
6) AVERAGE ENDURANCE POWER (SHP), HP 12087.
(5) X 1.10
7) RATIO, AVG END SHP/RATED F.P. SHP 0.27534
(6)/(4)
8) AVERAGE ENDURANCE BHP, HP 16996.
(8A)+(8B)
8A) AVERAGE PRPLN ENDURANCE BHP, HP 13646.
(6) /TRANSMISSION EFFICIENCY
8B) SHIP SERV PWR SUPPLIED BY PRPLN ENG, HP 3350.
9) 24 HOUR AVERAGE ELECTRIC LOAD, KW 2343.
9A) 24 HOUR AVERAGE ELECTRIC LOAD PORTION
SUPPLIED BY SS ENG, KW 0.
10) CALCULATED PROPULSION FUEL RATE @(8), LBM/HP-HR 0.318
11) CALC PRPLN FUEL CONSUMPTION, LBM/HR 5398.4
(10)X(8)
12) CALC SS GEN FUEL RATE @ (9A), LBM/KW-HR 0.000
13) CALC SS GEN FUEL CONSUMPTION, LBM/HR 0.0
(12)X(9A)
14) CALC FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR OTHER SERVICES, LBM/HR 0.0
15) TOTAL CALC ALL-PURPOSE FUEL CONSUMPTION, LBM/HR 5398.4
(11)+(13)+14)
16) CALC ALL-PURPOSE FUEL RATE, LBM/HP-HR 0.447
(15)/(6)
17) FUEL RATE CORRECTION FACTOR BASED ON (7) 1.0400
18) SPECIFIED FUEL RATE, LBM/HP-HR 0.464
(16)X(17)
19) AVG ENDURANCE FUEL RATE, LBM/HP-HR 0.488
(18)X1.05
20) ENDURANCE FUEL (BURNABLE), LTON 1052.7
(1)X(6)X(19)/(2)X2240
21) TAILPIPE ALLOWANCE FACTOR 0.95
22) ENDURANCE FUEL LOAD, LTON 1108.1
(20)/(21)
37. MACHINERY MODULE — MACHINERY MARGINS
PROPULSION PLANT
MAIN ENG MAX LOAD FRAC 1.000
SEC ENG MAX LOAD FRAC
TORQUE MARGIN FAC 1.200
ELECTRIC PLANT
SS ENG MAX LOAD FRAC 0.920
ELECT LOAD DES MARGIN FAC 0.050
ELECT LOAD SL MARGIN FAC 0.050
ELECT LOAD IMBAL FAC 0.900
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38. WEIGHT MODULE SUMMARY
WEI G H T LCG VCG RESULTANT ADJ
SWBS GROUP LTON PER CENT FT FT WT-LTON VCG-FT
========= ====== ======== ====== ===== ======= ======
100 HULL STRUCTURE 3402.0 40.4 280.33 27.85 137.3 .56
200 PROP PLANT 393.3 4.7 397.52 19.54
300 ELECT PLANT 263.4 3.1 285.03 28.10
400 COMM + SURVEIL 179.1 2.1 219.51 40.51 75.5 .46
500 AUX SYSTEMS 887.0 10.5 317.71 26.57 29.2 .12
600 OUTFIT + FURN 510.2 6.1 288.83 28.81
700 ARMAMENT 912.0 10.8 259.94 32.77 909.7 3.54
Mil D+B WT MARGIN
D+B KG MARGIN
0.0 288.78
L IGHTSHIP 6546.9 77.8 288.78 28.29 1151.6 4.67
F00 FULL LOADS 1869.9 22.2 304.44 20.34 675.4 2.68
F10 CREW + EFFECTS 20.6 271.50 32.34
F20 MISS REL EXPEN 611.0 254.17 35.56
F30 SHIPS STORES 28.7 311.93 24.26
F40 FUELS + LUBRIC 1179.7 332.07 12.52
F50 FRESH WATER 29.9 6.10
F60 CARGO
M24 FUTURE GROWTH
FULL LOAD WT 8416.8 100.0 292.26 26.53 1827.0 7.35
287
39. WEIGHT MODULE — HULL STRUCTURES WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT
100 HULL STRUCTURES







120 HULL STRUCTURAL BULKHDS
121 LONGIT STRUCTURAL BULKHDS
122 TRANSV STRUCTURAL BULKHDS
123 TRUNKS + ENCLOSURES






135 5TH DECK+DECKS BELOW
136 01 HULL DECK
137 02 HULL DECK
138 03 HULL DECK






145 5TH PLAT+PLATS BELOW
149 FLATS
150 DECK HOUSE STRUCTURE
160 SPECIAL STRUCTURES
161 CASTINGS+FORGINGS+EQUIV WELDMT





167 HULL STRUCTURAL CLOSURES
168 DKHS STRUCTURAL CLOSURES
169 SPECIAL PURPOSE CLOSURES+STRUCT
170 MASTS+KINGPOSTS+SERV PLATFORM
171 MASTS , TOWERS , TETRAPODS
172 KINGPOSTS AND SUPPORT FRAMES
179 SERVICE PLATFORMS
180 FOUNDATIONS
181 HULL STRUCTURE FOUNDATIONS
182 PROPULSION PLANT FOUNDATIONS
183 ELECTRIC PLANT FOUNDATIONS
184 COMMAND+SURVEILLANCE FDNS
185 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS FOUNDATIONS
186 OUTFIT+FURNISHINGS FOUNDATIONS
187 ARMAMENT FOUNDATIONS
190 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS
191 BALLAST+BOUYANCY UNITS
197 WELDING AND RIVETS










































* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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40. WEIGHT MODULE — PROPULSION PLANT WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT WT-LTON VCG-FT
200 PROPULSION PLANT 393.3 19.54
210 ENERGY GEN SYS (NUCLEAR)
220 ENERGY GENERATING SYSTEM (NONNUC)
221 PROPULSION BOILERS
222 GAS GENERATORS
223 MAIN PROPULSION BATTERIES
224 MAIN PROPULSION FUEL CELLS






236 SELF-CONTAINED PROPULSION SYS
237 AUXILIARY PROPULSION DEVICES
240 TRANSMISSION+PROPULSOR SYSTEMS
241 REDUCTION GEARS




246 PROPULSOR SHROUDS AND DUCTS
247 WATER JET PROPULSORS
250 SUPPORT SYSTEMS
251 COMBUSTION AIR SYSTEM
252 PROPULSION CONTROL SYSTEM
253 MAIN STEAM PIPING SYSTEM
254 CONDENSERS AND AIR EJECTORS
255 FEED AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM
256 CIRC + COOL SEA WATER SYSTEM 10.1 15.52
258 H.P. STEAM DRAIN SYSTEM
2 59 UPTAKES (INNER CASING)
260 PROPUL SUP SYS- FUEL, LUBE OIL
261 FUEL SERVICE SYSTEM
262 MAIN PROPULSION LUBE OIL SYSTEM
264 LUBE OIL HANDLING
290 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS
298 OPERATING FLUIDS
299 REPAIR PARTS + TOOLS


























300 ELECTRIC PLANT, GENERAL
310 ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
311 SHIP SERVICE POWER GENERATION
312 EMERGENCY GENERATORS
313 BATTERIES+SERVICE FACILITIES
314 POWER CONVERSION EQUIPMENT
320 POWER DISTRIBUTION SYS
321 SHIP SERVICE POWER CABLE
322 EMERGENCY POWER CABLE SYS





340 POWER GENERATION SUPPORT SYS
341 SSTG LUBE OIL
342 DIESEL SUPPORT SYS
343 TURBINE SUPPORT SYS
390 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYS
398 ELECTRIC PLANT OP FLUIDS
399 REPAIR PARTS+SPECIAL TOOLS
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
VCG-FT



















42. WEIGHT MODULE — COMMAND fc SURVEILLANCE WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT WT-LTON VCG-FT
400 COMMAND+SURVEILLANCE 179.1 40.51
* 410 COMMAND+CONTROL SYS 3.5 34.83
411 DATA DISPLAY GROUP
412 DATA PROCESSING GROUP
413 DIGITAL DATA SWITCHBOARDS
414 INTERFACE EQUIPMENT
415 DIGITAL DATA COMMUNICATIONS
417 COMMAND+CONTROL ANALOG SWBD
420 NAVIGATION SYS
430 INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS
* 440 EXTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS
441 RADIO SYSTEMS
442 UNDERWATER SYSTEMS
443 VISUAL + AUDIBLE SYSTEMS
444 TELEMETRY SYSTEMS
445 TTY + FACSIMILE SYSTEMS
446 SECURITY EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
450 SURF SURV SYS (RADAR) 8.0 74.12
* 451 SURFACE SEARCH RADAR .1 66.36
* 452 AIR SEARCH RADAR (2D) 5.6 77.31
453 AIR SEARCH RADAR (3D)
454 AIRCRAFT CONTROL APPROACH RADAR
* 455 IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS (IFF) 2.3 66.96
456 MULTIPLE MODE RADAR
459 SPACE VEHICLE ELECTRONIC TRACKG
460 UNDERWATER SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
461 ACTIVE SONAR
462 PASSIVE SONAR
463 MULTIPLE MODE SONAR
464 CLASSIFICATION SONAR
465 BATHYTHERMOGRAPH
470 COUNTERMEASURES 42.6 31.29
471 ACTIVE + ACTIVE/PASSIVE ECM
472 PASSIVE ECM
473 TORPEDO DECOYS
* 474 DECOYS (OTHER) 1.6 70.31
475 DEGAUSSING 41.0 29.74
476 MINE COUNTERMEASURES
480 FIRE CONTROL SYS 29.9 56.88
* 481 GUN FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS 1.0 62.81
* 482 MISSILE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS 28.9 56.68
483 UNDERWATER FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS
484 INTEGRATED FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS
489 WEAPON SYSTEM SWITCHBOARDS
490 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYS 4.9 29.74
491 ELCTRNC TEST, CHKOUT,MONITR EQPT
492 FLIGHT CNTRL+INSTR LANDING SYS
493 NON-COMBAT DATA PROCESSING SYS
494 METEOROLOGICAL SYSTEMS
495 SPEC PURPOSE INTELLIGENCE SYS
498 C+S OPERATING FLUIDS
499 REPAIR PARTS+SPECIAL TOOLS 4.9 29.74
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
291
43. WEIGHT MODULE — AUXILIARY SYSTEMS WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT
500 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS, GENERAL
510 CLIMATE CONTROL
511 COMPARTMENT HEATING SYSTEM
512 VENTILATION SYSTEM
513 MACHINERY SPACE VENT SYSTEM
514 AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM
516 REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
517 AUX BOILERS+OTHER HEAT SOURCES





































570 UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SYSTEMS
571 REPLENISHMENT-AT-SEA SYSTEMS
572 SHIP STORES+EQUIP HANDLING SYS
573 CARGO HANDLING SYSTEMS
574 VERTICAL REPLENISHMENT SYSTEMS
580 MECHANICAL HANDLING SYSTEMS
581 ANCHOR HANDLING*STOWAGE SYSTEMS
582 MOOR ING+TOWING SYSTEMS
583 BOATS, HANDLING+STOWAGE SYSTEMS
584 MECH OPER DOOR , GATE , RAMP , TTBL SYS
585 ELEVATING + RETRACTING GEAR
586 AIRCRAFT RECOVERY SUPPORT SYS
587 AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SUPPORT SYSTEM
588 AIRCRAFT HANDLING, SERVICING, STOWAGE





FIREMAIN ACTUATED SERV, OTHER
PLUMBING DRAINAGE





AUX STEAM + DRAINS IN MACH BOX
AUX STEAM + DRAINS OUT MACH BOX



































































43. WEIGHT MODULE (continued)
589 MISC MECH HANDLING SYSTEMS
590 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 77.4 21.96
591 SCIENTIFIC+OCEAN ENGINEERING SYS
592 SWIMMER+DIVER SUPPORT+PROT SYS
593 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CNTL SYS 5.4 9.10
594 SUBMARINE RESC+SALVG+SURVIVE SYS
595 TOW, LAUNCH, HANDLE UNDERWATER SYS
596 HANDLING SYS FOR DIVER+SUBMR VEH
597 SALVAGE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
598 AUX SYSTEMS OPERATING FLUIDS 67.4 22.92
599 AUX SYSTEMS REPAIR PARTS+TOOLS 4.5 22.98
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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642 NON-COMM OFFICER B+M
643 ENLISTED PERSONNEL B+M
644 SANITARY SPACES+FIXTURES







656 TRASH DISPOSAL SPACES
660 WORKING SPACES
661 OFFICES
662 MACH CNTL CENTER FURNISHING
663 ELECT CNTL CENTER FURNISHING
664 DAMAGE CNTL STATIONS
665 WORKSHOPS, LABS, TEST AREAS
670 STOWAGE SPACES
671 LOCKERS+SPECIAL STOWAGE
672 STOREROOMS+ ISSUE ROOMS
673 CARGO STOWAGE
690 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS
698 OPERATING FLUIDS


















































45. WEIGHT MODULE — ARMAMENT WEIGHT
SWBS COMPONENT WT-LTON VCG-FT
700 ARMAMENT 912.0 32.77





* 721 LAUNCHING DEVICES





727 MISSILE LAUNCHER CONTROL
728 MISSILE HEAT, COOL, TEMP CNTRL
729 MISSILE MONITOR, TEST, ALINEMENT
730 MINES




741 DEPTH CHARGE LAUNCHING DEVICES
742 DEPTH CHARGE HANDLING





760 SMALL ARMS+PYROTECHNICS 2.3 39.24
761 SMALL ARMS+PYRO LAUNCHING DEV 1.0 39.24
762 SMALL ARMS+PYRO HANDLING
763 SMALL ARMS+PYRO STOWAGE 1.3 39.24
770 CARGO MUNITIONS
772 CARGO MUNITIONS HANDLING
773 CARGO MUNITIONS STOWAGE
* 780 AIRCRAFT RELATED WEAPONS 2.7 50.2 7
782 AIRCRAFT RELATED WEAPONS HANDL
783 AIRCRAFT RELATED WEAPONS STOW
790 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS
792 SPECIAL WEAPONS HANDLING
793 SPECIAL WEAPONS STOWAGE
797 MISC ORDINANCE SPACES
798 ARMAMENT OPERATING FLUIDS
799 ARMAMENT REPAIR PART+TOOLS
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
295
46. WEIGHT MODULE — LOADS WEIGHT (FULL LOAD CONDITION)
SWBS COMPONENT WT-LTON VCG-FT
F00 LOADS 1869 .9 20 34
F10 SHIPS FORCE 20 .6 32 34
Fll OFFICERS 3 .0 32 34
F12 NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 2 .2 32 34
F13 ENLISTED MEN 15 .4 32. 34
F14 MARINES
F15 TROOPS
F16 AIR WING PERSONNEL
F19 OTHER PERSONNEL
F20 MISSION RELATED EXPENDABLES+SYS 611 .0 35. 56
F21 SHIP AMMUNITION 604 .6 35 30
F22 ORD DEL SYS AMMO
F23 ORD DEL SYS (AIRCRAFT) 6 .4 59. 77
F24 ORD REPAIR PARTS (SHIP)
F25 ORD REPAIR PARTS (ORD)
F26 ORD DEL SYS SUPPORT EQUIP
F29 SPECIAL MISSION RELATED SYS
F30 STORES 28 .7 24. 26
F31 PROVISIONS+PERSONNEL STORES 23 .4 23 68
F32 GENERAL STORES 5 .3 26 82
F33 MARINES STORES (SHIPS COMPLEM)
F39 SPECIAL STORES
F40 LIQUIDS, PETROLEUM BASED 1179 7 12 52
F41 DIESEL FUEL MARINE 1108 1 12. 53
F42 JP-5 64 4 13 00
F43 GASOLINE
F44 DISTILLATE FUEL
F45 NAVY STANDARD FUEL OIL (NSFO)
F46 LUBRICATING OIL 7 2 6 33
F49 SPECIAL FUELS AND LUBRICANTS
F50 LIQUIDS, NON-PETRO BASED 29 9 6. 10
F51 SEA WATER
F52 FRESH WATER 29 9 6 10
F53 RESERVE FEED WATER
F54 HYDRAULIC FLUID
F55 SANITARY TANK LIQUID
F56 GAS (NON FUEL TYPE)
F59 MISC LIQUIDS, NON-PETROLEUM
F60 CARGO
F61 CARGO, ORDINANCE + DELIVERY SYS
F62 CARGO, STORES
F63 CARGO, FUELS + LUBRICANTS
F64 CARGO, LIQUIDS, NON-PETROLEUM
F65 CARGO, CRYOGENIC+LIQUEFIED GAS
F66 CARGO, AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SYS
F67 CARGO, GASES
F69 CARGO, MISCELLANEOUS
M24 FUTURE GROWTH MARGIN
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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47. WEIGHT MODULE — WEIGHT AND KG MODIFICATION SUMMARY
ROW P+A NAME
WT ORIGINAL WT CHNG, RESULTNT ORIGINAL KG CHNG, RESULTNT
KEYS WT, LTON LTON WT, LTON KG, FT FT KG, FT
57 STEEL LANDING PAD [ON HULL] SH-60 CAPABLE
WHO 1093.5 10.7 1104.2 20.2 39.2 20.4
25 VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 0.0 21.1 UNKNOWN 34.8
26 VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
21.1 34.8
27 VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
21.1 33.1
28 VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
21.1 33.1
29 VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
21.1 33.8
30 VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
21.1 126.6 33.8 33.9
47 1/4 OF DD 963 CIC COMMAND AND DECISION
W410 0.0 3.5 3.5 UNKNOWN 34.8 34.8
37 DDG51 EXCOMM
W440 0.0 32.4 32.4 UNKNOWN 40.2 40.2
38 SPS-64 SURFACE SEARCH & NAVIGATION RADAR
W451 0.0 0.1 0.1 UNKNOWN 66.4 66.4
39 MK-23 TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM [NSSMS TAS]
W452 0.0 5.6 5.6 UNKNOWN 77.3 77.3
40 MK XII AIMS IFF
W455 0.0 2.3 2.3 UNKNOWN 67.0 67.0
41 SLQ-32(V)3 MK-36 DLS W/4 LAUNCHERS
W474 0.0 1.6 1.6 UNKNOWN 70.3 70.3
49 MK-16 CIWS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W481 0.0 1.0 1.0 UNKNOWN 62.8 62.8
13 VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.0 0.7 UNKNOWN 37.0
14 VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
0.7 37.0
15 VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
0.7 35.3
16 VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
0.7 35.3
17 VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
0.7 36.0
18 VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
0.7 36.0
43 MK-91 NSSMS MFCS
11.2 79.4
44 MK-91 NSSMS MFCS (ADD'L MK76 DIRECTOR)
2.3 79.4
45 TOMAHAWK WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
5.6 37.0
46 TOMAHAWK WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
5.6 28.9 37.0 56.7
31 VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
W529 18.4 3.0 -147.3 34.0
32 VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
3.0 34.0
33 VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
3.0 32.3
34 VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
3.0 32.3
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47. WEIGHT MODULE (continued)
35 VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
3.0 33.0
36 VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
3.0 36.4 33.0 23.8
55 LAMPS III HELO IN-FLIGHT REFUELING SYSTEM [HIFR]
W542 0.0 7.6 7.6 UNKNOWN 28.8 28.8
56 LAMPS III HELO SECURING SYSTEM
W588 0.0 3.6 3.6 UNKNOWN 44.8 44.8
48 2X MK-16 20MM CIWS [VULCAN-PHALANX] + WORKSHOPS
W710 0.0 13.2 13.2 UNKNOWN 69.3 69.3
1 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
W721 0.0 148.0 UNKNOWN 33.0
2 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
148.0 33.0
3 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
148.0 31.3
4 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
148.0 31.3
5 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
148.0 32.0
6 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
148.0 887.8
19 VLS WEAPON HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 0.0 1.0
20 VLS WEAPON HANDLING SYSTEM
1.0
21 VLS WEAPON HANDLING SYSTEM
1.0
22 VLS WEAPON HANDLING SYSTEM
1.0
23 VLS WEAPON HANDLING SYSTEM
1.0
24 VLS WEAPON HANDLING SYSTEM
1.0 6.0
53 LAMPS III HELO REARM + MAGAZINE
W780 0.0 2.7 2.7
7 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
WF21 0.0 99.0 UNKNOWN 35.6
8 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
99.0 35.6
9 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
99.0 33.9
10 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
99.0 33.9
11 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
99.0 34.6
12 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VLASROC
99.0 34.6
42 MK-36 DLS SRBOC CANNISTERS [100 ROUNDS]
2.2 70.3
50 MK-16 20MM CIWS AMMO [16000 ROUNDS]
8.4 604.6 68.3 35.3
52 LAMPS III SH-60B HELICOPTER & HANGER
WF23 0.0 6.4 6.4 UNKNOWN 59.8 59.8
54 LAMPS III AVIATION FUEL [JP-5]

















































STEEL LANDING PAD [ON HULL] SH-60 CAPABL
WHO 10.70 0.00 D20
VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 21.10 0.00 D6.5
VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 21.10 0.00 D6.5
VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 21.10 0.00 D10
VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 21.10 0.00 D10
VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 21.10 0.00 D15
VLS MAGAZINE ARMOR [LEVEL III HY-80]
W164 21.10 0.00 D15










MK-23 TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM [NSSMS T
W452 5.55 0.00 D3
MK XII AIMS IFF
W455 2.33 0.00 MAST
SLQ-32(V)3 MK-36 DLS W/4 LAUNCHERS
W474 1.63 0.00 D3
MK-16 CIWS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W481 1.00 0.00 D3
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.70 0.00 D6.5
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.70 0.00 D6.5
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.70 0.00 D10
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.70 0.00 D10
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.70 0.00 D15
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 0.70 0.00 D15
MK-91 NSSMS MFCS
W482 11.20 0.00 D3
MK-91 NSSMS MFCS (ADD'L MK76 DIRECTOR)
W482 2.30 0.00 D3
TOMAHAWK WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 5.61 0.00 D6.5
TOMAHAWK WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM
W482 5.61 0.00 D6.5
VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
W529 3.00 0.00 D6.5
VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
W529 3.00 0.00 D6.5
VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
W529 3.00 0.00 D10
VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
W529 3.00 0.00 D10
VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM






































VLS MAGAZINE DEWATERING SYSTEM
W529 3.00 0.00 D15 -10 .80 1 .00
55 LAMPS III HELO IN-FLIGHT REFUELING SYSTE
W542 7.60 0.00 D15 -15 .00 1 .00
56 LAMPS III HELO SECURING SYSTEM
W588 3.60 0.00 D20 5 .80 1 .00
48 2X MK-16 20MM CIWS [VULCAN-PHALANX] + WO
W710 13.20 0.00 D3 21 .00 1 .00
1 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 1
W721 147.96 0.00 D6.5 -11 .80 1 .00
2 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 1
W721 147.96 0.00 D6.5 -11 .80 1 .00
3 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 1
W721 147.96 0.00 D10 -11 .80 1 .00
4 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 1
W721 147.96 0.00 D10 -11 .80 1 .00
5 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 1
W721 147.96 0.00 D15 -11 .80 1 .00
6 8X MK41 VLS 61-CELL W/7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 1
W721 147.96 0.00 D15 -11 .80 1 .00
19 VLS WEAPC* 1 HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 1.00 0.00 D6.5 -4 .00 1 .00
20 VLS WEAPOh 1 HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 1.00 0.00 D6.5 -4 .00 1 .00
21 VLS WEAPC* 1 HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 1.00 0.00 D10 -4 00 1 .00
22 VLS WEAPOh 1 HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 1.00 0.00 D10 -4 .00 1 .00
23 VLS WEAPC* 1 HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 1.00 0.00 D15 -4 .00 1 .00
24 VLS WEAPOIn 1 HANDLING SYSTEM
W722 1.00 0.00 D15 -4 .00 1 .00
53 LAMPS III HELO REARM + MAGAZINE
W780 2.72 0.00 D15 6 50 1 .00
7 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VL
WF21 99.00 0.00 D6.5 -9 20 1 .00
8 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VL
WF21 99.00 0.00 D6.5 -9 20 1 .00
9 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VL
WF21 99.00 0.00 D10 -9 20 1 .00
10 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VL
WF21 99.00 0.00 D10 -9 20 1 .00
11 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VL
WF21 99.00 0.00 D15 -9. 20 1 .00
12 MISSILES: 7TMKWK + 45SM2 + 16VLSS + 5VL
WF21 99.00 0.00 D15 -9. 20 1 .00
42 MK-36 DLS SRBOC CANNISTERS [ 100 ROUNDS]
WF21 2.18 0.00 D3 22. 00 1 .00
50 MK-16 20M> 1 CIWS AMMO [16000 ROUNDS
]
WF21 8.39 0.00 D3 20. 00 1 .00
52 LAMPS III SH-60B HELICOPTER & HANGER
WF23 6.40 0.00 D15 16. 00 1 00
54 LAMPS III AVIATION FUEL [JP- 5]
WF42 64.40 0.00 BL 13. 00 1 00
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49. SPACE MODULE — SUMMARY
COLL PROTECT SYS-PARTIAL SONAR DOME-NONE UNIT COMMANDER-NONE
FULL LOAD WT, LTON
TOTAL CREW ACC
HULL AVG DECK HT, FT
MR VOLUME, FT3
8416.8 HAB STANDARD FAC
201. PASSWAY MARGIN FAC
11.17 AC MARGIN FAC































1. MISSION SUPPORT 26.2
2. HUMAN SUPPORT 13780.6 839.5 18.7
3. SHIP SUPPORT 37561.7 3160.5 51.1
4. SHIP MOBILITY SYSTEM 2917.3 1209.2 4.0
5. UNASSIGNED 0.0
TOTAL 73503.8 7295.7 100.0
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* 1.121 SURFACE SURV (RADAR)
1.122 UNDERWATER SURV (SONAR)
1.13 COMMAND +CONTROL





























*1.38 AVIATION FUEL SYS
1.39 AVIATION STORES






1.9 SM ARMS, PYRO+SALU BAT
1.911 SM ARMS (LOCKER)
1.921 PYROTECHNICS (LOCKER)
1.932 SALUTING BAT (MAGAZINE)
1.95 LANDING FORCE EQUIP
TOTAL DKHS



























* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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51. SPACE MODULE — HUMAN SUPPORT AREA
TOTAL
sscs GROUP AREA FT2
2. HUMAN SUPPORT 13780.6
2.1 LIVING 8360.7
2.11 OFFICER LIVING 2501.3
2.111 BERTHING 2230.4
2.1111 SHIP OFFICER 2230.4
2.1115 FLAG OFFICER
2.112 SANITARY 270.9
2.1121 SHIP OFFICER 270.9
2.1125 FLAG OFFICER
2.12 CPO LIVING 841.1
2.121 BERTHING 664.0
2.122 SANITARY 177.0




2.14 GENERAL SANITARY FACILITIES 110.0
2.141 LADIES RETIRING RM 80.0
2.142 BRIDGE WASHROOM+WC 15.0
2.143 DECK WASHROOM+WC 15.0
2.15 SHIP RECREATION FAC 64.3
2.152 MOTION PIC FILM+EQUIP 40.2
2.153 PHYSICAL FITNESS 24.1
2.154 BAND EQUIP RM
2.2 COMMISSARY 3832.2
2.21 FOOD SERVICE 2350.1
2.211 OFFICER (MESS+LOUNGE) 683.0
2.212 CPO (MESS+LOUNGE) 540.8
2.213 CREW (MESS+LOUNGE) 1126.3
2.22 COMMISSARY SERVICE SPACES 1032.5
2.23 FOOD STORAGE+ISSUE 449.5
2.231 CHILL PROVISIONS 164.7
2.232 FROZEN PROVISIONS 59.6
2.233 DRY PROVISIONS 225.2
2.234 ISSUE
2.3 MEDICAL+DENTAL (MEDICAL) 300.0
2.4 GENERAL SERVICES 793.6
2.41 SHIP STORE SPACES 258.1
2.411 SHIP STORE 111.0
2.412 CLOTHING+SM STORES ISSUE 17.8
2.415 SHIP STORE STORES 129.3
2.42 LAUNDRY FACILITIES 387.5
2.43 DRY CLEANING+TAILOR SHOP
2.44 BARBER SERVICE 80.0
2.46 POSTAL SERVICE 56.0
2.47 BRIG
2.48 RELIGIOUS 12.0
2.5 PERSONNEL STORES 170.7
2.51 BAGGAGE 39.3
2.52 WARDROOM STOREROOM 13.0
2.53 CPO STORE ROOM 8.5
2.54 COMMANDING OFFICER STRM 40.0
2.55 FOUL WEATHER GEAR (LOCKER) 30.0
2.57 FOLDING CHAIR STOREROOM 40.0


















52. SPACE MODULE — SHIP SUPPORT AREA
sscs GROUP
3. SHIP SUPPORT
3.1 SHIP CNTL SYS(STEERING+DIVING)
3.2 DAMAGE CNTL













3.4X AUXILIARY MACHINERY DELTA
3.5 ELECTRICAL
3.51 POWER GENERATION







3.611 AUX (FILTER CLEANING)
3.612 ELECTRICAL
3.613 MECH (GENERAL WK SHOP)
3.614 TEST LAB
3.615 NUCLEONICS
3.62 OPERATIONS DEPT (ELECT SHOP)
3.63 WEAPONS DEPT (ORDNANCE SHOP)
3.64 DECK DEPT (CARPENTER SHOP)
3.7 STOREROOMS+ ISSUE RMS
3.71 SUPPY DEPT
3.711 HAZARDOUS MATL (FLAM LIQ)
3.712 SPECIAL CLOTHING
3.713 GEN USE CONSUM+REPAIR PART
3.714 HANDLING (STORE CONV TRUNK)
3.72 ENGINEERING DEPT
3.73 OPERATIONS DEPT
3.74 DECK DEPT (BOATSWAIN STORES)
3.8 ACCESS (INTERIOR-NORMAL)
TOTAL DKHS











































* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS
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53. SPACE MODULE — SHIP MOBILITY SYSTEM AREA
TOTAL DKHS
sscs GROUP AREA FT2 AREA FT2
4. SHIP MOBILITY SYSTEM 2917.3 1209.2











4.14 GAS TURBINE 2917.3 1209.2
4.142 COMBUSTION AIR 806.9 526.0
4.143 EXHAUST 1170.4 683.2
4.144 CONTROL 940.0
4.3 FUEL-NUCLEAR (CORE REMOVAL)
* DENOTES INCLUSION OF PAYLOAD OR ADJUSTMENTS






WASTE OIL WATER, FT3
CLEAN BALLAST, FT3
TANKAGE MARGIN, FT3









55. COST ANALYSIS — WARNINGS
** WARNING - COST ANALYSIS **






















NOTE-THIS INTERIM MODULE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR DECISIONS
REGARDING SHIP DESIGN TRADEOFFS AND COMPARATIVE
EVALUATIONS. REQUESTS FOR ESTIMATES OF SHIP COSTS
FOR BUDGETARY PURPOSES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO NAVSEA.
56. COST ANALYSIS — SUMMARY
YEAR $ 1992.
INFLATION ESCALATION FAC 2.149
LEARNING RATE 0.970
FUEL COST, $/GAL 2.579
PAYLOAD FUEL RATE, LTON/HR 0.33
SHIP FUEL RATE, LTON/HR 2.63















AVG ACQUISITION COST/SHIP(10 SHIPS)
LIFE CYCLE COST/SHIP (30 YEARS)
TOTAL LIFE CYCLE COST (30 YEARS)
DISCOUNTED LIFE CYCLE COST/SHIP
DISCOUNTED TOTAL LIFE CYCLE COST
COSTS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)









**DISCOUNTED AT 10 PERCENT
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UNITS INPUTS FACTORS $K $K
===============•== = = = = = ===================
LTON 3402.0 1.00 38870. 36537.
HP 52800.0 2.35 61350. 57669.
LTON 263.4 1.00 25727. 24183.
LTON 179.1 3.15 18063. 16979.
LTON 887.0 1.53 62919. 59144.
LTON 510.2 1.00 28116. 26429.
LTON 912.0 1.00 15033. 14131.
LTON 0.0 0. 0.
26.06 392992. 43425.
4.25 62624. 58866.
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COST 705694. 337364.
CONSTRUCTION COST 705694. 337364.
PROFIT (15.0 PERCENT OF CONSTRUCTION COST) 105854. 50605.
PRICE 811548. 387969.
CHANGE ORDERS (12/8 PERCENT OF PRICE) 97386. 31037.
NAVSEA SUPPORT (2. 5 PERCENT OF PRICE) 20289. 9699.
POST DELIVERY CHARGES ( 5 PERCENT OF PRICE) 40577. 19398.
OUTFITTING (4 PERCENT OF PRICE) 32462. 15519.
H/M/E + GROWTH (10 PERCENT OF PRICE) 81155. 38797.
TOTAL SHIP COST 1083417. 502419.
ESTIMATED PAYLOAD COST 1319714. 1158490.
SHIP PLUS PAYLOAD COST
ADJUSTED FIRST UNIT SHIP COST, $K 534488.6
COMBAT SYSTEM WEIGHT, LTON 1798.3
PROPULSION SYSTEM WEIGHT, LTON 393.3
ADJUSTED FIRST UNIT SHIP COST EQUALS
FOLLOW SHIP TOTAL COST DIVIDED BY 0.940
2403131 1660909,
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58. COST ANALYSIS — LIFE CYCLE COSTS
IOC YEAR
R+D PROGRAM LENGTH, YRS
NUMBER OF SHIPS ACQUIRED
SERVICE LIFE, YRS
NO OF OFFICERS/SHIP
NO OF ENLISTED MEN/SHIP
2010. PAYLOAD FUEL RATE, LTON/HR 0.33
5. SHIP FUEL RATE, LTON/HR 2.63
10. TECH ADV COST, $M 0.00
30. ADDL FACILITY COST, $M 0.00
17. DEFERRED MMHRS REQ, HR/WK 0.
165. PRODUCTION RATE, SHIPS/YR 2.00
30 - YEAR SYSTEMS COST
(MILLIONS OF YEAR 1992 DOLLARS)
SHIP PAYLOAD OTHER TOTAL SYSTEM TOTAL
COST ELEMENT NONREC NONREC NONREC NONREC RECUR SYSTEM
R+D TOTAL 1814. 266. 0. 2080. 2080.
DESIGN+DEVELMNT 440. 0. 440. 440.
TEST+EVALUATION 1374. 266. 0. 1640. 1640.
INVESTMENT 5217. 15622. 17. 20856. 20856.
EQUIPMENT 5072. 14095. 19167. 19167.
PRIME 4831. 11746. 16577. 16577.
SUPPORT 242. 2349. 2591. 2591.
FACILITIES 0. 0. 0.
INITIAL SPARES 145. 1527. 1672. 1672.






REPL SPARES 10867. 10867.
MAJOR SUPPORT 2091. 2091.
ASSOCIATED SYS 61. 61.
LESS RESIDUAL VALUE 610.
LIFE CYCLE TOTAL SYSTEMS COST 46432.
DISCOUNTED AT 10 PERCENT 3424.
COST PER VEHICLE-UNDISCOUNTED 4643.
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